The Costs of Agricultural Trade Barriers

Introduction

Free trade has become more and more the reality around the world in today’s era of globalization. It has been the driving force behind unparalleled economic growth in many countries. However, in many arenas free trade is very unpopular. Economist and politician Phil Gramm explains why: “Free trade benefits almost everybody, but they don’t know who they are. Free trade hurts a few, and they all know who they are.”[1] Nowhere is this truer than in the agricultural sector, traditionally the most protected of all sectors of the economy.

While the United States has frequently painted itself as the champion of free trade, it has not been willing to apply its rhetoric to its agricultural programs. Other developed countries have followed the US example. When the General Agreement on Tariffs was signed in 1947, both the European Community (the predecessor of the European Union) and the United States demanded that agriculture be entirely excluded from the agreement.[2] The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has eliminated all significant tariff and quota barriers between Canada, the United States and Mexico in all areas except agriculture.[3] The richest developed countries use “a dizzying array of policies to support farm income, such as import tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (in which imports up to a certain level are subject to a given tariff rate and imports above the quota limit are subject to a different, usually higher, tariff rate); subsidies on inputs, outputs, and exports, and direct payments to farmers.”[4]

Such programs have real and substantial costs, and not only for the people of countries that use these subsidies. A former World Bank chief economist estimated the cost of subsidies alone among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (an organization made up mostly of high income developed nations) to be more than three hundred billion dollars annually. He further noted that such trade practices “impose a high burden on farmers and rural households in developing countries.”[5]

Means of Agricultural Protectionism

In most developed countries, import tariffs are the most common tool to protect inefficient domestic producers from foreign competition.[6] A few examples show just how much tariffs can distort prices. Canadian dairy tariffs increase the cost of imported dairy products by 200 to 300 percent; US sugar tariffs double the cost of sugar; US peanut tariffs sit at 130 percent; Canadian poultry tariffs are around 240 percent; and US tobacco tariffs are estimated at 350 percent.[7] South Korea applies tariffs to potatoes at 304 percent and to barley at 324 percent.[8] These tariffs are the greatest obstacle to free trade in agriculture. An empirical study in 2006 concluded that if all agricultural support polices were removed worldwide, “93 percent of the gains in real income for the world would be due to tariff elimination, 5 percent due to elimination of production subsidies, and 2 percent attributable to export subsidies.”[9]

Agricultural subsidies are used far more by developed countries than developing countries. 84 percent of total agricultural subsidies worldwide are used by the United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan to protect their own domestic markets. These expensive subsidies have been justified as a way to help small family farmers stay in business, but the reality is that larger company farms reap disproportionate benefit from such programs. “For example, in the United States in 2004, farms that accounted for more than $250,000 in sales, which represented only about 9 percent of all farms, received 58 percent of total government payments. In the European Union in 2003, farms that accounted for over 100,000 euros in sales, which represented only 0.3 percent of all farms, received about 12 percent of government payments.”[10]

Other non-tariff barriers exist and can have a significant effect on international trade in agricultural products. Free trade agreements use mechanisms called rules of origin to keep countries that are not party to the agreement from taking advantage of differences in tariffs between countries in the free trade area by proving where the goods originally came from. Restrictive rules of origin increase costs to the exporter because it complicates inspections, increases administrative costs, and makes cross-border trade less predictable. As a result, many exporters decide it is better for them to pay extra duties than to take advantage of the benefits of the free trade agreement and have to deal with proving origin of their goods. Rules of origin can be entirely avoided if states involved in free trade agreements are willing to submit to a common external tariff,[11] though many nations are reluctant to do so.

How Protectionism Hurts the Developed World

Agricultural trade barriers hurt the developed world both because of their direct costs and the way they distort the agricultural market. These trade barriers are a consistent roadblock in trade liberalization talks[12] and thus prevent the economic growth that could be had with greater liberalization in other sectors of the economy. Developing countries are increasingly skeptical of greater trade integration, because “the gap between rhetoric and reality is enormous.”[13] The same countries that call for global free trade also use consistently high protectionist supports that have drawn objections throughout the developing world.[14]

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union is a very inefficient way to increase farm incomes; about half the total cost of the program goes to pay for rents and purchases of agricultural land whose prices are inflated by the distortions of the CAP. Politicians quick to pander to well organized agricultural interests ought to realize that “if farm subsidies and trade barriers were to be reduced and eventually eliminated, the biggest beneficiaries would be the developed countries themselves and especially their poorest citizens, for they spend more of their income on food than the rich do and so would gain most from lower food prices.”[15] Despite differences in methodology and data sets, all studies of the effects of removing agricultural trade barriers back the assertion that developed countries would benefit most from liberalization, with the greatest gains in the countries with the most distortive agricultural policies such as the European Union, the United States, Japan and South Korea.[16] The richest countries in the world are hurting the prospects for their own economic growth by squandering their resources on inefficient agricultural policies.

How Protectionism Hurts the Developing World

When developed countries pump huge subsidies into their agricultural sector, the result is a worldwide depression of market prices as developed countries dump their surplus goods onto the global market priced below their actual cost to produce. This drives local farmers in developing countries out of business by destroying their ability to compete both in their local and global markets; this shrinks rural economies worldwide.[17]

Removing barriers on agricultural trade would result in a worldwide rise in agricultural commodity prices. Developing countries often have a comparative advantage in agriculture. As a result, developing countries as a whole would greatly benefit from increased agricultural trade liberalization. This does not mean that all countries would benefit; some developing countries are net importers of food products and cannot easily increase their domestic agricultural capacity. These nations have benefited from the dumping of agricultural products from developed countries; higher food prices would hit these countries hard.[18]

Among those countries that would benefit from removing barriers on agricultural trade, the benefits would not be equally divided, because trade barriers are not equally divided among agricultural commodities. Those nations that export products that are less distorted by tariffs and subsidies would gain less than those nations that export products that are much more distorted.[19]

The specific case of cotton illustrates the varied effects of liberalization. Cotton is heavily subsidized in the United States, to the tune of $3.4 billion dollars in 2001 alone.[20] This depresses the world price of cotton significantly, hurting some of the poorest countries in the world. In places like Chad, Mali, Benin, and Burkina Faso, with average per-capita incomes of fewer than four hundred dollars a year, cotton accounts for up to half of their total exports. This is why these countries have sought unsuccessfully to use the World Trade Organization to force the US to stop subsidizing cotton.[21] According to both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, removing these subsidies would increase incomes of West and Central African countries by at least $250 million dollars per year.[22]

While the net welfare of the world would go up with cotton market liberalization from gains in efficiency and significant gains in sub-Saharan Africa, some countries, such as India, Bangladesh and some parts of Latin America would be worse off because they depend on imported cotton for their textile industries and benefit from the current depressed price.[23] Some Mediterranean countries would suffer for the same reason.[24]

Some skeptics of increasing agricultural trade liberalization, particularly in the European Union, point to the existing system of preferences that enables some of the least developed countries to export to the European and US markets at tariff rates lower than most favored nation status. They argue that reducing tariffs in general will erode the benefit that such preferences provide to some of the poorest countries in the world and therefore oppose liberalization to help these countries’ economic development. Empirical studies have shown, however, preference erosion is not a significant concern. To receive these preferences, exporters must keep detailed records and comply with rules of origin and other technical requirements. The costs of compliance add up to approximately four percent of the value of the exports involved. The average margin of these preferences is less than four percent, so the overall net effect of preference erosion would be minimal,[25] though some developing countries could lose some markets to richer countries like Australia or New Zealand, or even to other developing countries that are doing well economically, such as Brazil.[26]

Efforts to Reduce the Negative Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization

There have been some efforts to reduce the negative impacts of agricultural trade liberalization, with somewhat mixed results. The Agreement on Agriculture, signed in 1994, included a provision that was supposed to provide funding to aid developing countries if food import bills went up too quickly. The provision was there to assuage concerns from net-food importing developing countries. In 1995 and 1996, food prices worldwide increased significantly, raising food import bills in developing countries by a full forty percent. The IMF decided that this wasn’t caused by the trade agreement, and the developed countries refused to fund the promised aid as a result.[27]

In 2004, the IMF announced the Trade Integration Mechanism, designed to assist countries that encounter balance-of-payments problems as a result of multilateral trade liberalization by making resources more predictably available. Since its creation, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, and Madagascar have sought and been granted aid by this program.[28]

The Prospects for Change

The North American Free Trade Agreement has been a means of reducing trade barriers in many sectors, but reducing agricultural trade barriers between its members is not likely to happen anytime soon. Tensions on immigration issues are very high in the United States, and this issue overshadows any further economic integration in the region.[29] All three NAFTA members have their own array of free trade agreements that they have signed with trade partners worldwide. All these agreements would need to be harmonized to effectively reduce barriers for the bloc as a whole.[30] All three NAFTA members are uncomfortable with the idea of transferring regulatory authority to any supranational institution and regard their ability to make their own agricultural policy as a critical part of their national sovereignty, and “protectionist sentiments run deep in each NAFTA country.”[31]

Bilateral trade agreements do not seem any more likely to make progress. There are three pending bilateral trade agreements between the US and Panama, Columbia and South Korea that have the potential to reduce some agricultural trade barriers. All three were negotiated and signed by the Bush administration, and President Obama can decide if and when to send the agreements to Congress for approval. Trade promotion authority rules allow these agreements to follow expedited legislative procedures that forbid amendments, limit debate and force a straight up or down vote.[32]

In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama said that America “has to seek new markets aggressively, just as our competitors are…[or] we will lose the chance to create jobs… [that] is why we will strengthen our trade relations in Asia and with key partners like South Korea and Panama and Columbia.”[33] However, President Obama has been reluctant to move forward on any of these proposals. With regards to Panama, the Obama administration has set two conditions: cutting the minimum number of members required to form a trade union in Panama by half to twenty workers, and to sign a tax information exchange treaty to make it harder to launder money in Panama.[34] With regards to South Korea, the Obama administration has concerns about the provisions governing US access to the South Korean automobile market, and has made no concrete plan to resolve these concerns or submit the agreement to Congress.[35] The Columbian trade agreement has stalled due to human rights concerns among Democratic congressmen about violence against trade unions there and is not likely to be considered for a vote anytime soon.[36] The common thread through all of these agreements is that the Obama administration appears committed to strengthening the political position of labor unions both at home and abroad.

On a more global level, agricultural trade has been one of the most contentious issues. It has paralyzed the Doha Development Round of negotiations through the World Trade Organization and made liberalizing trade more difficult in other areas as a result. Developed nations have not been willing to give up their protectionist agricultural policies, and developing countries have made reducing agricultural trade barriers and subsidies in developed countries a vital condition of any agreement.[37]

Therefore, it appears at present that meaningful progress on reducing agricultural trade barriers is very unlikely, thanks to a matrix of entrenched agricultural interests, protectionist sentiments and the attaching of additional conditions by the Obama administration to bilateral trade agreements after they have been signed by a previous president. It has proven very difficult to find the political will to permanently reduce agricultural protectionist supports anywhere in the developed world.[38] All of this is unfortunate, because it ensures the continued squandering of resources on inefficient farming policies throughout the world.

References

Bouët, Antoine, et al. "Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: The Contrasting Fortunes of Developing Countries in the Doha Round." World Economy 28, no. 9 (September 2005): 1329-1354. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost(accessed February 4, 2012).

Fergusson, Ian F. "World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda." Congressional Research Service: Report (December 12, 2011): 1-24. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost(accessed February 5, 2012).

Jurenas, Remy. "Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea: R40622." Congressional Research Service: Report (February 4, 2010): 1-18. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed February 5, 2012).

Meilke, Karl, James Rude, and Steven Zahniser. "Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option in the North American Agrifood Sector?." World Economy 31, no. 7 (July 2008): 925-946. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

Murphy, Sophia. "Free Trade in Agriculture," Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 61, no. 3 (July 2009): 78-91, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

Nordlinger, Jay. “Conservatives vs Capitalism,” National Review Online, January 9, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/287606/conservatives-vs-capitalism-jay-nordlinger (accessed February 4, 2012).

Tokarick, Stephen. "Dispelling Some Misconceptions about Agricultural Trade Liberalization." Journal Of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 199-216. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

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[1] Jay Nordlinger, “Conservatives vs Capitalism,” National Review Online, January 9, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/287606/conservatives-vs-capitalism-jay-nordlinger (accessed February 4, 2012).

[2] Sophia Murphy, "Free Trade in Agriculture," Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine 61, no. 3 (July 2009): 79. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

[3] Karl Meilke, James Rude, and Steven Zahniser. "Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option in the North American Agrifood Sector?." World Economy 31, no. 7 (July 2008): 927. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

[4] Stephen Tokarick, "Dispelling Some Misconceptions about Agricultural Trade Liberalization," Journal Of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 1 (Winter2008 2008): 199. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

[5] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 199.

[6] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 202.

[7] Karl Meilke, James Rude, and Steven Zahniser. "Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option in the North American Agrifood Sector?." World Economy 31, no. 7 (July 2008): 932. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed February 4, 2012).

[8] Remy Jurenas, "Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea: R40622." Congressional Research Service: Report (February 4, 2010): 13. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed February 5, 2012).

[9] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 210.

[10] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 203-204.

[11] Meilke, “Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option,” 930

[12] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 215.

[13] Murphy, “Free Trade in Agriculture,” 81.

[14] Murphy, “Free Trade in Agriculture, 86.

[15] “Give Freedom a Chance,” The Economist (June 26, 2003). http://www.economist.com/node/1857671 (accessed February 4, 2012).

[16] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 208.

[17] Murphy, “Free Trade in Agriculture,” 85.

[18] Antoine Bouët, et al. "Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: The Contrasting Fortunes of Developing Countries in the Doha Round." World Economy 28, no. 9 (September 2005): 1331. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost(accessed February 4, 2012).

[19] Bouët, “Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation,” 1331.

[20] “Give Freedom a Chance,” The Economist.

[21] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 212.

[22] “Give Freedom a Chance,” The Economist.

[23] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 212.

[24] Bouët, “Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalisation,” 1352.

[25] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 213-214.

[26] Bouët, “Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalization,” 1332

[27] Murphy, “Free Trade in Agriculture,” 81.

[28] Tokarick, “Dispelling Some Misconceptions,” 214-215.

[29] Meilke, “Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option,” 929-930.

[30] Meilke, “Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option,” 934.

[31] Melike, “Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option,” 943.

[32] Jurenas, “Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements,” 5.

[33] Jurenas, “Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements,“ 4.

[34] Jurenas, “Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements,” 10.

[35] Jurenas, “Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements,” 11, 16.

[36] Jurenas, “Agriculture in Pending U.S. Free Trade Agreements,” 20.

[37] Ian F. Fergusson, "World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda." Congressional Research Service: Report (December 12, 2011): 1-24. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost(accessed February 5, 2012).

[38] Meilke, “Is ‘NAFTA Plus’ an Option,” 939.

Think before you Shoot: The Reality of Military Intervention

Intervention in internal conflicts is a nasty business, often with many unforeseen consequences. Such intervention is frequently unsuccessful. Such intervention often fails because intervening troops have an inadequate mandate, their forces are not sufficiently armed, and because intervention can prolong conflicts that otherwise would have ended.

Intervention in an internal conflict can only be successful with a force that is appropriate to the actual situation on the ground, not the situation policymakers wish for. Lightly armed peacekeepers can be successful in monitoring a peace agreement where it is in the interest of both sides to continue such an agreement. However, if the goal is to impose a peace upon groups who otherwise would continue fighting, overwhelming force and an acceptance of the casualties that such intervention is likely to bring is the price of victory, making such intervention very expensive in blood and treasure; such intervention must have either a compelling national interest or moral outrage to genocide to justify such a cost. Halfhearted intervention, however, is often worse than no intervention at all.

An inadequate mandate can cripple intervention. One poignant example is Rwanda. “The most unambiguous case of genocide since Hitler's war against the Jews” (Gourevitch 1998, cover) occurred while UN peacekeepers were stationed in the country to try to ensure the success of a peace agreement between the government and the rebel RPF army. These peacekeepers were intended to keep Kigali, the Rwandan capital, free of weapons. The UN commander on the ground, General Dallaire, received concrete information from a well-placed source in the Hutu militias known as interahamwe that a major weapons cache, which was going to be used to slaughter Tutsis, was in Kigali. The informant then requested protection from the UN. General Dallaire prepared to move against the cache but was forbidden by his superiors at the United Nations, who said that such action was “beyond the mandate of UNAMIR.” Instead of allowing him to take action to protect the people about to be murdered, the UN ordered Dallaire to turn over his information to President Habyarimana, who had armed the militias in the first place. Instead of protecting someone who offered critical information at great personal risk, the UN simply informed Habyarimana that he had a leak in his security apparatus (Gourevitch 1998, 105).

Inadequately arming peacekeepers and inadequate forces also cripple intervention. The UN force in Bosnia in the early 1990s is one poignant example. When these lightly armed peacekeepers proved incapable of defending themselves, “one side literally chained peacekeepers to their armored fighting vehicles so that UN aircraft could not attack them as they violated the peace agreement without killing their fellow peacekeepers” (Snow 2010, 104-105). In Somalia, humanitarian intervention ended in humiliation for the United States and failure for the UN because not enough troops were committed to pacify the country and President Bush decided that the operation was not worth incurring many American casualties (Calvert & Calvert 2007, 275).

Intervention can prolong a conflict by giving enough aid to allow the war to continue indefinitely. As outside groups pick which side to favor in a forced peace agreement, they often make things worse (Snow 2010, 107). This certainly happened in Rwanda. When the French finally intervened under Operation Turquoise, they ensured the safe passage of the Hutus that had been massacring their neighbors out of the country instead of protecting their victims. Eventually, the RPF drove the government troops and interahamwe militias over the border into Zaire where the planners, orchestrators, and executors of the genocide in Rwanda fleeing as fugitives from justice, were welcomed into UN camps as “refugees.” These camps provided safe haven for the murderous interahamwe and soldiers to attack Tutsis in Zaire as well as cross border raids back into Rwanda. Similar camps were also established inside of Rwanda for “internally displaced persons” which also provided a base for continued violence under the flag of the United Nations. The money from these camps “went straight through the political rackets into the purchase of arms and munitions” to use to continue the bloodshed (Gourevitch 1998, 271).

In a more recent example, NATO intervention in Libya also appears to be prolonging a conflict. NATO does not have enough of a compelling interest to make a full intervention there. Without any real information on the true objectives of the rebels fighting Gadhafi, we cannot know even if the government they would install would be better or worse than the current dictatorship. NATO member states are simply not willing to suffer the kinds of casualties it would take to try to remove Gadhafi directly, resorting to half-hearted air strikes instead. And now, the rebel forces are out of money and many supplies (Stratfor 2011b) and are certainly not able to “sustain combat at significant distances from their base of power against a well-defended urban area [Tripoli] — a tactical situation that would be difficult even for the best-trained and best-equipped military forces” (Stratfor 2011a, n.p.). Gadhafi simply is trying to hold on until NATO gets tired of the cost of its involvement (Stratfor 2011a) which already appears to be happening in the United States with the growing opposition in Congress.

The international community needs to learn this simple fact: intervention is complicated, expensive, and often has unintended results. If we have a compelling national interest or we seek to prevent genocide, intervention can certainly be justified. If we decide to intervene, we must dedicate the resources and be willing to pay the cost to bring things to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible. But if we cannot stomach seeing the flag-draped caskets of our soldiers on the evening news, if we cannot have a full, unequivocal commitment to victory, then we should not get involved at all, because we will make the situation worse.

References

Calvert, Peter and Susan Calvert. 2007. Politics and Society in the Developing World. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited.

Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families. New York: Picador.

Snow, Donald. 2010. Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman.

Stratfor. 2011. Libya: A New Rebel Front and Gadhafi's Strategy. Strategic Forecasting. June 8. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110607-libya-new-rebel-front-and-gadhafis-strategy (accessed June 18, 2011).

Stratfor. 2011. Libya: Rebels Run Out of Money. June 18. http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20110618-libya-rebels-run-out-money (accessed June 18, 2011).

Democratization in Belarus

The former Soviet republic Belarus has yet to achieve meaningful democratization. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described it as "the last remaining true dictatorship in Europe" (CNN 2005). Since President Alexander Lukashenko took power in 1994, Belarus has not seen a single free and fair election; Beatings of opposition candidates and mass arrests are commonplace (Rosenberg 2010). The election laws are routinely and blatantly violated there (Marples 2009, 760).

Discussion of Belarus is important because Belarus is very relevant to American security concerns, because “Nato sees Belarus as a potential threat to neighboring Lithuania. Russian tanks stationed in Belarus can be in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, in about 90 minutes" (Gedmin 2009). Belarus also is important to EU energy security, since one-fifth of all Russian natural gas exports to Europe pass through Belarus (Gedmin 2009). In the larger scheme of things, Democratization in this seemingly inconsequential country is important because “Democratization in countries such as Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine will almost certainly help to curb Russia’s imperial appetite. Faced with neighboring democracies, Russia would be forced to take greater stock of its affairs at home… the outside game – what happens in Russia’s neighborhood—may be as important as what’s happening inside Russia" (Gedmin 2009).

In the three stage model of democratization, stage one is described as where an authoritarian government comes under pressure and makes limited concessions, such as "permitting opposition groups to organize, restraining the police and security agencies, extending the scope of free speech and expression and permitting the emergence (or re-emergence) of civil society” (Calvert & Calvert 2006, 359). Belarus is clearly still in stage one.

Belarus is quite an oppressive and authoritarian state. It is a one-party dominant state. Opposition parties are permitted to exist but are harshly repressed and have no real power. The regime has used the military against protestors after elections (Marples 2009, 757), and routinely jails opposition leaders for years. Press freedom is virtually non-existent; Freedom House ranked Belarus 188th out of 195 countries in terms of press freedom (Gedmin 2009).

However, in recent times, Belarus has made some concessions that place it in the first stage of democratization. It released many political prisoners before the parliamentary elections in September 2008 (Marples 2009, 770), largely as a result of US and EU demands (Gedmin 2009). The regime has also recently allowed two opposition newspapers to be sold in public as a result of EU pressure, although state control of broadcast media remains very tight (Marples 2009, 770). The poor economy in Belarus is likely to force further concessions. Twenty five percent of state employees were working reduced hours in 2009 because of a shortage of funds (Gedmin 2009).

Belarus does not have good long term prospects for significant democratization. Belarus has no examples of democracy in its history to draw on (Marples 2009, 757). Tight state control of media combined with frequent arrests of opposition leaders during election periods make it very difficult for the opposition to garner support among the people. State officials even go so far as to conscript family members of opposition politicians in retaliation for their political activities (Marples 2009, 760). State propaganda constantly derides such leaders as "enemies of Belarus and/or in the pay of foreign governments" (Marples 2009, 760), and the opposition is plagued by its own internal disputes that prevent coordination. The fact also remains that the Lukashenko regime enjoys genuine popularity among many people, due to its ability to deliver economic prosperity (largely funded by subsidies from Moscow, especially in terms of discounted natural gas). This support will likely erode in the face of rising energy prices, but in the short term Lukashenko is still quite popular (Marples 2009).

The fact also remains that both the Obama and Bush administrations have been extremely focused on the Middle East since 2001, and have largely neglected the security concerns that exist for US allies in Eastern Europe. President Obama in particular has chosen to pander to Russia by reneging on missile defense agreements in Poland to obtain Russian concessions with regard to the Middle East (Boudwin 2010). Because of this focus, it is unlikely that the United States will bring to bear any significant resources to encourage democratization in Belarus, which makes the future of freedom in that country even bleaker than it already is.

References

Boudwin, Ryan. 2010. Feeding Warsaw to the Bear. APUS paper reprinted at http://aworldinconflict.blogspot.com/2010/12/feeding-poland-to-bear.html (accessed June 5, 2011).

Calvert, Peter and Susan Calvert. 2007. Politics and Society in the Developing World. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited.

CNN. 2005. "Rice: Russia's future linked to democracy." April 20. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/20/rice.dougherty/index.html (accessed June 5, 2011).

Gedmin, Jeffrey. 2009. "Europe's Last Dictatorship." Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, May 29. A13. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed June 6, 2011).

Marples, David R. 2009. "Outpost of tyranny? The failure of democratization in Belarus." Democratization 16, no. 4: 756-776. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed June 6, 2011).

Rosenberg, Steve. 2010."Hundreds of protesters arrested in Belarus." BBC News. December 20. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12037486 (accessed June 5, 2011).

The Inverse Triangle of Jihad

Not all jihadists are created equal. Some have proven far more capable of adapting their strategies to fit the situation on the ground than others. Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Jemaah Islamiyah enjoy wider popular support and as a result are more difficult to eradicate than other Islamist organizations because they follow the “inverse triangle” model of jihad. This model is one “in which a broad network of social services supports a smaller jihadist core...it adopts a model of charities and NGOs that help... advance its jihadist goals” (Abuza 2009, paragraph 1). This approach is particularly effective in areas where the state is weak and unable to provide basic services (Hilsenrath 2005, 365).

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood was first founded in 1928. Its goal was to establish an Islamic state in Egypt free of foreign influence; these goals remain its driving ideology to this day (Caromba & Solomon 2008, 119). Unlike some of the other organizations discussed in this paper, the Muslim Brotherhood has declared that it has accepted procedural democracy. It has however, wholeheartedly rejected liberalism. Caromba and Solomon caution that

Pro-democracy arguments are useful for a party in opposition; less so for a party in government. It may be that the Brotherhood’s idea of democracy is merely a cynical ruse: ‘one man, one vote, one time’, in the words of Bernard Lewis... the pro-democracy rhetoric of the Brotherhood should not obscure its proscriptive policy preferences, which are likely to undermine freedom of speech, religion and gender equality if the Brotherhood ever came to power. Additionally, an Egypt ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood would certainly be more hostile to the West and Israel than the current regime, and might result in domestic sectarian violence between Muslims and religious minorities. In short, this would not be a desirable outcome for either Egyptians or the rest of the world (2008, 121 & 123).

The Muslim Brotherhood has built its popularity in two major ways. First, it took control of the Egyptian unions. The Egyptian civil society is dominated by these unions. This strategy has given the Muslim Brotherhood great access to the educated elite of Egypt (Caromba & Solomon 2008, 119-120). Second, it created a network of social services to address needs that the Egyptian government has not met.

This network of social services provides employment, health care, and food to a people desperately in need. This network was proved to be much more effective than the Egyptian government after the 1992 Cairo earthquake. The Muslim Brotherhood provided medical tents, food, clothing, blankets and shelters very quickly, and even gave one thousand US dollars to every family that lost their home. Their effectiveness made the government feel threatened; it responded by prohibiting humanitarian intervention by the Brotherhood (which backfired and made the Brotherhood even more popular than it already was). This network of social services creates an association in the minds of Egyptians between Islam and economic prosperity by showing success in areas where the state has failed, thereby advancing the Brotherhood's Islamist agenda (Caromba & Solomon 2008, 120).

Hamas

Hamas has long been considered a terrorist organization throughout the world. It was officially founded in 1987, though it had operated since 1973 as the Islamic Center, an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It has long followed the “inverse triangle” model by operating schools, mosques, orphanages, medical centers, soup kitchens, and even sports leagues. These activities are funded by Palestinians working in foreign lands and private donors from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. One Israeli scholar admitted that “Approximately 90 percent of its work is in social, welfare, cultural and educational activities” (Snow 2010, 15). Hamas's medical centers serve the dual purpose of endearing it to the Palestinian people as well as serving as a vehicle for jihadist propaganda; waiting rooms in their hospitals are littered with posters that glorify violence against Israel. Hilesnrath explained that “Hamas has adeptly exploited health services to gain legitimacy and, on occasion, to provide a base for terrorist actions against Israel” (2005, 369-370).

Hamas has long been respected for its ability to operate its network of social services without the same level of corruption that plagues the Fatah party associated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Snow 2010, 15). Understanding that makes it easier to understand why Hamas was able to win control of the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. This was a free and fair election that was monitored by the international community and drove Fatah from power (Snow 2010, 13).

The international community was horrified that a terrorist organization could win an election; the magic silver bullet of democracy had failed to moderate Palestinian politics. However, it seems evident that their electoral success had less to do with their violent jihadist agenda and more to do with the top of the inverse triangle; that is, their proven ability to provide services that would normally be performed by governments. Newsweek gave the following personal example: “In the West Bank village of Bidya, an old man who runs a vegetable stand explains that he voted for the Hamas mayor because he 'fixed the [mosque's] toilets'” (Peraino et al 2005). Hamas provides an excellent example of how the inverse triangle can ensure the support of the common people for a terrorist organization.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah was labeled a terrorist organization by the United States in 1983 following the bombing of a marine barracks in Beirut and other attacks against Jews and Americans. However, many other governments, including the European Union, have refused to do the same (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009,123) because Hezbollah has so adeptly followed the “inverse triangle” model of jihad.

Hezbollah is primarily known in the United States for the violent actions of its paramilitary units and terrorist attacks; in reality, this is only a small part of Hezbollah's reach. Hezbollah runs a network of health and social services that is far stronger than the Lebanese government is capable of. It also is a major political party that dominates politics in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah's members see their social programs and political activity as part and parcel of their unified strategy of resistance to Israel and the West. International donors and aid agencies have a hard time avoiding interaction with Hezbollah, since they are one of the best equipped organizations to distribute aid (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 122-123).

Hezbollah's assistance to the Lebanese people takes many forms. They helped people trapped in their homes during a major snowstorm in 1992. Through their Jihad Construction Foundation, Hezbollah has built up infrastructure in Lebanon. In the early part of the 2000s, Hezbollah was distributing 45% of the water to Beirut's southern Shiite suburb. They also provide garbage collection in poor areas (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 125,129). Hezbollah gives financial assistance to families who have lost loved ones or been wounded in conflicts with Israel, and rebuilt over five thousand homes in eighty-two different villages in only two months after Israel attacked Lebanon in 1996. They even provide loans to start small businesses (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 127, 131).

Hezbollah also has a significant influence in education. Public education in Lebanon is very poor quality, leading those with means to turn to expensive private schools. Hezbollah operates private schools for far less than other organizations, to the tune of 14,000 students. They also provide scholarships, financial assistance for low-income students and operate libraries (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 125-126).

Hezbollah is known for improving access to health care. In Lebanon, government health care has long been used as a tool of political patronage for politicians to reward their supporters. Hezbollah has met health care needs through its Islamic Health Unit, which operates three hospitals and more than fifty other health care facilities that provide low-income residents care at little or no cost. They also offer free health insurance and use a network of pharmacies to provide prescription coverage. As a result of their success, the Lebanese government turned over several government hospitals in Southern Lebanon to their control (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 125, 130).

This devotion to services has ensured strong political support for Hezbollah. Seventy-two percent of Lebanon's poor back the party (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 132). After all, “one can see the appeal of a party that has designated itself as 'the champion of the peasants and farmers, the laborers and the poor, the oppressed and the deprived, the workers and the homeless'” (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 127). The Shiite population in particular trusts Hezbollah to come to its rescue if they are victims of violence (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 125).

Hezbollah is quite unambiguous about its motives. Hezbollah's NGO director Hajj Kassem Aleik put it bluntly that “the resistance society [against Israel] is our vision. It is the task to build a society that will refuse oppression and fight for its rights. All the rest – water provision, garbage collection, agricultural training – is only a working strategy” (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009, 133). Hezbollah's “inverse triangle” has brought it great political success.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah is a terrorist organization that fights for an Islamist state in Indonesia. It was founded in 1993, and is an al-Qaeda affiliate that trained both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In its first years of operation, it was a more conventional terrorist organization. It slaughtered Christians and Hindus in an attempt to create separate Islamist areas for Muslims. It has also used bombings to achieve its goals. In October 2002, it bombed a disco in Bali, which resulted in the deaths of over two hundred people. The Indonesian authorities responded with a fairly successful crackdown in 2003, forcing Jemaah Islamiyah to change its strategy and adopt the “inverse triangle” model proven by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah to survive (Abuza 2009).

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia serves as the parent organization for all of Jemaah Islamiyah's overt activities. This organization has published anti-Semitic and anti-American books, magazines, and even multimedia since 1999. It now lobbies politicians and is successfully working within the system to implement Islamic law at the regional level. In nearly forty regions, local governments have implemented Sharia law to force Qur'an reading, ban alcohol and regulate interaction between the sexes. It also seeks to replace secular media programming with Islamic programming, require Arabic literacy and force government employees to wear Islamic dress (Abuza 2009).

Jemaah Islamiyah is more transparent about its dislike for freedom than other Islamist organizations. Muhammad Jibril, the manager of the multimedia publishing department, explained to Al-Jazeera: “We want an Islamic state where Islamic law is not just in the books but enforced, and enforced with determination. There is no space and no room for democratic consultation” (Azusa 2009). Another leader, Ba'asyir, said that “The democratic system is not the Islamic way. It is forbidden. Democracy is based on people, but the state must be based on God's law- I call it Allahcracy. Islam's victory can only come through da'wa and jihad, not elections” (Azusa 2009).

Jemaah Islamiyah now offers social services in keeping with the example of Hezbollah as a way to increase its support. During the tsunami of December 2004 and the earthquake of May 2006, Jemaah Islamiyah used its charities to advance its Islamist goals. It sent volunteers that assisted in reconstructing mosques, distributing aid and the burial of the many who perished. Beyond its humanitarian goals, however, it sought to prevent non-Muslim relief agencies from being able to proselyte in Indonesia. The World Food Program gave one of Jemaah Islamiyah's affiliates a major aid distribution contract; the aid was to be distributed by terrorists just released from prison. The WFP only backed out after strong international opposition led by neighboring Australia (Azusa 2009).

The “inverse triangle” model has been very successful in Indonesia. There is no longer any political will to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure that exists there. Political leaders have also been unwilling to enforce United Nations Security Council 1267 or US Treasury Department rulings that prohibit fundraising for Jemaah Islamiyah and its deriviatives because they have the mistaken belief that their overt activities will de-radicalize them. Many Indonesians no longer consider Jemaah Islamiyah a radical organization because of their change in strategy. Terrorist leaders have been released from prison and now work openly in politics, religion and through their charities. Their greater connections with the legal civilian world has made them able to continue their work more effectively (Azusa 2009). Azusa warned that:

Policymakers in Indonesia need to understand precedent. The existence of charities and social service networks has not made Hamas or Hezbollah any less violent although they have contributed to de-legitimization of governments. The Indonesian government should do what the Lebanese, Israeli, and Palestinian Authority governments did not: They must uproot social networks. Few governments have put forward a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the phenomenon of the inverse triangle, and most disaggregate the terrorist and social welfare arms and fund raising. This unwillingness to take on terrorist infrastructure is regrettable. First, like Hezbollah and Hamas, Jemaah Islamiyah has a long-term timetable. Second, by pursuing overt strategies, Jemaah Islamiyah is able to forge closer ties and common cause with Islamists who might otherwise eschew their violence... Targeting their financial and social networks is essential to the long-term fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

What can we learn from the success of Islamist organizations using the “inverse triangle” model? We learn that counter-terrorism that only targets military wings of organizations cannot be successful. It is like trying to kill a hydra. You can cut off one head, but two more will grow in its place. There are real and significant reasons these groups enjoy popular support. We must understand their appeal and provide the people meaningful alternatives.

A comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that features meaningful economic development as its primary focus will be far more successful than one that focuses on military means. Improving governance, reducing corruption and improving the abilities of nation-states to respond to their own citizens needs is also essential. Winning over the hearts and minds of the people who support these organizations is only possible if they have somewhere else to go when they are injured or sick; somewhere else to turn for clean drinking water, and somewhere else to educate their children. If the void these organizations fill through the “inverse triangle” is filled, then people will have a greater incentive to reject their radical agenda; they won't have to bite the only hand willing to feed them.

Reference List

Abuza, Zachary. 2009. "Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model." Middle East Quarterly 16, no. 1: 15-26. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 21, 2011).

Caromba, Laurence, and Hussein Solomon. 2008. "Understanding Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood." African Security Review 17, no. 3: 118-124. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed April 21, 2011).

Flanigan, Shawn Teresa, and Mounah Abdel-Samad. 2009. "Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations." Middle East Policy 16, no. 2: 122-137. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 21, 2011).

Hilsenrath, Peter. 2005. "Health Policy as Counter-terrorism: Health Services and the Palestinians." Defence & Peace Economics 16, no. 5: 365-374. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 21, 2011).

Peraino, Kevin, Nuha Musleh, and Samir Zedan. 2005. "How Hamas Wins Voters." Newsweek 145, no. 16: 42. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 21, 2011).

Snow, Donald. 2010. Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman.

Why there will be no peace in Palestine

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of a conflict without much hope for resolution. The Holy Land has been the site of vicious ethnic conflict for thousands of years, and the Israeli-Palestinian impasse is but a short blip on the long and bloody history of the land we call Palestine. Even if we focus only on the recent past, “If Israelis and Palestinians have endured sixty years of conflict of one kind or another, the question arises as to whether both sides are prepared for peace. Do both sides want peace and are they ready for it?” (Kibble 2010, 65). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has six different common characteristics that define irresolvable conflict: There are multiple claimants to sovereign control of territory, the territorial conflict is an "extremely emotional, deep and fundamental... rightful homeland issue" divided by religion or ethnicity, it is seen as a zero sum game by both sides with positions that are mutually exclusive, both sides see compromise as unacceptable and their point of view as righteous, outside mediation has failed, and the parties are unable to find acceptable outcomes to resolve the conflict (Snow 2010, 59-60).

The first two characteristics of irresolvable conflict are that there are multiple claimants to sovereign control of territory and that "this territorial conflict must be extremely emotional, deep, and fundamental" divided by religion or ethnicity (Snow 2010, 59). There is no better textbook example of this in our world than the struggle in the Holy Land. The city of Jerusalem is considered a holy city by Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and that injects a religious element unseen in other conflicts far beyond simple differences of faith. The Palestinians wish to return to the land of their fathers they see as having been stolen from them. For the Jews the question is about survival. Yigal Allon, former Israeli foreign minister and military commander, explained it thus:

"The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the Arab states and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the anticipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army. To our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative to survive" (Hasson 2010, 701).

With every new atrocity on each side, with each new dead mother, dead father, and dead child, the territorial issues become more deeply emotional for all involved. Earlier this month, an Israeli family of five was brutally murdered in a West Bank settlement, including three young children (Al-Jazeera 2011). This attack has already prompted Israeli hard-liners to demand increased construction and expansion of existing settlements. One local mother, responding to the incident, said that "If we expand and build, it will tell the Arabs that this is our land, and they will know their place" (Heller 2011).

Mutually exclusive positions and the perception that the Israeli-Palestinian impasse is a zero sum game provide further evidence that this is an irresolvable conflict. The Jewish settler theology claims all of Palestine as a God-given homeland for Jews as the covenant people of God, and many Muslims see the entire region as a Muslim endowment from Allah (Kibble 2010, 70-71). The issue of East Jerusalem is another example. Arabs expect a Palestinian capital there as part of any peace agreement, and even Prime Minister Olmert agreed with that premise as he left office but Netanyahu refuses to give up East Jerusalem (Kibble 2010, 70).

There is a perception on both sides of the conflict that compromise is unacceptable and that their side has a truly righteous position. "Jewish settlers in the war-won territories and their political sympathizers... still expect Netanyahu to fight for the Land of Israel and for an all-Jewish Jerusalem" (Hasson 2010, 699). Hamas executes moderates it deems Israeli collaborators (BBC 2010), which makes the Palestinians most likely to embrace a peace agreement too intimidated to speak out against them.

Outside mediation has failed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for two reasons. First, “The United States, whose influence in the area is critical is seen… as a staunch supporter of Israel… and whatever the truth of the matter, and despite evidence to the contrary, the Washington administration is believed to be strongly influenced by the American Jewish lobby" (Kibble 2010, 69-70). Second, the Arab world is divided and does not provide a unified voice for peace. Moderate states such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been inclined to support the possibility of peace, but other regional powers such as Iran and Syria directly support terrorist organizations that make peace negotiations more difficult, and fundamentalist Islamists place their own pressures on the peace process. "Both governments seem to radiate weakness when confronting spoilers who seek to derail the otherwise fragile negotiations for peace" (Hasson 2010, 710).

Both parties have been unable to find an acceptable solution to the conflict. A recent poll showed that over sixty percent of both Israelis and Palestinians support the idea of a peace process, but only twenty nine percent of Israelis and eighteen percent of Palestinians believe that peace is even possible (Kibble 2010, 65). Israelis are divided on the solution; some seek a solution in democracy and economic prosperity, some demand defensible borders at any cost, some favor unilateral withdrawal, some seek the expansion of Israeli territorial control, and some seek a democratic bi-national state (Hasson 2010, 696-697). The Palestinians are similarly divided, as illustrated by the inability of the Palestinian Authority to control Hamas (Hasson 2010, 702).

Peace in the Middle East is not on the horizon. "A viable Palestinian state is a dream that disappeared in the face of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Within the framework of the existing territorial divisions, a Palestinian state would be reduced to a collection of reservations lacking territorial contiguity and economic viability" (Hasson 697). The Israeli and Palestinian peoples are so intertwined now that I do not believe a two-state solution is viable. I believe the only solution that can allow peace to come is to establish a secular democratic state with full religious freedom that can provide economic development for all in the region. This however is not likely, because Israel is unwilling to threaten its identity as a Jewish state and the Palestinians expect their own state. "In other words, what is mostly desired (i.e., the two-state solution) cannot be realized, at least not in the short run, and what might have a chance to be realized (a bi-national state) is clearly not desired by the majority of Israelis and Palestinians" (Hasson 2010, 713).

References

Al-Jazeera. 2011. "Five Israelis Killed in West Bank." March 12. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/ middleeast/2011/03/201131214044228389.html (accessed March 14, 2011).

BBC News. 2010. "'Palestinian collaborators' executed by Hamas." April 15. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8622084.stm (accessed March 14, 2010).

Hasson, Shiomo. 2010. "Israel's Geopolitical Dilemma." Eurasian Geography & Economics 51, no. 6: 694- 715. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 14, 2011).

Heller, Aron. 2011. "Angry Israeli settlers demand more construction in the wake of grisly murder of parents, kids." Canadian Press. March 14. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast /2011/03/201131214044228389.html (accessed March 14, 2011).

Kibble, David G. 2010. "Are Israel and Palestine Ready for Peace?." Peace Review 22, no. 1: 65-72. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 14, 2011).

Snow, Donald. 2010. Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman.

How the Kremlin Uses Political Parties

Russias party system was extremely fragmented in the 1990s, with electoral volatility at an all time high and large numbers of politicians who achieved victory without party affiliation (Gel’man 2008, 913-914). As Russia’s system of politics matured and moved towards stronger parties, which political scientists consider indispensable for democracy (Gel’man 2008, 915), Russia has become more and more authoritarian. The Kremlin has increasingly turned to political parties to maintain its power, a very rational choice given that party-based authoritarian regimes last much longer than personalist and military ones (Gel’man 2008, 917).

In today’s Russian system only four parties are represented in national politics: United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, A Just Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Of these, only the Communist Party was not created by the Kremlin itself; United Russia is the chosen ruling party and LDPR and Just Russia were created and maintained as satellite parties of the Kremlin. Vladimir Rzyhkov, a former Duma deputy, called this situation a “’a Dresden party system,’ openly referring to the experience of East Germany under the GDR’s communist regime, which was familiar to Vladimir Putin during his KGB service in the 1980s… However, party-based authoritarianism in the GDR was probably one of the most repressive regimes in Eastern Europe” (Gel’man 2008, 927-928).

United Russia was created from a merger of Fatherland-All Russia, a group of party substitutes that had threatened the Kremlin, with Unity, the Kremlin’s own party, in 2002 (Hale 2010, 93). The United Russia party does not have a clear ideological basis. It has kept its position very vague on major policy issues During the 2007 election, UR’s strategy was to endorse Putin’s plan, without getting into specifics as to what that plan actually was (Gel’man 2008, 921). United Russia, led by Putin, has made sweeping changes to the nature of Russian elections in order to secure its position as a permanent ruling party. Changing the threshold for proportional representation voting from five to seven percent, moving to a purely PR system, creating party registration requirements, prohibiting coalitions of parties from running together on the party list, and eliminating the election of regional governors were all moves calculated to ensure that United Russia would dominate all significant aspects of government (Hale 2010, 94 & Gel’man 2008, 919). United Russia itself is a puppet party created to legitimize the autocratic rule of the Kremlin; Kremlin officials control all strategic decision-making of the party (Gel’man 2008, 920). United Russia has also made ties to political parties in other nations; one specific example is its alliance with the Democratic Party of Moldova in September 2010 (Strategic Forecasting, 2010).

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is a satellite party, believed by some to have been created by the KGB to discredit democratic principles (Hale 2010, 89). It relies on corporate donations and on the protest vote of poor young men. Ideologically it is a strongly nationalist and populist party. The LDPR has been very loyal to the Kremlin, forcing through governmental policy proposals and blocking an attempt to impeach the president in 1999. Its main purpose now is to cripple opposition parties through negative campaigning (Gel’man 2008, 924).

A Just Russia is another satellite party created by the Kremlin. It was merged from the Pensioner's Party, the Party of Life and Motherland (Gel’man 2008, 923) and was intended to bleed left-wing votes from the Communist Party (Hale 2010, 96); splitting the Communist vote in this fashion has crippled the opposition. It employs strongly socialist rhetoric (Gel’man 2008, 923).

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is a veteran party and the only party that can truly be considered independent of the Kremlin’s control. It is not a direct continuation of the soviet-era Communist Party; it has embraced nationalism to get support from hard-line nationals as well as former communists (Hale 2010, 85). It is the “primary source of political competition” to united Russia (Hale 2010, 87). It has been well-targeted by the Kremlin; it loses votes on the right to LDPR and on the left to Just Russia. As an opposition party it is not very relevant, because even “all parties other than UR acting together do not have enough potential to form a meaningful alternative to it” (Gel’man 2008, 914).

Russia is an authoritarian state that uses political parties as a means to legitimize its rule, and its experience is not unique. Its multi-party competition is an illusion; like communist Poland and East Germany, it created “loyal peasant and Christian parties… as channels of political control over targeted social milieus” (Gel’man 2008, 924). Now that the Kremlin has solidified its position, it is unlikely that the balance of power in Russia will change in the near future.

References

Gel'man, Vladimir. 2008. "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy." Europe-Asia Studies, August. 913-930. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed January 24, 2011).

Hale, Henry. 2010. “Russia’s Political Parties and their Substitutes.” Developments in Russian Politics 7. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Strategic Forecasting. 2010. An Agreement Between Russian, Moldovan Political Parties. September 16. Email subscription.