Hezbollah and Hamas provide some interesting implications from their current political situation. Hamas can no longer be relegated to the role of “lunatic fringe,” since they constitute the democratically elected government of the Palestinian Authority. 1 There are three criteria to be considered to qualify for the status of belligerency: “rebellion must be organized around a government, the revolt must extend a local uprising, and a substantial area must be under the de facto control of antigovernment forces.” 2 Based on these criteria, Hamas fits the bill. They are organized and have popular support, and they control the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hezbollah’s qualifications are not as clear cut due to their minority status.
However, Wolfe’s criteria for belligerency omits a critical point. Belligerency status in the context of international law specifically subjects the belligerency to both the protection and obligations of the laws of war and the Geneva Convention. This principle was established in 1861, when although formal recognition of independence was withheld, Britain, Spain and France recognized the Confederacy as “a belligerent community subject to the rules of the law of war and entitled to the protection thereof.” 3 The Geneva Convention lays out some specific criteria for privileged combatants (those protected by the Geneva Convention) who are not members of the armed forces of a recognized nation-state:
“(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”4
Hamas and Hezbollah are both organized resistance movements with a command structure. However, they do not wear uniforms or other distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, or follow the laws of war. They deliberately target civilians and hide behind white flags amongst the population; the civilian blood on their hands makes them unprivileged combatants, not protected by the Geneva Convention.
It is both politically and morally contradictory to recognize either Hamas or Hezbollah as a belligerency in the context of international law without also holding them to the standard of the rules of war. If they are to be recognized as a belligerency then we should be following the example of Nuremberg and more recently in Yugoslavia and trying the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah for war crimes before an international tribunal.
References:
1. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA World Factbook: West Bank. (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_we.html.
2. JAMES HASTINGS WOLFE, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (PRENTICE HALL 2002).
3. Id.
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Saturday, November 28, 2009
From Washington to Paris
The American Revolution resulted in a stable republic that has lasted more than two hundred years. The French Revolution began in the same time period with similar goals, but quickly degenerated into the Reign of Terror and ultimately the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte. What made this Revolution end so differently? Following the revolution, America was left to its own devices; its geographical isolation ensured its survival. Financial ruin (caused in part by French involvement in the American Revolution) ensured the end of the French King’s absolute power, but did not explain the abuses and excesses that followed the initial Revolution (Schama, 1989, p. 62). France faced external pressures that were not present in America, beginning with the joint declaration of Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire threatening armed intervention in France, which spread into a conflict with most of Europe united against the French revolutionaries. The French Revolution failed because the French faced hostile external pressures that were not present in America.
The Spark of Revolution
The French Revolution had largely economic causes. The government was deeply indebted from its frequent intervention in various wars, including the American Revolution. But the financial crisis that gripped France in the eighteenth century alone does not explain the French Revolution or the excesses that followed. Simon Schama, a respected historian, explains that “If the causes of the French Revolution are complex, the causes of the downfall of the monarchy are not. The two phenomena are not identical, since the end of absolutism in France did not of itself entail a revolution of such transformative power as actually came to pass in France” (Schama, 1989, p. 62).
The American Revolution began in opposition to new taxes imposed by Great Britain without any American representation in Parliament (Nash et al., 2002, p. 141). The French Revolution had at its root a much more emotional issue; the people were facing starvation. A poor harvest led to a famine that was blamed on the aristocracy, and provoked a much more violent and emotional reaction from the common people than taxes aroused in America (Schama, 1989). The many hungry poor Frenchmen saw the privileged few as an evil to be destroyed. De Tocqueville, a French historian best known for his works on American democracy, explained that the “intense, indomitable hatred of inequality” was far more deeply rooted in French society than the desire for political freedom (1856/1955, p. 207).
Politically, the American colonies were much better prepared for revolution than France. The American colonies had more than 150 years of limited self rule experience through established legislative assemblies, such as the House of Burgesses in Virginia (Nash et al, 2002, p. 37). The Estates-General of France showed its lack of experience by being considerably less deliberative and more theatrical than the American Constitutional Convention (Schama, 1989). “When the revolution started, it would have been impossible to find, in most parts of France, even ten men used to acting in concert and defending their interests without appealing to the central power for aid” (de Tocqueville, 1856/1955, p. 206).
America had the advantage of not having a local king. The Comte de La Blache explained that “the French are not a people who have just emerged from the depths of the woods to form an original association,” and that the existence of the monarchy was a great complication for the French (Schama, 1989, p. 443). The fact that the Queen of France also was sister to the Emperor of Austria brought foreign threats to any assault on the monarchy.
The United States was also better prepared in terms of military organization. The American colonies had long-established organized militias who had experience fighting together in the French and Indian War; the Americans were able to fight the British as organized units. The French military was torn apart by the Revolution; anti-government feeling was widespread among junior officers and non-commissioned officers, and the army as a whole was inclined to disobey orders (Schama, 1989, p. 371-375). Defections and emigrations were common and created an atmosphere of conspiracy and paranoia. The French Revolution was driven onward by a series of popular uprisings of mobs that were impossible to control and sunk to the deepest depravity and brutality. Schama described the fate of the King’s guards at the hands of the mob:
"But that noontime they were given neither shelter nor quarter. Hunted down, they were mercilessly butchered: stabbed, sobered, stoned and clubbed. Women stripped the bodies of clothes and whatever possessions they could find. Mutilators hacked off limbs and scissored out genitals and stuffed them in gaping mouths or fed them to the dogs. What was left was thrown on bonfires" (1989, p. 615).
The War on the Church
The American Revolution avoided making attacks on religion, largely due to the diversity of religious groups in the American colonies. The French revolutionaries however saw in the vast estates of the Catholic church a fiscal salvation for the Republic. The church was also seen as a political threat too closely tied to the monarchy. Church lands were sold and priests were forced to swear an oath of allegiance to the state or face execution. Later, in keeping with a general policy of dechristianization, churches were looted and vandalized, and the church bells melted down for munitions to defend the Republic. (Schama, 1989).
It is interesting to note that such actions had support even in countries that were part of the counter-revolutionary coalition. Mary Wollstonecraft, a British radical thinker, justified the redistribution of property from both nobles and the Church in France, saying that both clergy and the nobility had received these lands not from any merit of their own but from illegal seizures of much earlier times (1790/1995, p. 50).
Invasion and Rebellion
The Americans were fortunate to have the Atlantic to protect them from foreign invasion. Once the British were gone, their geographic isolation allowed them to survive six years of ineffective governance and still achieve a peaceful transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution.
The French were not so lucky. Even before France boiled over into revolution, there was a precedent for counterrevolutionary invasion; Prussia had invaded the Netherlands to put down a revolution against their monarch (Schama, 1989, p. 252). The French revolution alarmed all the rulers of Europe (especially after the execution of the king, Louis XVI), and their stated goal of a republican crusade throughout the continent united former enemies against France. Brissot, a prominent revolutionary, had said, “We cannot be calm until all of Europe is in flames” (Schama, 1989, p. 643). France faced a coalition of Britain, Prussia, Austria, Holland, and Spain. As the Prussian and Austrian armies approached Paris, their commander, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a proclamation, stating his intention to restore the monarchy, and warned that if the royal family were harmed he would level the city of Paris and slaughter the entire population of the city (1792).
The French also faced an internal rebellion from the department of Vendee, where a royalist army arose in response to the Republic’s many attacks on the Catholic Church (Schama, 1989 p. 690). The counterrevolutionary rebellion, combined with the real threat of foreign troops on French soil and widespread fears of conspiracy, created an atmosphere of extreme paranoia that would spill over into the bloody slaughter of the Reign of Terror. “Obsessive fears of this kind led directly to the deaths of many thousands of people,” not just in France but also later in equally bloody revolutions in Russia and China (Tackett, 2000, p. 693).
From the ashes of the Terror, all that remained was a trail of blood. France’s radical republicans could not erase all of the economic problems from France simply by slaughtering the aristocracy. After the failure of the Revolution to establish good governance and end anarchy, “the ideal of freedom had lost much of its appeal and the nation, at a loss where to turn, began to cast round for a master,” which they would find in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte (de Tocqueville, 1856/1955, p. 209).
What then, is the lesson for our day that rises paramount from the failure of the French Revolution? That American ideals, institutions, and methods will not succeed as a universal prescription for the world; that local economic, political, social, and religious conditions can make policies that have succeeded in one country fail utterly in another. The blood still dripping from the blade of the guillotine and Napoleon’s battlefields calls out to us today, warning of the dangers of “nation building” and “regime change” without a profound understanding of how local conditions and culture will affect planning and the prospects of success.
References
De Tocqueville, A. (1955). The old regime and the French Revolution. (S. Gilbert, Trans.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Original work published 1856).
Duke of Brunswick. (1792). The proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick, 1792. Readings in European History 2. 443-445. Retrieved from http://history.hanover.edu/texts/bruns.htm.
Nash, G. B., Jeffrey, J.R., Howe, J. R., Frederick, P. J., Davis, A. F., & Winkler, A. M. (2002). The American people: Creating a nation and a society. (5th ed.). No location given: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
Schama, S. (1989). Citizens: A chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc.
Tackett, T. (2000). Conspiracy obsession in a time of revolution. American Historical Review 105(3). 690-713.
Wollstonecraft, M. (1995). A vindication of the rights of men with a vindication of the rights of woman and hints. (Sylvana Tomaselli, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1790).
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Chechnya: Russia’s Inferno
Chechnya has long been a hotbed of violence and discontent and a thorn in the side of Russian leaders. Chechnya has been fighting the Russians in their various political incarnations for nearly three centuries and has been the site of atrocities by both sides of the conflict. Having shown that it has been unable to fully govern itself as a de-facto independent state during the 1990s, but also that it is completely unwilling to accept Russian control, the only real solution for stability in Chechnya is “conditional independence under an international administration,” as put forward by Maskhadov, the former Chechen president (Evangelista, 2003, p. 6).
Cultural Considerations
Chechnya is primarily a Muslim country; Islam was strongly established in Chechnya during the eighteenth century (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 31). Religious tensions with the Russian Christians in the era of the Tsars and later the anti-religious Soviet Union have added fuel to the conflagration of Russian-Chechen relations. Chechens also have a strong clan-based social structure that ties individuals to a large family and to the land itself; these relationships, combined with their ties to Islam, have prevented Chechen assimilation into Russian society (Gall & de Waal, 1998).
Historical Context
Monica Toft, in her work The Geography of Ethnic Violence, explains that “Chechen history has been riddled with wars of conquest and these wars have imprinted on Chechen identity a virulent determination to resist any form of colonization by outsiders” (2003, p. 65). “Long before they came to fight a guerilla war with Russia… the Chechens were the most rebellious people in the Russian empire” (Gaal and de Waal, 1998, p. 20). Only by understanding the historical context of this conflict can we understand the basis for the hatred that has driven the violence in Chechnya.
Chechnya was first invaded by the Russian empire in 1722, when Peter the Great led an expedition against Persia through the Caucasus Mountains, sparking the first Chechen battle against the Russian Army (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 37). The first real organized revolt was led by a Chechen named Ushurma in 1785, who called for an Islamic jihad against the Tsars that ruled Russia. Ushurma was eventually captured 1791 and his insurrection put down (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 38), but the Chechens would not remain quiet long.
Alexei Yermolov, who was appointed as a Tsarist general to subdue the Caucasus, founded Grozny, the future capital, in 1818 on the ruins of six Chechen villages he had razed, but then had to fight a strong Chechen rebellion in 1825 (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 40). In 1834, Imam Shamil led a rebellion that lasted twenty-five years, followed by yet another uprising in 1877 (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 43).
The rise of the Soviet Union would not change much in Chechen-Russian relations. Lenin and Stalin promised freedom to the Chechens in 1917 in exchange for help during the Bolshevik Revolution (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 53). Although in 1919 Uzum Haji, a Chechen jihadist, led a force against the White Army, his words of hatred showed that no lasting peace would ensue: “I weave a rope to hang engineers, students and all those who write from left to right” (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 21). The Chechens revolted against Soviet rule first in 1920, and then again in 1929 when collectivization of Soviet agriculture spread to Chechnya.
The Soviets struck back with brutal methods. Stalin began mass executions in 1937, and in 1944 he ordered troops off of the front line of World War II to deport over six hundred thousand Chechens to Kazakhstan. Within four years of their exile, nearly one-fourth of all the Chechens had died (Gall and de Waal, 1998, p. 61). But, in keeping with tradition, the Chechens rebelled in Kazakhstan in 1954. The hatred that had begun with Tsarist exploitation and brutality now solidified in the cold of exile, unifying the Chechens that were before divided between clans into one true nation (Gall and de Waal, 1998, p. 74).
The Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya as part of Khruschev’s destalinization program, but they were still brutally oppressed. All of their mosques were closed by 1961 (Gall and de Waal, p. 33). With their long history of bloodshed and conflict with the Russians, it is no surprise that Chechnya would declare its independence in 1991 in the midst of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gall and de Waal, p. 98).
The Chechen Wars
Russia was not about to just let Chechnya go, however. As soon as it got itself back on its feet after the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, they sent troops to quell this latest rebellion in Chechnya. Russian president Boris Yeltsin was particularly concerned that if Chechnya were allowed to secede unchallenged, there would be a “domino effect” as the many other ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation took similar action and the country would disintegrate into many independent states (Toft, 2003, p. 81).
Russian troops fought a bloody and vicious war in Chechnya from 1994 until 1996. Despite overwhelming military superiority, Moscow lost to an underequipped and undermanned guerrilla insurgency that often used terrorism to achieve its goals. In the face of huge casualties they withdrew, making Chechnya a de-facto independent republic (Toft, 2003, p. 79). Matthew Evangelista explained the result of such a settlement thus: “The lessons learned by many Chechens- at least the ones with guns- were that Russia is vulnerable to terrorist acts, that the Russian people are easily demoralized, and that their leaders will heed their views and withdraw as the costs mount” (2003).
After three years of instability and continued violence, President Vladimir Putin invaded Chechnya again, citing apartment bombings in Russia that killed almost three hundred people that were blamed on Chechen terrorists and an invasion of Dagestan by Islamic radicals based in Chechnya (Evangelista, 2003). Russian troops reestablished federal control of Chechnya, and declared their counter-terrorism effort finished in 2009 (Schwirtz, 2009b).
But recent events have shown the resilience of the Chechen resistance. Chechnya has flared up again in the summer of 2009. Islamic militants declared that “all members of law enforcement and state officials are traitors to Islam and enemies that should be exterminated” (Schwirtz, 2009a). They have attacked these groups as collaborators with the Russian occupation. Police officers, judges, government officials, and the civilians caught in the crossfire have died in increasing numbers, with more than 120 killed between January and June 2009 (Schwirtz, 2009a), with 436 more killed from June through August (Barry, 2009). Grigory S. Shvedov, a local journalist, sums it up: “The number of bombings, terrorist attacks and murders as in the past remains high; they occur every week. It is a fairy tale that Chechnya has become a stable region” (Schwirtz, 2009b).
Issues of Sovereignty in Chechnya
Tony Wood, in his book Chechnya: The Case for Independence, claims that Chechnya has a defined territory, a specific group that claims that territory, and had a legitimately elected government with effective control of the population, meeting three prerequisites for national sovereignty (Ware, 2007). However, the invasion of Dagestan by Basayev and Khattab, Islamic militants who led 1200 fighters across the Chechen border, shows that the independent Chechen government was unable to control radical elements (Abdullaev, 2004).
Tony Wood also claims in his book that the international world should have recognized Chechnya as an independent state when the Soviet Union fell apart, as they did 15 other former soviet republics. However, the Soviet republic Chechnya that was a part of also included Ingushetia, which broke from Chechnya in 1992 (Ware, 2007).
The European Union’s view of the conflict in Chechnya has evolved over the years. The European Parliament has issued repeated resolutions attacking human rights violations in Chechnya by both Russia itself and local security forces loyal to Moscow, as recently as January 2006 (Francis, 2008). Despite their repeated declarations, “their concrete proposals were not translated into meaningful action” (Francis, 2008). The furthest the European Union was willing to go was to freeze some 120 million euros in aid to Russia and call for a commission of inquiry that was never actually implemented (Francis, 2008).
The European Union has never questioned the territorial integrity of Russia, and while calling for a negotiated end to the violence, has never accepted the Chechens’ claim of independence as legitimate (Francis, 2008). The attacks of 9/11 softened much worldwide criticism of Russia’s heavy hand in Chechnya, because President Putin was better able to frame his war in the context of the global war on terrorism, with several Chechen groups declared terrorists by the United States (Evangelista, 2003). Putin’s Chechenization policy of indirect rule through non-separatist Chechens has almost completely silenced the EU’s previous demands of negotiation (Francis, 2008). Without European support, Chechnya’s hopes for sovereignty and independence are abysmal.
Lessons of the Chechen Conflict
Chechnya is a prime example of the power sub-state actors wield in today’s fragmenting world. Chris Berzins and Patrick Cullen explain: “Allegiance to the nation-state appears to be bending in significant ways to sub-state forms of political identity, for example at the local and regional level, as well as to supra-state forms of political allegiance at the global level” (Berzins & Cullen, 2003). They also explain that we now live in a neo-medievalist world, with overlapping loyalties that resemble feudalism as practiced during the Middle Ages (Berzins & Cullen, 2003).
Chechnya also shows us the influence of supra-state actors like the European Union. It is likely that Putin’s decision to adopt indirect rule in Chechnya was made largely to silence EU criticism of the situation in Chechnya (Francis, 2008). Transnational terrorism has also been facilitated by the disintegrating borders and shifting allegiances of the modern neo-medieval world; the advances of technology have also made it easier for foreign fighters to reach remote areas and communicate without state control (Francis, 2008).
Conclusion
The situation in Chechnya is complicated by the fact that neither side of the conflict has the moral high ground. The Chechens have used acts of terrorism that have led to huge death tolls of non-combatants to achieve their goals; Russian troops have violated the Geneva Convention and engaged in state-sponsored terrorism by “wholesale destruction of villages, mass bombing of the Chechen capital of Grozny and other cities, indiscriminate roundups of civilians, torture, and extrajudicial killings” (Evangelista, 2003). The Russians have brutalized the Chechens for three centuries; the Chechen militants seek to establish a religious state based on the brutal Islamic code of law known as sharia, and to force that ideal upon the entire Caucasus region, not just Chechnya (Ware, 2007). After all, the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen militants helped to spark the second Chechen war (Abdullaev, 2004).
The Chechens have shown that they will never accept Russian occupation, and will not stop fighting until they have driven the Russians out once and for all. The Russians will not let go either, as Abdullaev explains: “since foreign elements and an emphasis on terrorism have virtually hijacked the Chechen cause, Moscow believes that it has no other viable choice but to continue its war in the Northern Caucasus.” Russia will not tolerate a failed state in the Caucasus. The only real solution for stability in Chechnya is “conditional independence under an international administration,” as put forward by Maskhadov, the former Chechen president (Evangelista, 2003, p. 6). This is the only way that the Chechen people will put down their weapons and yet ensure that Chechnya does not fall into a fundamentalist Islamic state that will be a harbor for terrorists.
References
Abdullaev, Nabi. Chechnya ten years later. Current History 103(675). Retrieved from the ProQuest Index.
Barry, E. (2009). Echoes of a grim past: Chechnya and its neighbors suffer a relapse. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis Nexis.
Berzins, C. & Cullen, P. Terrorism and Neo-Medievalism. Neo-Medievalism and Civil Wars 6(2). Retrieved from APUS online classroom.
Evangelista, M. (2003). Chechnya’s Russia problem. Current History 102(666). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Francis, C. (2008). ‘Selective Affinities’: The reactions of the Council of Europe and the European Union to the second armed conflict in Chechnya (1999-2006). Europe-Asia Studies 60(2). Retrieved from the Ebsco index.
Gall, C., & de Waal, T. (1998). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.
Schwirtz, M. (2009). Judge is latest victim of Caucasus violence. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
Schwirtz, M. (2009). Russia announces end of operation in Chechnya. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
Toft, M. D. (2003). The geography of ethnic violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ware, R. B. (2007). Remember Chechnya? Current History 106(702). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Chechnya has long been a hotbed of violence and discontent and a thorn in the side of Russian leaders. Chechnya has been fighting the Russians in their various political incarnations for nearly three centuries and has been the site of atrocities by both sides of the conflict. Having shown that it has been unable to fully govern itself as a de-facto independent state during the 1990s, but also that it is completely unwilling to accept Russian control, the only real solution for stability in Chechnya is “conditional independence under an international administration,” as put forward by Maskhadov, the former Chechen president (Evangelista, 2003, p. 6).
Cultural Considerations
Chechnya is primarily a Muslim country; Islam was strongly established in Chechnya during the eighteenth century (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 31). Religious tensions with the Russian Christians in the era of the Tsars and later the anti-religious Soviet Union have added fuel to the conflagration of Russian-Chechen relations. Chechens also have a strong clan-based social structure that ties individuals to a large family and to the land itself; these relationships, combined with their ties to Islam, have prevented Chechen assimilation into Russian society (Gall & de Waal, 1998).
Historical Context
Monica Toft, in her work The Geography of Ethnic Violence, explains that “Chechen history has been riddled with wars of conquest and these wars have imprinted on Chechen identity a virulent determination to resist any form of colonization by outsiders” (2003, p. 65). “Long before they came to fight a guerilla war with Russia… the Chechens were the most rebellious people in the Russian empire” (Gaal and de Waal, 1998, p. 20). Only by understanding the historical context of this conflict can we understand the basis for the hatred that has driven the violence in Chechnya.
Chechnya was first invaded by the Russian empire in 1722, when Peter the Great led an expedition against Persia through the Caucasus Mountains, sparking the first Chechen battle against the Russian Army (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 37). The first real organized revolt was led by a Chechen named Ushurma in 1785, who called for an Islamic jihad against the Tsars that ruled Russia. Ushurma was eventually captured 1791 and his insurrection put down (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 38), but the Chechens would not remain quiet long.
Alexei Yermolov, who was appointed as a Tsarist general to subdue the Caucasus, founded Grozny, the future capital, in 1818 on the ruins of six Chechen villages he had razed, but then had to fight a strong Chechen rebellion in 1825 (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 40). In 1834, Imam Shamil led a rebellion that lasted twenty-five years, followed by yet another uprising in 1877 (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 43).
The rise of the Soviet Union would not change much in Chechen-Russian relations. Lenin and Stalin promised freedom to the Chechens in 1917 in exchange for help during the Bolshevik Revolution (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 53). Although in 1919 Uzum Haji, a Chechen jihadist, led a force against the White Army, his words of hatred showed that no lasting peace would ensue: “I weave a rope to hang engineers, students and all those who write from left to right” (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 21). The Chechens revolted against Soviet rule first in 1920, and then again in 1929 when collectivization of Soviet agriculture spread to Chechnya.
The Soviets struck back with brutal methods. Stalin began mass executions in 1937, and in 1944 he ordered troops off of the front line of World War II to deport over six hundred thousand Chechens to Kazakhstan. Within four years of their exile, nearly one-fourth of all the Chechens had died (Gall and de Waal, 1998, p. 61). But, in keeping with tradition, the Chechens rebelled in Kazakhstan in 1954. The hatred that had begun with Tsarist exploitation and brutality now solidified in the cold of exile, unifying the Chechens that were before divided between clans into one true nation (Gall and de Waal, 1998, p. 74).
The Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya as part of Khruschev’s destalinization program, but they were still brutally oppressed. All of their mosques were closed by 1961 (Gall and de Waal, p. 33). With their long history of bloodshed and conflict with the Russians, it is no surprise that Chechnya would declare its independence in 1991 in the midst of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gall and de Waal, p. 98).
The Chechen Wars
Russia was not about to just let Chechnya go, however. As soon as it got itself back on its feet after the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, they sent troops to quell this latest rebellion in Chechnya. Russian president Boris Yeltsin was particularly concerned that if Chechnya were allowed to secede unchallenged, there would be a “domino effect” as the many other ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation took similar action and the country would disintegrate into many independent states (Toft, 2003, p. 81).
Russian troops fought a bloody and vicious war in Chechnya from 1994 until 1996. Despite overwhelming military superiority, Moscow lost to an underequipped and undermanned guerrilla insurgency that often used terrorism to achieve its goals. In the face of huge casualties they withdrew, making Chechnya a de-facto independent republic (Toft, 2003, p. 79). Matthew Evangelista explained the result of such a settlement thus: “The lessons learned by many Chechens- at least the ones with guns- were that Russia is vulnerable to terrorist acts, that the Russian people are easily demoralized, and that their leaders will heed their views and withdraw as the costs mount” (2003).
After three years of instability and continued violence, President Vladimir Putin invaded Chechnya again, citing apartment bombings in Russia that killed almost three hundred people that were blamed on Chechen terrorists and an invasion of Dagestan by Islamic radicals based in Chechnya (Evangelista, 2003). Russian troops reestablished federal control of Chechnya, and declared their counter-terrorism effort finished in 2009 (Schwirtz, 2009b).
But recent events have shown the resilience of the Chechen resistance. Chechnya has flared up again in the summer of 2009. Islamic militants declared that “all members of law enforcement and state officials are traitors to Islam and enemies that should be exterminated” (Schwirtz, 2009a). They have attacked these groups as collaborators with the Russian occupation. Police officers, judges, government officials, and the civilians caught in the crossfire have died in increasing numbers, with more than 120 killed between January and June 2009 (Schwirtz, 2009a), with 436 more killed from June through August (Barry, 2009). Grigory S. Shvedov, a local journalist, sums it up: “The number of bombings, terrorist attacks and murders as in the past remains high; they occur every week. It is a fairy tale that Chechnya has become a stable region” (Schwirtz, 2009b).
Issues of Sovereignty in Chechnya
Tony Wood, in his book Chechnya: The Case for Independence, claims that Chechnya has a defined territory, a specific group that claims that territory, and had a legitimately elected government with effective control of the population, meeting three prerequisites for national sovereignty (Ware, 2007). However, the invasion of Dagestan by Basayev and Khattab, Islamic militants who led 1200 fighters across the Chechen border, shows that the independent Chechen government was unable to control radical elements (Abdullaev, 2004).
Tony Wood also claims in his book that the international world should have recognized Chechnya as an independent state when the Soviet Union fell apart, as they did 15 other former soviet republics. However, the Soviet republic Chechnya that was a part of also included Ingushetia, which broke from Chechnya in 1992 (Ware, 2007).
The European Union’s view of the conflict in Chechnya has evolved over the years. The European Parliament has issued repeated resolutions attacking human rights violations in Chechnya by both Russia itself and local security forces loyal to Moscow, as recently as January 2006 (Francis, 2008). Despite their repeated declarations, “their concrete proposals were not translated into meaningful action” (Francis, 2008). The furthest the European Union was willing to go was to freeze some 120 million euros in aid to Russia and call for a commission of inquiry that was never actually implemented (Francis, 2008).
The European Union has never questioned the territorial integrity of Russia, and while calling for a negotiated end to the violence, has never accepted the Chechens’ claim of independence as legitimate (Francis, 2008). The attacks of 9/11 softened much worldwide criticism of Russia’s heavy hand in Chechnya, because President Putin was better able to frame his war in the context of the global war on terrorism, with several Chechen groups declared terrorists by the United States (Evangelista, 2003). Putin’s Chechenization policy of indirect rule through non-separatist Chechens has almost completely silenced the EU’s previous demands of negotiation (Francis, 2008). Without European support, Chechnya’s hopes for sovereignty and independence are abysmal.
Lessons of the Chechen Conflict
Chechnya is a prime example of the power sub-state actors wield in today’s fragmenting world. Chris Berzins and Patrick Cullen explain: “Allegiance to the nation-state appears to be bending in significant ways to sub-state forms of political identity, for example at the local and regional level, as well as to supra-state forms of political allegiance at the global level” (Berzins & Cullen, 2003). They also explain that we now live in a neo-medievalist world, with overlapping loyalties that resemble feudalism as practiced during the Middle Ages (Berzins & Cullen, 2003).
Chechnya also shows us the influence of supra-state actors like the European Union. It is likely that Putin’s decision to adopt indirect rule in Chechnya was made largely to silence EU criticism of the situation in Chechnya (Francis, 2008). Transnational terrorism has also been facilitated by the disintegrating borders and shifting allegiances of the modern neo-medieval world; the advances of technology have also made it easier for foreign fighters to reach remote areas and communicate without state control (Francis, 2008).
Conclusion
The situation in Chechnya is complicated by the fact that neither side of the conflict has the moral high ground. The Chechens have used acts of terrorism that have led to huge death tolls of non-combatants to achieve their goals; Russian troops have violated the Geneva Convention and engaged in state-sponsored terrorism by “wholesale destruction of villages, mass bombing of the Chechen capital of Grozny and other cities, indiscriminate roundups of civilians, torture, and extrajudicial killings” (Evangelista, 2003). The Russians have brutalized the Chechens for three centuries; the Chechen militants seek to establish a religious state based on the brutal Islamic code of law known as sharia, and to force that ideal upon the entire Caucasus region, not just Chechnya (Ware, 2007). After all, the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen militants helped to spark the second Chechen war (Abdullaev, 2004).
The Chechens have shown that they will never accept Russian occupation, and will not stop fighting until they have driven the Russians out once and for all. The Russians will not let go either, as Abdullaev explains: “since foreign elements and an emphasis on terrorism have virtually hijacked the Chechen cause, Moscow believes that it has no other viable choice but to continue its war in the Northern Caucasus.” Russia will not tolerate a failed state in the Caucasus. The only real solution for stability in Chechnya is “conditional independence under an international administration,” as put forward by Maskhadov, the former Chechen president (Evangelista, 2003, p. 6). This is the only way that the Chechen people will put down their weapons and yet ensure that Chechnya does not fall into a fundamentalist Islamic state that will be a harbor for terrorists.
References
Abdullaev, Nabi. Chechnya ten years later. Current History 103(675). Retrieved from the ProQuest Index.
Barry, E. (2009). Echoes of a grim past: Chechnya and its neighbors suffer a relapse. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis Nexis.
Berzins, C. & Cullen, P. Terrorism and Neo-Medievalism. Neo-Medievalism and Civil Wars 6(2). Retrieved from APUS online classroom.
Evangelista, M. (2003). Chechnya’s Russia problem. Current History 102(666). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Francis, C. (2008). ‘Selective Affinities’: The reactions of the Council of Europe and the European Union to the second armed conflict in Chechnya (1999-2006). Europe-Asia Studies 60(2). Retrieved from the Ebsco index.
Gall, C., & de Waal, T. (1998). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.
Schwirtz, M. (2009). Judge is latest victim of Caucasus violence. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
Schwirtz, M. (2009). Russia announces end of operation in Chechnya. New York Times. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
Toft, M. D. (2003). The geography of ethnic violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ware, R. B. (2007). Remember Chechnya? Current History 106(702). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
Iran: A Nuclear Power?
Iran troubles the United States for two reasons: its nuclear weapons program and its support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah. It is not likely to give up either because Iran wants to be the dominant power in the Middle East (Friedman, 2009b), and the fact that the United States has invaded and occupied two of Iran’s neighbors also makes them seek a nuclear trump card with greater fervor. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have provoked an international crisis.
Russian Collusion
Iran claims that its nuclear program is of a purely civilian nature, but there is extensive evidence to the contrary. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, recently presented evidence to Russian authorities that Russian scientists were in Iran assisting with nuclear weapons programs (Mahanami, Franchetti & Swain, 2009). The International Atomic Energy Agency had already found that at least one Russian scientist helped with research and design of detonators intended for nuclear weapons in Iran (Blair, 2008). The Russians denied state involvement but have stated that they cannot control their own nuclear scientists who work for Iran as individuals (Interfax, 2009). However, George Friedman explained that "If Netanyahu went to Moscow to deliver this intelligence to the Russians, the only surprise would have been the degree to which the Israelis had penetrated the program, not that the Russians were there. The Russian intelligence services are superbly competent, and keep track of stray nuclear scientists carefully. They would not be surprised by the charge, only by Israel’s knowledge of it" (2009c).
The disclosure to the world of a secret uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom has not eased America’s fears (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009), but only provided more evidence that Iran routinely lies to the world (Erlanger & Landler, 2009).
Failing Negotiations
The Obama administration has reached out to Tehran to negotiate a peaceful end to its nuclear weapons program. A compromise agreed to in principle by Iranian leaders in October and supported by the United States called for Iran to ship out its stockpile of uranium to a foreign country, possibly Russia, for reprocessing into fuel rods that could only be used for peaceful energy and medical purposes (Erlanger & Landler, 2009). However, according to a senior Iranian official, that agreement has been called off (CNNWorld, 2009). While the American administration still holds out hope for a favorable decision from Tehran (Clinton, 2009), it appears that sanctions are forthcoming; or rather, an attempt at sanctions. The only way this situation could be resolved in the near future without sanctions is if Iran agreed to a proposal where Turkey, a Muslim country that enjoys good relations with both Iran and the United States, would store Iran’s uranium until reprocessing and return of fuel rods took place. Turkey’s energy minister stated that Turkey would be willing to fulfill this role to defuse tensions in the region (Associated Press, 2009).
While such an agreement would reduce tensions, it does not destroy Iran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons unless Iran abandons its enrichment projects entirely, since "there is no essential difference between the technology required to enrich to 5% and 90%. Once Iran has mastered the technology to produce low enriched uranium, it can reconfigure the equipment to produce HEU [high enriched uranium, or weapons-grade] relatively simply. There is some technical debate among experts about how long it would take to do so—but none that it is possible" (Acton, 2009).
Sanctions are meaningless without Russian support. The Russians hold veto power in the Security Council and are unlikely to capitulate on Iran without a quid-pro-quo of America giving up its interests in NATO expansion in the former Soviet Union (Friedman, 2009a). The only sanctions possible with any real teeth would be a gasoline embargo, since Iran imports a significant portion of its gasoline as a result of insufficient refinery capacity, but this would likely hurt the common people more than the regime (Acton, 2009).
Even the head of the IAEA has admitted that “sanctions… will not resolve the issue” (Cohen, 2009). Sanctions did not prevent North Korea from obtaining a nuclear device or cause meaningful change in Iraq. Even in Iran, the Security Council has approved sanctions three times without affecting this nuclear program, and Venezuela has promised to help Iran with its thirst for gasoline regardless of international opposition (Bolton, 2009).
The United States is too bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan for any significant military action against Iran, leaving it with two options: permit an Israeli strike (which would rile up the entire Middle East, and delay but not destroy the Iranian program), or accept a nuclear-armed Iran.
Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East
If the United States accepts Iran as a nuclear power, then deterrence will keep the peace in the Middle East. Strategic deterrence prevented nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States and remains a cornerstone of our nuclear nonproliferation policy. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States said in its recent report that “declaratory policy is a signal of U.S. intent. As such, it plays an essential role in reinforcing deterrence (Perry, et al., 2009). Iran is still a nation-state and despite its heated rhetoric is still a rational actor. If Iran knew without a shadow of a doubt that a nuclear attack on Israel would result in an instant and devastating American nuclear response, it would be unlikely to take such an action. Such a declaration is likely to restrain Israel from making a unilateral attack on Iran that would unify the Middle East against them and would certainly provoke an increase of terrorism around the world.
However, due to Iran’s extensive support of terrorist groups, especially Hezbollah, such guarantees of American retaliation are meaningless unless it is explicitly stated that nuclear attacks by any of Iran’s proxies or other groups that it provides support for will be presumed to have official state support and be treated in exactly the same way as a missile launched from Tehran. This would give Iran an incentive to restrain such organizations.
If the United States must accept Iran as a nuclear power, then only deterrence will keep the peace in the Middle East. President Obama must extend the nuclear umbrella to Israel, with a firm, unequivocal declaration that any nuclear attack by Iran or its terrorist proxies will result in a devastating nuclear response from the United States, as he himself proposed in 2008 (Fox News).
References
Acton, J. (2009). Iran’s nuclear program. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/09/25/DI2009092501605.html.
Associated Press. (2009). Turkey would not say no to storing Iran’s uranium. FoxNews.com. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,574845,00.html.
Blair, D. (2008). Russian scientist helped Iran with nuclear weapons programme. Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/3172760/Russian-scientist-helped-Iran-with-nuclear-weapons-programme.html.
Bolton, J. (2009). President Obama’s foreign policy: An assessment. Imprimis, 38(10).
Cohen, R. (2009). Bunkers or breakthrough? New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/opinion/06iht-edcohen.html?_r=2.
Clinton, H. R. (2009). Interview on the Charlie Rose show. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009b/11/131713.htm.
CNNWorld. (2009). Report: Iran will not ship uranium out of the country. CNNWorld. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html.
Fox News. (2008). Report: Obama to offer Israel nuclear umbrella against Iran. Foxnews.com. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2008/12/11/report-obama-offer-israel-nuclear-umbrella-iran/.
Erlanger, S. & Landler, M. (2009). Iran agrees to send enriched uranium to Russia. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
Friedman, G. (2009). The BMD decision and the global system. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090921_bmd_decison_and_global_system.
Friedman, G. (2009). The real struggle in Iran and implications for U.S. dialogue. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from email subscription to stratfor.com.
Friedman, G. (2009). Two leaks and the deepening Iran Crisis. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091005_two_leaks_and_deepening_iran_crisis.
GlobalSecurity.org. (2009). Weapons of Mass Destruction: Qom. GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/qom.htm.
Interfax. (2009). MP admits Russian scientists may be helping Iran develop nuclear weapons. Johnson’s Russia List. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/Russia/johnson/2009-185-29.cfm.
Mahanimi, U., Franchetti, M. & Swain, J. (2009). Israel names Russians helping Iran build a nuclear bomb. The Sunday Times. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6860161.ece.
Perry, W. J, et al. (2009). America’s strategic posture: The final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Iran troubles the United States for two reasons: its nuclear weapons program and its support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah. It is not likely to give up either because Iran wants to be the dominant power in the Middle East (Friedman, 2009b), and the fact that the United States has invaded and occupied two of Iran’s neighbors also makes them seek a nuclear trump card with greater fervor. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have provoked an international crisis.
Russian Collusion
Iran claims that its nuclear program is of a purely civilian nature, but there is extensive evidence to the contrary. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, recently presented evidence to Russian authorities that Russian scientists were in Iran assisting with nuclear weapons programs (Mahanami, Franchetti & Swain, 2009). The International Atomic Energy Agency had already found that at least one Russian scientist helped with research and design of detonators intended for nuclear weapons in Iran (Blair, 2008). The Russians denied state involvement but have stated that they cannot control their own nuclear scientists who work for Iran as individuals (Interfax, 2009). However, George Friedman explained that "If Netanyahu went to Moscow to deliver this intelligence to the Russians, the only surprise would have been the degree to which the Israelis had penetrated the program, not that the Russians were there. The Russian intelligence services are superbly competent, and keep track of stray nuclear scientists carefully. They would not be surprised by the charge, only by Israel’s knowledge of it" (2009c).
The disclosure to the world of a secret uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom has not eased America’s fears (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009), but only provided more evidence that Iran routinely lies to the world (Erlanger & Landler, 2009).
Failing Negotiations
The Obama administration has reached out to Tehran to negotiate a peaceful end to its nuclear weapons program. A compromise agreed to in principle by Iranian leaders in October and supported by the United States called for Iran to ship out its stockpile of uranium to a foreign country, possibly Russia, for reprocessing into fuel rods that could only be used for peaceful energy and medical purposes (Erlanger & Landler, 2009). However, according to a senior Iranian official, that agreement has been called off (CNNWorld, 2009). While the American administration still holds out hope for a favorable decision from Tehran (Clinton, 2009), it appears that sanctions are forthcoming; or rather, an attempt at sanctions. The only way this situation could be resolved in the near future without sanctions is if Iran agreed to a proposal where Turkey, a Muslim country that enjoys good relations with both Iran and the United States, would store Iran’s uranium until reprocessing and return of fuel rods took place. Turkey’s energy minister stated that Turkey would be willing to fulfill this role to defuse tensions in the region (Associated Press, 2009).
While such an agreement would reduce tensions, it does not destroy Iran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons unless Iran abandons its enrichment projects entirely, since "there is no essential difference between the technology required to enrich to 5% and 90%. Once Iran has mastered the technology to produce low enriched uranium, it can reconfigure the equipment to produce HEU [high enriched uranium, or weapons-grade] relatively simply. There is some technical debate among experts about how long it would take to do so—but none that it is possible" (Acton, 2009).
Sanctions are meaningless without Russian support. The Russians hold veto power in the Security Council and are unlikely to capitulate on Iran without a quid-pro-quo of America giving up its interests in NATO expansion in the former Soviet Union (Friedman, 2009a). The only sanctions possible with any real teeth would be a gasoline embargo, since Iran imports a significant portion of its gasoline as a result of insufficient refinery capacity, but this would likely hurt the common people more than the regime (Acton, 2009).
Even the head of the IAEA has admitted that “sanctions… will not resolve the issue” (Cohen, 2009). Sanctions did not prevent North Korea from obtaining a nuclear device or cause meaningful change in Iraq. Even in Iran, the Security Council has approved sanctions three times without affecting this nuclear program, and Venezuela has promised to help Iran with its thirst for gasoline regardless of international opposition (Bolton, 2009).
The United States is too bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan for any significant military action against Iran, leaving it with two options: permit an Israeli strike (which would rile up the entire Middle East, and delay but not destroy the Iranian program), or accept a nuclear-armed Iran.
Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East
If the United States accepts Iran as a nuclear power, then deterrence will keep the peace in the Middle East. Strategic deterrence prevented nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States and remains a cornerstone of our nuclear nonproliferation policy. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States said in its recent report that “declaratory policy is a signal of U.S. intent. As such, it plays an essential role in reinforcing deterrence (Perry, et al., 2009). Iran is still a nation-state and despite its heated rhetoric is still a rational actor. If Iran knew without a shadow of a doubt that a nuclear attack on Israel would result in an instant and devastating American nuclear response, it would be unlikely to take such an action. Such a declaration is likely to restrain Israel from making a unilateral attack on Iran that would unify the Middle East against them and would certainly provoke an increase of terrorism around the world.
However, due to Iran’s extensive support of terrorist groups, especially Hezbollah, such guarantees of American retaliation are meaningless unless it is explicitly stated that nuclear attacks by any of Iran’s proxies or other groups that it provides support for will be presumed to have official state support and be treated in exactly the same way as a missile launched from Tehran. This would give Iran an incentive to restrain such organizations.
If the United States must accept Iran as a nuclear power, then only deterrence will keep the peace in the Middle East. President Obama must extend the nuclear umbrella to Israel, with a firm, unequivocal declaration that any nuclear attack by Iran or its terrorist proxies will result in a devastating nuclear response from the United States, as he himself proposed in 2008 (Fox News).
References
Acton, J. (2009). Iran’s nuclear program. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/09/25/DI2009092501605.html.
Associated Press. (2009). Turkey would not say no to storing Iran’s uranium. FoxNews.com. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,574845,00.html.
Blair, D. (2008). Russian scientist helped Iran with nuclear weapons programme. Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/3172760/Russian-scientist-helped-Iran-with-nuclear-weapons-programme.html.
Bolton, J. (2009). President Obama’s foreign policy: An assessment. Imprimis, 38(10).
Cohen, R. (2009). Bunkers or breakthrough? New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/opinion/06iht-edcohen.html?_r=2.
Clinton, H. R. (2009). Interview on the Charlie Rose show. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009b/11/131713.htm.
CNNWorld. (2009). Report: Iran will not ship uranium out of the country. CNNWorld. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/07/iran.uranium.shipment/index.html.
Fox News. (2008). Report: Obama to offer Israel nuclear umbrella against Iran. Foxnews.com. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2008/12/11/report-obama-offer-israel-nuclear-umbrella-iran/.
Erlanger, S. & Landler, M. (2009). Iran agrees to send enriched uranium to Russia. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
Friedman, G. (2009). The BMD decision and the global system. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090921_bmd_decison_and_global_system.
Friedman, G. (2009). The real struggle in Iran and implications for U.S. dialogue. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from email subscription to stratfor.com.
Friedman, G. (2009). Two leaks and the deepening Iran Crisis. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091005_two_leaks_and_deepening_iran_crisis.
GlobalSecurity.org. (2009). Weapons of Mass Destruction: Qom. GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/qom.htm.
Interfax. (2009). MP admits Russian scientists may be helping Iran develop nuclear weapons. Johnson’s Russia List. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/Russia/johnson/2009-185-29.cfm.
Mahanimi, U., Franchetti, M. & Swain, J. (2009). Israel names Russians helping Iran build a nuclear bomb. The Sunday Times. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6860161.ece.
Perry, W. J, et al. (2009). America’s strategic posture: The final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
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