The Republic of Georgia has a very interesting history, and its relationship with NATO is no exception. Until 1991, it was the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and an integral part of the Soviet Union. Today, it has turned against its former rulers and patrons in Moscow, embraced its former enemies in the West and sought to become a part of the alliance that was originally formed to oppose the Soviet Union. Whether Georgia is ready for the obligations of NATO membership and whether it is in the interest of the alliance to guarantee Georgian security remain open questions.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization promised in April 2008 that Georgia would become a member of the alliance at some indeterminate point in the future, but did not give it a Membership Action Plan, which would have been a more specific plan and timetable for NATO membership. A Membership Action Plan was opposed because of Georgia’s lack of democratic reform (Civil Georgia, 2008). However, Georgia has two deeper problems that could increase risk to NATO if it were allowed to join: first, its inability to control large portions of its territory and a high probability of conflict with Russia, as illustrated by the 2008 war.
LaPalombara explained in his book Politics within Nations that one of the crises of nation-building is penetration:
"Laws that are not enforced (assuming they are really intended to be); policies that are not implemented; geographic areas that remain outside the orbit of central national control –all represent inadequate penetration. The problem, and potential crisis of penetration, therefore, raises questions about the fundamental organizational capabilities of the central government" (1974, p. 50-52).
Penetration is a huge problem for Georgia. There are two separatist regions where Georgia has never been able to assert its control: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Historical context proves critical in understanding why.
Historical Context
The Ossetians have always been an ethnic group distinct from the Georgians. The Ossetians were a Christian people whose settlement and growth southward into Georgia was encouraged and directed by the Russian empire in the 18th century so they could serve as a buffer zone to protect Russians from highlander attacks in the Caucasus (King, 2010, p. 9 and 68). Thus the Ossetians have a pattern of looking to Russia as a patron and protector for nearly three hundred years. Abkhazia and Ossetia were both given a special autonomous status within the Soviet Union, united with Georgia by treaty but became quite accustomed to managing their own affairs (King, 2010, p. 188). The Ossetians themselves were divided by the Russian-Georgian border into North and South Ossetia; at the time this division didn’t seem that important, since they were all still part of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Georgia shifted to the Western sphere of influence, tensions were bound to rise with the Russian-aligned Ossetians and Abkhazia.
The Abkhazian people were against Georgian independence from the Soviet Union because they thought they would lose power in the resulting republic. This led to a war in 1992 that ended in a cease fire monitored by Russian peacekeepers and failed to achieve any lasting resolution, ending in a de-facto and unrecognized independence (King, 2010, p. 215-216).
Tensions in South Ossetia spilled over into violence when South Ossetia demanded greater autonomy and Georgia responded by revoking the autonomous district status South Ossetia had previously had. This conflict lasted from 1990-1992 and ended in an unresolved cease fire in a similar manner as the Abkhazian conflict: de facto, unrecognized, Russian-backed independence (King, 2010, 216-217). The conflicts of Soviet succession left Georgia without actual control of a sizeable portion of its national territory.
As of August 2008, both Russia and Georgia were members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (NATO, 2005, p. 19). However, the ethnic tensions in the region made it a potentially explosive area. In 2008, Georgia moved troops to occupy South Ossetia and put an end to its de facto independence; Russia responded by driving the Georgians out of the contested area and invading Georgia itself (Friedman, 2008). The Russians responded so strongly for two reasons: one, to defend the Ossetian people who have looked to Russia for protection for centuries; and also to show the world that America cannot always protect its client states, especially when they are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman, 2008).
Georgia had been taking steps towards NATO membership for three years when the war occurred. Although Georgia initially won the support of public opinion and painted Russia as an outside aggressor, Georgia lost credibility when more of the facts of the conflict became public, especially the fact that Georgian troops had begun shelling civilians before Russia even crossed the border (King, 2010, p. 258-259). Dmitry Kadomtsev, a Russian-born American citizen was in St. Petersburg visiting his family during the 2008 war in Georgia, and his account helps to illustrate Russian public opinion. Kadomtsev explained in a personal phone interview that the Russian public strongly supported the war in Georgia for two reasons: first, since South Ossetia had such a long history of autonomy, it had never really been considered a part of Georgia anyway; second, Georgia’s shelling of civilians in cities inflamed the Russian public. Kadomtsev believed that the Georgian president was attempting to provoke a confrontation between NATO and Russia. Kadomtsev’s description of Russian opinion at the time is confirmed by King, who said that “the intervention in Georgia was wildly popular in Russia” (2010, p. 259).
Lessons from the 2008 War
The 2008 war in Georgia had important consequences. Following the war, Russia recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics on August 26, 2008 (King, 2010, p. 256). The international community as a whole did not follow suit, but between Russia increasing its military presence in the secessionist areas of Georgia and its diplomatic recognition of the two areas, it became “clear that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would never return to full Georgian control” (King, 2010, p. 257).
NATO’s response to the war in Georgia was quite timid. During the conflict itself, their support for Georgia never was more than a few press conferences, calling the Russian intervention disproportionate “which is incompatible with Russia’s peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (NATO, 2010). NATO also issued a statement opposing Moscow’s diplomatic recognition of the two secessionist areas, affirming support for Georgian territorial integrity and demanded that Russia reverse its decision (NATO, 2010). Such hopes and demands belong in a fantasy world.
Georgia will never regain control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia because of one simple geopolitical reality: the Caucasus is a crucial and vital national security interest for Russia, but only a peripheral one for the United States and its allies. The Caucasus Mountains provide an area that is easy for the Russians to defend from an invasion from Turkey or Iran. If Russia lost these mountains, it would be much more difficult to defend the southern border, which explains Russia’s stubborn hold on Chechnya and tensions with Georgia (Friedman, 2009, p. 107). Russia has demonstrated that it is far more willing to pay the price in blood for control of the Caucasus than the United States, and their pattern of Caucasus intervention goes back three hundred years. That propensity is not likely to change; in today’s globalized world it is even more important for Russia to maintain a hold on the Caucasus, given their difficulties with Muslim terrorists there, so that they can better control the movement of people and weaponry in that region.
Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion
Today’s resurging Russia has consistently fought NATO expansion all along its borders; continuing expansion into Georgia will only increase tensions. NATO has moved right up to the Russian border in the Baltic States and is increasing its reach into Eastern Europe. NATO troops are now only seventy miles from St. Petersburg; during the Cold War, they were more than a thousand miles away (Friedman, 2009, p. 103). Having NATO along their southern border as well would make them feel even more surrounded and increase the likelihood of war.
NATO’s broken promises give Russia every reason not to trust that this geographic encirclement is really as harmless as NATO claims it to be. Dr. Kelly Pease pointed out that “the expansion of NATO raises serious questions regarding the alliance’s purposes, goals, and credibility” (2008, p. 147). In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Gorbachev, “if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east" (Bradley, 2009). But NATO now includes much of Eastern Europe. President Putin referenced this incident when he said “A powerful military bloc appearing near our borders will be perceived in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. Statements claiming that this process is not directed against Russia are not satisfactory to us. National security is not built on promises, especially since we have had similar promises prior to the previous waves of the bloc’s expansion” (Russia Today, 2008).
NATO expansion is already losing momentum, as Russia’s neighbors begin to see the costs of defying Moscow. The Ukraine had been promised eventual membership in NATO at the 2008 Bucharest Summit (at the same meeting a similar promise was made to Georgia). But as recently as April 2010, the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych dissolved his government’s commission tasked with preparing for NATO membership and is trying to bolster relations with Russia (Nicola, 2010).
Georgia’s internal territorial disputes, its recent attacks on civilians in the 2008 war, and the dangers of it sparking a wider conflict with Russia make it clear that NATO has more to lose by allowing Georgia to join the alliance than it could ever hope to gain, especially since there is already a framework for Georgia to participate in NATO actions on a case by case basis through the Partnership for Peace, without having to make treaty guarantees that could force NATO into war with Russia over a part of the world that is peripheral to Western interests but absolutely crucial to the Russians.
References
Bradley, B. (2009). A diplomatic mystery. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery.
Civil Georgia. (2008). Eventual membership agreed, action plan delayed. Civil.ge Politics. Retrieved from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17514.
Friedman, G. (2008). The Russo-Georgian War and the balance of power. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power.
Friedman, G. (2009). The Next 100 Years. New York: Anchor Books.
King, C. (2010). The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. New York: Oxford University Press.
Joseph LaPalombara, Politics Within Nations, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1974. pp. 46-57. Excerpt retrieved from APUS online classroom.
Nicola, S. (2010). Ukraine shelves NATO membership plan. UPI.com. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/04/06/Ukraine-shelves-NATO-membership-plan/UPI-73401270567983/.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005). Security through partnership. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010). NATO’s relations with Georgia. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm?selectedLocale=en.
Pease, K. S. (2008). International Organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Russia Today. (2008). NATO expansion a ‘direct threat to Russia.’ Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT6Us.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Monday, April 26, 2010
Hamas & Co. and Legitimacy
Political Islam is at the heart of two organizations that have continually stoked the fires of violence against Israel: Hamas and Hezbollah. There will be no peace in Palestine as long as Hamas retains any power. The very charter of the organization states that “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors” (Hamas, 1988, art. 13). Milton-Edwards makes it clear that Hamas is not willing to accept any compromise that allows Israel to exist in any part of Palestine (2006, p. 154). Hamas also opposes the Palestinian Authority’s attempts to create a secular Palestinian state. They will only be satisfied by an Islamic state that encompasses the whole of Palestine. This makes compromise with them impossible, because even if an agreement were to be reached for a two-state solution with more moderate Palestinians, like Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas would not stop their attacks on Israel but would also likely attack the new Palestinian state as well, given their history of violence against Fatah in the Gaza strip in 2007 and their more recent extrajudicial executions of April 15 (Hider, 2010).
Hezbollah provides an Islamist threat on the Northern end of Israel, albeit of a more Iranian variety. What both Hamas and Hezbollah have in common is that in addition to their thirst for blood, both organizations have sought greater legitimacy and power through democratic elections and social programs. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2006 through the ballot box (Milton-Edwards, 2006) and Hezbollah has also fought for seats in Lebanon’s parliament. Both organizations operate an extensive array of welfare, educational, religious and first aid programs in their respective areas. Their election victories and social outreach give them a legitimacy that makes them even more dangerous to the rest of the world than their thirst for violence (Pipes, 2009). A secular Palestinian state would have a difficult time coexisting peacefully with Israel, and the chances of a peaceful solution are infinitismal with an Islamic state driven by the ideology of Hamas.
References
Hamas. (1988). The covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Retrieved from http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.
Hider, J. (2010). Hamas executes Palestinian ‘collaborators’. Times Online. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7099074.ece.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
Pipes, D. (2009). Islamism 2.0. Jerusalem Post. Retrieved from http://www.danielpipes.org/7770/islamism.
Hezbollah provides an Islamist threat on the Northern end of Israel, albeit of a more Iranian variety. What both Hamas and Hezbollah have in common is that in addition to their thirst for blood, both organizations have sought greater legitimacy and power through democratic elections and social programs. Hamas took power in Gaza in 2006 through the ballot box (Milton-Edwards, 2006) and Hezbollah has also fought for seats in Lebanon’s parliament. Both organizations operate an extensive array of welfare, educational, religious and first aid programs in their respective areas. Their election victories and social outreach give them a legitimacy that makes them even more dangerous to the rest of the world than their thirst for violence (Pipes, 2009). A secular Palestinian state would have a difficult time coexisting peacefully with Israel, and the chances of a peaceful solution are infinitismal with an Islamic state driven by the ideology of Hamas.
References
Hamas. (1988). The covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Retrieved from http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm.
Hider, J. (2010). Hamas executes Palestinian ‘collaborators’. Times Online. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7099074.ece.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
Pipes, D. (2009). Islamism 2.0. Jerusalem Post. Retrieved from http://www.danielpipes.org/7770/islamism.
Friday, April 2, 2010
NATO expansion
The expansion of NATO does not automatically increase its strength or ability to defend itself. Each country seeking NATO membership must be evaluated on an individual basis, to determine whether their ability to contribute to NATO missions outweighs the risks that it brings to the alliance by adding another country to be defended. Jamie Shea said that “NATO membership has to be re-evaluated. NATO membership used to be much about benefits and not much about responsibilities, except for the countries that were on the front line during the Cold War in providing much of the military backbone of western defence. But for many Allies it was a wonderful insurance policy… The end of the Cold War has meant that NATO membership today has to really mean something. It has to mean developing those capabilities that make all the differences in places like Afghanistan and Iraq” (Shea, 2004).
When talking about NATO enlargement, we must also keep in mind that new members can be extremely vulnerable. The situation in Georgia is one example. Both Russia and Georgia are members of the Partnership for Peace (NATO, 2005, p. 19). However, the ethnic tensions in the region make it a potentially explosive area. As recently as 2008, Georgia moved troops to occupy a part of Georgia that was under separatist control; Russia responded by driving the Georgians out of the contested area and invading Georgia itself (Friedman, 2008). The Russians invaded Georgia to show the world that America cannot always protect them, especially when they are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman, 2008). Georgia had been taking steps towards NATO membership for three years when the war occurred; if Georgia had already been a member, the United States and the rest of Europe would have been forced into a direct military conflict with Russia from what began as an internal Georgian conflict, which shows the danger of admitting members with continuing ethnic disputes.
NATO enlargement also provides other challenges. NATO is an organization that operates by consensus. As the number of states involved in NATO’s decisions increases, the difficulty of reaching a consensus for meaningful action increases exponentially. If NATO expands too far, it will become as paralyzed as the United Nations has been, unable to come to a consensus about much of anything. A better solution to further NATO expansion would be “to encourage the development of many mini-NATOs in other regions around the globe based on the same principles of democratic decision making and integrated military structures so that they will be able to handle in their regions the type of tasks that NATO has handled in the Euro-Atlantic area, and therefore avoid the need for a globalized NATO being pushed increasingly into vacuums because of an absence of similar type of organizations” (Shea, 2004). Keeping these organizations local to a particular region would make them much more likely to be able to reach consensus for action because the countries involved would have more common interests. In today’s globalized world, these organizations may have to act outside their geographical area (as NATO has in Afghanistan), but they should remain focused on their region’s interests.
The Partnership for Peace provides a framework for NATO to receive support for individual missions from other nations without the complications of a formal treaty arrangement. This framework allowed Russia to contribute peacekeepers to the NATO force in the Balkans and ten different Partner countries to contribute directly to NATO efforts in Afghanistan (NATO, 2005). The Partnership for Peace is an excellent way for NATO to expand its influence without the paralysis of overexpansion.
Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion is partly driven by geography. The region of the Caucasus is extremely important, because the mountains there provide an area that is easy for the Russians to defend from an invasion from Turkey. If Russia lost these mountains, it would be much more difficult to defend the southern border, which explains Russia’s stubborn hold on Chechnya and tensions with Georgia (Friedman, 2009, p. 107). The northern European plain is another problem for Russia, because there are no natural barriers to stop an invading army. Russia has historically solved this problem with a buffer zone, but now, NATO has moved right up to the Russian border in the Baltic states and is increasing its reach into Eastern Europe. NATO troops are now only seventy miles from St. Petersburg; during the Cold War, they were more than a thousand miles away (Friedman, 2009, p. 103).
NATO’s broken promises give Russia every reason not to trust that this geographic encirclement is really as harmless as NATO claims it to be. Dr. Kelly Pease pointed out that “the expansion of NATO raises serious questions regarding the alliance’s purposes, goals, and credibility” (2008, p. 147). In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Gorbachev, “if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east" (Bradley, 2009). But NATO now includes much of Eastern Europe. President Putin referenced this incident when he said “A powerful military bloc appearing near our borders will be perceived in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. Statements claiming that this process is not directed against Russia are not satisfactory to us. National security is not built on promises, especially since we have had similar promises prior to the previous waves of the bloc’s expansion” (Russia Today, 2008).
Russia is resurging, and NATO expansion will continue to raise tensions with Russia. Russia’s national interests will push it to continue to reassert its influence in the former Soviet Union and beyond.
References
Bradley, B. (2009). A diplomatic mystery. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery.
Friedman, G. (2008). The Russo-Georgian War and the balance of power. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power.
Friedman, G. (2009). The Next 100 Years. New York: Anchor Books.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005). Security through partnership. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
Pease, K. S. (2008). International Organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Russia Today. (2008). NATO expansion a
‘direct threat to Russia.’ Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT6Us.
Shea, J. (2004). How global can NATO go? North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040309a.htm.
When talking about NATO enlargement, we must also keep in mind that new members can be extremely vulnerable. The situation in Georgia is one example. Both Russia and Georgia are members of the Partnership for Peace (NATO, 2005, p. 19). However, the ethnic tensions in the region make it a potentially explosive area. As recently as 2008, Georgia moved troops to occupy a part of Georgia that was under separatist control; Russia responded by driving the Georgians out of the contested area and invading Georgia itself (Friedman, 2008). The Russians invaded Georgia to show the world that America cannot always protect them, especially when they are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman, 2008). Georgia had been taking steps towards NATO membership for three years when the war occurred; if Georgia had already been a member, the United States and the rest of Europe would have been forced into a direct military conflict with Russia from what began as an internal Georgian conflict, which shows the danger of admitting members with continuing ethnic disputes.
NATO enlargement also provides other challenges. NATO is an organization that operates by consensus. As the number of states involved in NATO’s decisions increases, the difficulty of reaching a consensus for meaningful action increases exponentially. If NATO expands too far, it will become as paralyzed as the United Nations has been, unable to come to a consensus about much of anything. A better solution to further NATO expansion would be “to encourage the development of many mini-NATOs in other regions around the globe based on the same principles of democratic decision making and integrated military structures so that they will be able to handle in their regions the type of tasks that NATO has handled in the Euro-Atlantic area, and therefore avoid the need for a globalized NATO being pushed increasingly into vacuums because of an absence of similar type of organizations” (Shea, 2004). Keeping these organizations local to a particular region would make them much more likely to be able to reach consensus for action because the countries involved would have more common interests. In today’s globalized world, these organizations may have to act outside their geographical area (as NATO has in Afghanistan), but they should remain focused on their region’s interests.
The Partnership for Peace provides a framework for NATO to receive support for individual missions from other nations without the complications of a formal treaty arrangement. This framework allowed Russia to contribute peacekeepers to the NATO force in the Balkans and ten different Partner countries to contribute directly to NATO efforts in Afghanistan (NATO, 2005). The Partnership for Peace is an excellent way for NATO to expand its influence without the paralysis of overexpansion.
Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion is partly driven by geography. The region of the Caucasus is extremely important, because the mountains there provide an area that is easy for the Russians to defend from an invasion from Turkey. If Russia lost these mountains, it would be much more difficult to defend the southern border, which explains Russia’s stubborn hold on Chechnya and tensions with Georgia (Friedman, 2009, p. 107). The northern European plain is another problem for Russia, because there are no natural barriers to stop an invading army. Russia has historically solved this problem with a buffer zone, but now, NATO has moved right up to the Russian border in the Baltic states and is increasing its reach into Eastern Europe. NATO troops are now only seventy miles from St. Petersburg; during the Cold War, they were more than a thousand miles away (Friedman, 2009, p. 103).
NATO’s broken promises give Russia every reason not to trust that this geographic encirclement is really as harmless as NATO claims it to be. Dr. Kelly Pease pointed out that “the expansion of NATO raises serious questions regarding the alliance’s purposes, goals, and credibility” (2008, p. 147). In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Gorbachev, “if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east" (Bradley, 2009). But NATO now includes much of Eastern Europe. President Putin referenced this incident when he said “A powerful military bloc appearing near our borders will be perceived in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. Statements claiming that this process is not directed against Russia are not satisfactory to us. National security is not built on promises, especially since we have had similar promises prior to the previous waves of the bloc’s expansion” (Russia Today, 2008).
Russia is resurging, and NATO expansion will continue to raise tensions with Russia. Russia’s national interests will push it to continue to reassert its influence in the former Soviet Union and beyond.
References
Bradley, B. (2009). A diplomatic mystery. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery.
Friedman, G. (2008). The Russo-Georgian War and the balance of power. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power.
Friedman, G. (2009). The Next 100 Years. New York: Anchor Books.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2005). Security through partnership. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
Pease, K. S. (2008). International Organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Russia Today. (2008). NATO expansion a
‘direct threat to Russia.’ Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT6Us.
Shea, J. (2004). How global can NATO go? North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040309a.htm.
Sunday, March 28, 2010
NATO's Transformation and Darfur
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has confounded the world’s expectations by outliving its original purpose of defending Western Europe against an invasion by the Soviet Union. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union’s empire, NATO has continued to be a relevant international organization through expansion and adaptation and has proven to be a stabilizing influence for Europe as a whole, and has served an important purpose in making multilateral action possible in situations where the United Nations has been unable or unwilling to act.
What is truly remarkable about NATO’s post Cold War transformation is how it has responded to areas outside of Europe. Jamie Shea explained that “the fact that NATO was ready to respond in Afghanistan well beyond the traditional NATO perimeter was also I think something which was overlooked at the time because it was rather revolutionary in its range” (Shea, 2004). Equally remarkable is the fact that NATO provided significant assistance to the African Union mission in Darfur, Sudan, another area outside of the original scope of the Washington Treaty that established the alliance.
In June 2005, NATO began assisting the African Union by airlifting five thousand African soldiers to Darfur, almost tripling the number of troops available to AU commanders on the ground. NATO continued to provide airlift support for the African Union until December 2007, having transported over thirty-seven thousand personnel. NATO also assisted by providing training in strategic and operational planning (NATO, 2010).
Mr. Shea pointed out that “NATO is not in Afghanistan through an act of international charity. We're there because security in that country is a key part of the campaign to defeat international terrorism” (Shea, 2004). I submit that NATO did not assist the African Union mission in Darfur as an act of international charity either, but rather, acting out of the national interests of its members.
The United Nations Security Council spelled out why Darfur threatened the interests of the powers of NATO, when it determined “that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,” because of “the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population in the Darfur region as well as throughout Sudan, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons” (Security Council, 2005). The Security Council, and I believe NATO itself, recognized that the refugees from Darfur could destabilize the entire region and that the lack of rule of law in Darfur has made Sudan a failed state; Sudan was actually listed as the third most failed state in the entire world by the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace, 2009). Failed states can become havens to terrorist organizations as well as piracy, as we have seen in Somalia. The lack of effective governance anywhere in the world can provide dangers and risks for the rest of the world, and NATO acted in its own interest to try to help stabilize Darfur.
NATO did not intervene directly by military force for several reasons. First, it had extensive preexisting commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Second, both the African Union and Sudan itself opposed greater foreign involvement (Preble, 2006). Even after the African Union mission was rolled into the United Nations force known as UNAMID, Germany and Turkey, both NATO members, contributed both troops and police, showing their continued interest in Darfur (UNAMID, 2010).
The fact that NATO was willing to act to assist a peacekeeping mission in Africa shows the global perspective that now drives the alliance; NATO is no longer purely a defensive alliance providing for the security of Europe, but is a potent force for multilateral action anywhere in the world.
References
The Fund for Peace. (2009). Failed States Index. Retrived from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010). Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49194.htm.
Preble, C. (2006). Let the African Union intervene in Darfur. CATO Institute. Retrieved from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353.
Shea, J. (2004). The impact of September 11th on the Alliance. NATO Online Library. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040112a.htm.
UNAMID. (2010). UNAMID Facts and Figures. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml.
United Nations Security Council. (2005). Resolution 1590. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement.
What is truly remarkable about NATO’s post Cold War transformation is how it has responded to areas outside of Europe. Jamie Shea explained that “the fact that NATO was ready to respond in Afghanistan well beyond the traditional NATO perimeter was also I think something which was overlooked at the time because it was rather revolutionary in its range” (Shea, 2004). Equally remarkable is the fact that NATO provided significant assistance to the African Union mission in Darfur, Sudan, another area outside of the original scope of the Washington Treaty that established the alliance.
In June 2005, NATO began assisting the African Union by airlifting five thousand African soldiers to Darfur, almost tripling the number of troops available to AU commanders on the ground. NATO continued to provide airlift support for the African Union until December 2007, having transported over thirty-seven thousand personnel. NATO also assisted by providing training in strategic and operational planning (NATO, 2010).
Mr. Shea pointed out that “NATO is not in Afghanistan through an act of international charity. We're there because security in that country is a key part of the campaign to defeat international terrorism” (Shea, 2004). I submit that NATO did not assist the African Union mission in Darfur as an act of international charity either, but rather, acting out of the national interests of its members.
The United Nations Security Council spelled out why Darfur threatened the interests of the powers of NATO, when it determined “that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,” because of “the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population in the Darfur region as well as throughout Sudan, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons” (Security Council, 2005). The Security Council, and I believe NATO itself, recognized that the refugees from Darfur could destabilize the entire region and that the lack of rule of law in Darfur has made Sudan a failed state; Sudan was actually listed as the third most failed state in the entire world by the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace, 2009). Failed states can become havens to terrorist organizations as well as piracy, as we have seen in Somalia. The lack of effective governance anywhere in the world can provide dangers and risks for the rest of the world, and NATO acted in its own interest to try to help stabilize Darfur.
NATO did not intervene directly by military force for several reasons. First, it had extensive preexisting commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Second, both the African Union and Sudan itself opposed greater foreign involvement (Preble, 2006). Even after the African Union mission was rolled into the United Nations force known as UNAMID, Germany and Turkey, both NATO members, contributed both troops and police, showing their continued interest in Darfur (UNAMID, 2010).
The fact that NATO was willing to act to assist a peacekeeping mission in Africa shows the global perspective that now drives the alliance; NATO is no longer purely a defensive alliance providing for the security of Europe, but is a potent force for multilateral action anywhere in the world.
References
The Fund for Peace. (2009). Failed States Index. Retrived from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2010). Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49194.htm.
Preble, C. (2006). Let the African Union intervene in Darfur. CATO Institute. Retrieved from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6353.
Shea, J. (2004). The impact of September 11th on the Alliance. NATO Online Library. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040112a.htm.
UNAMID. (2010). UNAMID Facts and Figures. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml.
United Nations Security Council. (2005). Resolution 1590. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement.
NATO's role during the Cold War
“NATO is perhaps the best known and arguably the most successful multilateral military alliance in contemporary world politics” (Pease, 2008, p. 139). NATO is not successful solely by its ability to provide conventional and nuclear deterrence, thereby providing physical security for Western Europe. NATO also united Western Europe, and in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, ensured the economic rebuilding of Europe. These efforts made the later development of the European Union possible.
According to Dr. Kelly Pease, an eminent scholar in international relations, “[NATO] was able to stabilize the European continent after centuries of violent conflict and build a lasting peace between such historical adversaries as France and Germany” (2008, p. 141). NATO provided a forum for both military and political cooperation for the states of Western Europe. While NATO was not entirely free of conflict (as the tension between Greece and Turkey clearly showed) it provided a greater degree of cooperation than had ever been seen before in Europe.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was only one part of the American strategy for the rebuilding and security of Europe. The Marshall Plan was the other. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, secretary-general of NATO, explained that “security and economics are linked. One cannot flourish without the other” (Lord Robertson, 2001). The common strategy of NATO and the Marshall Plan linked the two together so closely that President Truman said that the Marshall Plan and NATO were “two halves of the same walnut” (Lord Robertson, 2001). The Marshall Plan also promoted European unity just as NATO had done. States were only eligible for aid under the Marshall Plan if they accepted international economic cooperation as a specific condition (Pease, 2008, p. 146). President Clinton, speaking at Geneva on the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, explained the unity that this economic program brought to Europe:
“The Marshall Plan offered a cure, not a crutch. It was never a handout; it was always a hand up. It said to Europe, if you will put your divisions behind you, if you will work together to help yourselves, then America will work with you. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, called the Marshall Plan ‘a lifeline to sinking men, bringing hope where there was none.’ From the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean, European nations grabbed that lifeline, cooperating as never before on a common program of recovery. The task was not easy, but the hope they shared was more powerful than their differences” (Bill Clinton, 1997).
Jamie Shea also pointed out that the security guarantees that NATO provided allowed the European powers to focus on economic development and reconstruction without the heavy burden of high defense spending (Shea, 2003). This shows how tightly integrated the NATO and Marshall Plan strategies were.
The economic rebuilding of Europe did as much to protect the national security of the United States as the military aspect of the alliance itself, because it prevented the contagion of communist revolution from spreading further west in the chaos that followed World War II and thereby prevented the Soviet Union from finding allies in Western Europe. It helped ensure that the American blood that was spent in the liberation of Europe would not be wasted. After World War I, the American people refused to support European recovery and security by rejecting the League of Nations and overseas commitments in general. The result was another bloody war that brought carnage to an unprecedented level. NATO and the Marshall Plan ensured that this terrible mistake would not be repeated. America realized then that forcing Europe to fend for itself following World War II could result in failed states that would be vulnerable to communist influences and provide security risks for the entire world. Even today, many of the security problems around the world revolve around failed states like Somalia, especially the plague of international terrorism.
References
Clinton, W. J. (1997). The lesson of the Marshall Plan. Vital Speeches of the Day, 63, (18), 546-549. Retrieved from EBSCO index.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. (2001). Security and prosperity: Two halves of the same walnut. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010315a.htm.
Pease, K. S. (2008). International organizations: Perspectives on governance in the twenty-first century. (3rd ed.) Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
Shea, J. (2003). How did NATO survive the Cold War? Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031106b.htm.
According to Dr. Kelly Pease, an eminent scholar in international relations, “[NATO] was able to stabilize the European continent after centuries of violent conflict and build a lasting peace between such historical adversaries as France and Germany” (2008, p. 141). NATO provided a forum for both military and political cooperation for the states of Western Europe. While NATO was not entirely free of conflict (as the tension between Greece and Turkey clearly showed) it provided a greater degree of cooperation than had ever been seen before in Europe.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was only one part of the American strategy for the rebuilding and security of Europe. The Marshall Plan was the other. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, secretary-general of NATO, explained that “security and economics are linked. One cannot flourish without the other” (Lord Robertson, 2001). The common strategy of NATO and the Marshall Plan linked the two together so closely that President Truman said that the Marshall Plan and NATO were “two halves of the same walnut” (Lord Robertson, 2001). The Marshall Plan also promoted European unity just as NATO had done. States were only eligible for aid under the Marshall Plan if they accepted international economic cooperation as a specific condition (Pease, 2008, p. 146). President Clinton, speaking at Geneva on the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, explained the unity that this economic program brought to Europe:
“The Marshall Plan offered a cure, not a crutch. It was never a handout; it was always a hand up. It said to Europe, if you will put your divisions behind you, if you will work together to help yourselves, then America will work with you. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, called the Marshall Plan ‘a lifeline to sinking men, bringing hope where there was none.’ From the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean, European nations grabbed that lifeline, cooperating as never before on a common program of recovery. The task was not easy, but the hope they shared was more powerful than their differences” (Bill Clinton, 1997).
Jamie Shea also pointed out that the security guarantees that NATO provided allowed the European powers to focus on economic development and reconstruction without the heavy burden of high defense spending (Shea, 2003). This shows how tightly integrated the NATO and Marshall Plan strategies were.
The economic rebuilding of Europe did as much to protect the national security of the United States as the military aspect of the alliance itself, because it prevented the contagion of communist revolution from spreading further west in the chaos that followed World War II and thereby prevented the Soviet Union from finding allies in Western Europe. It helped ensure that the American blood that was spent in the liberation of Europe would not be wasted. After World War I, the American people refused to support European recovery and security by rejecting the League of Nations and overseas commitments in general. The result was another bloody war that brought carnage to an unprecedented level. NATO and the Marshall Plan ensured that this terrible mistake would not be repeated. America realized then that forcing Europe to fend for itself following World War II could result in failed states that would be vulnerable to communist influences and provide security risks for the entire world. Even today, many of the security problems around the world revolve around failed states like Somalia, especially the plague of international terrorism.
References
Clinton, W. J. (1997). The lesson of the Marshall Plan. Vital Speeches of the Day, 63, (18), 546-549. Retrieved from EBSCO index.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. (2001). Security and prosperity: Two halves of the same walnut. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010315a.htm.
Pease, K. S. (2008). International organizations: Perspectives on governance in the twenty-first century. (3rd ed.) Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
Shea, J. (2003). How did NATO survive the Cold War? Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031106b.htm.
Sunday, February 7, 2010
China's unsustainable growth
Peter and Susan Calvert define developing countries as those that have a low quality of life compared to the rest of the world or those countries whose economic growth is unsustainable, despite a high standard of living (2007, p. 4).
China’s enormous GDP by itself does not make it a developed country; it simply means that China is an enormous country. The per capita gross national income calculated with purchasing power parity is a much better measure of the standard of living, because it takes into account the cost of living differences throughout the world. This measure shows China at $6,546 according to 2009 estimates, placing it below other developing countries such as Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica and Brazil (International Monetary Fund, 2009).
More importantly however, China’s economic growth is unsustainable, because of the way investment capital is distributed in China. “Who you know counts for much more than whether you have a good business plan. Between Asian systems of family and social ties and the communist system of political relationships, loans have been given out for a host of reasons, none of them having much to do with the merits of the business” (Friedman, 2009, p. 92). As a result, a huge proportion of those loans turns into bad debt, to the tune of 25-40% of total GDP. The weight of that debt will pull the Chinese economy apart as soon as growth starts to slow (Friedman, 2009, p. 95).
The artificially undervalued currency of China is also a problem. The undervalued yuan has made it much easier for China to export products at low prices and has made imports more expensive which reduces domestic competition with foreign companies. This accounts for a lot of China’s economic growth, but it has also made that growth unstable and kept the standard of living quite low for the Chinese people (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 2).The Chinese government is reluctant to allow its exchange rate to be set by market forces because it fears it would cause economic instability that would turn into political unrest down the line (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 4). China has also invested heavily in the U.S. treasury bonds that fund deficit spending. Any changes in currency policy that increase the worth of Chinese currency decrease the value of these investments, which are believed to total more than a trillion dollars (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 12).
Therefore, China must continue to be considered a developing country, and its immediate political interests keep it from making the kind of structural change needed to establish a sustainable economic plan that would lead to long-term development. This situation is not likely to change in the near future.
References
Calvert, P. & Calvert, S. (2007). Politics and society in the developing world. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited.
Friedman, G. (2009). The next one hundred years. New York: Anchor Books.
International Monetary Fund. (2009). Report for selected countries and subjects. World Economic Outlook Database. Retrieved from http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/.
Morrison, W. & Labonte, M. (2009). China’s currency: a summary of the economic issues. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=1&hid=3&sid=b13a00f1-abaa-4009-89b9-c96a2f218a6f%40sessionmgr14.
China’s enormous GDP by itself does not make it a developed country; it simply means that China is an enormous country. The per capita gross national income calculated with purchasing power parity is a much better measure of the standard of living, because it takes into account the cost of living differences throughout the world. This measure shows China at $6,546 according to 2009 estimates, placing it below other developing countries such as Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica and Brazil (International Monetary Fund, 2009).
More importantly however, China’s economic growth is unsustainable, because of the way investment capital is distributed in China. “Who you know counts for much more than whether you have a good business plan. Between Asian systems of family and social ties and the communist system of political relationships, loans have been given out for a host of reasons, none of them having much to do with the merits of the business” (Friedman, 2009, p. 92). As a result, a huge proportion of those loans turns into bad debt, to the tune of 25-40% of total GDP. The weight of that debt will pull the Chinese economy apart as soon as growth starts to slow (Friedman, 2009, p. 95).
The artificially undervalued currency of China is also a problem. The undervalued yuan has made it much easier for China to export products at low prices and has made imports more expensive which reduces domestic competition with foreign companies. This accounts for a lot of China’s economic growth, but it has also made that growth unstable and kept the standard of living quite low for the Chinese people (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 2).The Chinese government is reluctant to allow its exchange rate to be set by market forces because it fears it would cause economic instability that would turn into political unrest down the line (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 4). China has also invested heavily in the U.S. treasury bonds that fund deficit spending. Any changes in currency policy that increase the worth of Chinese currency decrease the value of these investments, which are believed to total more than a trillion dollars (Morrison & Labonte, 2009, p. 12).
Therefore, China must continue to be considered a developing country, and its immediate political interests keep it from making the kind of structural change needed to establish a sustainable economic plan that would lead to long-term development. This situation is not likely to change in the near future.
References
Calvert, P. & Calvert, S. (2007). Politics and society in the developing world. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited.
Friedman, G. (2009). The next one hundred years. New York: Anchor Books.
International Monetary Fund. (2009). Report for selected countries and subjects. World Economic Outlook Database. Retrieved from http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/.
Morrison, W. & Labonte, M. (2009). China’s currency: a summary of the economic issues. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=1&hid=3&sid=b13a00f1-abaa-4009-89b9-c96a2f218a6f%40sessionmgr14.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Hamas and Hezbollah in the Context of International Law
Hezbollah and Hamas provide some interesting implications from their current political situation. Hamas can no longer be relegated to the role of “lunatic fringe,” since they constitute the democratically elected government of the Palestinian Authority. 1 There are three criteria to be considered to qualify for the status of belligerency: “rebellion must be organized around a government, the revolt must extend a local uprising, and a substantial area must be under the de facto control of antigovernment forces.” 2 Based on these criteria, Hamas fits the bill. They are organized and have popular support, and they control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hezbollah’s qualifications are not as clear cut due to their minority status.
However, Wolfe’s criteria for belligerency omits a critical point. Belligerency status in the context of international law specifically subjects the belligerency to both the protection and obligations of the laws of war and the Geneva Convention. This principle was established in 1861, when although formal recognition of independence was withheld, Britain, Spain and France recognized the Confederacy as “a belligerent community subject to the rules of the law of war and entitled to the protection thereof.” 3 The Geneva Convention lays out some specific criteria for privileged combatants (those protected by the Geneva Convention) who are not members of the armed forces of a recognized nation-state:
“(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”4
Hamas and Hezbollah are both organized resistance movements with a command structure. However, they do not wear uniforms or other distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, or follow the laws of war. They deliberately target civilians and hide behind white flags amongst the population; the civilian blood on their hands makes them unprivileged combatants, not protected by the Geneva Convention.
It is both politically and morally contradictory to recognize either Hamas or Hezbollah as a belligerency in the context of international law without also holding them to the standard of the rules of war. If they are to be recognized as a belligerency then we should be following the example of Nuremberg and more recently in Yugoslavia and trying the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah for war crimes before an international tribunal.
References:
1. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook: West Bank. (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_we.html.
2. JAMES HASTINGS WOLFE, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (PRENTICE HALL 2002).
3. Id.
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68.
However, Wolfe’s criteria for belligerency omits a critical point. Belligerency status in the context of international law specifically subjects the belligerency to both the protection and obligations of the laws of war and the Geneva Convention. This principle was established in 1861, when although formal recognition of independence was withheld, Britain, Spain and France recognized the Confederacy as “a belligerent community subject to the rules of the law of war and entitled to the protection thereof.” 3 The Geneva Convention lays out some specific criteria for privileged combatants (those protected by the Geneva Convention) who are not members of the armed forces of a recognized nation-state:
“(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”4
Hamas and Hezbollah are both organized resistance movements with a command structure. However, they do not wear uniforms or other distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, or follow the laws of war. They deliberately target civilians and hide behind white flags amongst the population; the civilian blood on their hands makes them unprivileged combatants, not protected by the Geneva Convention.
It is both politically and morally contradictory to recognize either Hamas or Hezbollah as a belligerency in the context of international law without also holding them to the standard of the rules of war. If they are to be recognized as a belligerency then we should be following the example of Nuremberg and more recently in Yugoslavia and trying the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah for war crimes before an international tribunal.
References:
1. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook: West Bank. (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_we.html.
2. JAMES HASTINGS WOLFE, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (PRENTICE HALL 2002).
3. Id.
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68.
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