In his work “Capitalism and Democracy,” Gabriel Almond explained that Schumpeter, an academic writing during World War II, “projected a future of declining capitalism, and rising socialism.”1 A look at recent events in America (including the nationalization of major industries and a general expansion of the welfare state) as well as the socialist bent of Europe will show that Schumpeter’s view was indeed quite prophetic. Almond explained that “in a democracy, the demand for publicly provided services seems to be insatiable.”2 Although capitalism is a more efficient and productive model than socialism, the political pressures inherent in a democratic system with universal suffrage inevitably will push nations towards the yoke of socialism.
Before we can do effective analysis, we must define what we mean by capitalism, communism, socialism, and democracy; these words all are loaded terms with different meanings and connotations to different people. Capitalism is defined by O’Neil as a “system of private property and free markets” where laissez-faire reigns supreme.3 This same text defines communism as the very opposite, “an ideology that seeks to create human quality by eliminating private property and market forces.”4 Socialism is defined as a system that prioritizes economic equality over individual freedom but still accepts a limited role for private ownership of property.5 For the purposes of this assignment, I use the definition of liberal democracy as a political system where universal suffrage, participation, and individual rights are guaranteed.
Almond quotes Schumpeter as saying, “"History clearly confirms… [that] ... modern democracy rose along with capitalism, and in causal connection with it…modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process."6 He refers to a book by Robert Dahl to back up the idea that democracy has only developed in societies where property can be privately owned. Almond also refers to Peter Berger when he says that “If a capitalist economy is subjected to increasing degrees of state control, a point will be reached at which democratic governance becomes impossible.”7 I would say that democracy is all about the freedom to make choices; allowing individuals to make economic choices (as in a fully capitalist system) prepares them to make political ones. China is a prime example. There greater economic freedom has cultivated a thirst for political freedom, even inside the Chinese Communist Party. In August 2008, Zhang Chunxian, then a provincial Communist Party Secretary, said that China’s reform efforts should focus on political reform instead of economic priorities.8
Capitalism does not always support fair and democratic institutions, however. There are examples of authoritarian capitalist regimes throughout the world, such as Germany and Japan during one point or another in their history.9 Almond points to the power of corporations as an example, saying that “modern capitalism with the dominance of the large corporation, produces a defective or an impaired form of democracy.”10 One need only look to the history of the so-called “banana republics” to see how corporations can undermine democratic institutions. Even Adam Smith, the father of modern capitalism, understood that businesses would seek monopolies and to corrupt public officials with bribes to maximize their profits; he saw a need for government regulation to ensure a competitive environment to maximize the productivity of the “invisible hand.”10 Regulations that keep businesses in fair competition also limit the negative influence that business can have on democratic institutions.
Almond explained that democratization has strengthened capitalism in the sense that by forcing through certain welfare programs and reforms, it has enabled capitalism to survive without resorting to substantial repression.11 By allowing capitalism to survive, it strikes “a pragmatic compromise…[that obtains] a measure of distributive justice, security, and social guidance of economic life without losing too much of the allocative efficiency and dynamism of private enterprise and market organization.”12
Ultimately, democracy subverts capitalism more than it strengthens it. Alexis de Tocqueville showed a clear understanding of this in his book Democracy in America, written in the early 19th century. He explained that in a country where universal suffrage allows the poor to dictate policy, expenditures will increase, because they “readily find means of regulating the taxes so that they are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor... the government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which lays on taxes escapes the payment of them.” 13 Recent events in the United States show this danger clearly. The Democratic Party that controls both Congress and the White House rely on the masses that pay little or no income tax for their power, and the vast increase in spending, Obama’s health care package and the nationalization of General Motors through the auto bailout show a perfect example of how the democratic process inevitably leads to socialism. The only way to prevent it is through reforms that make it impossible for those who contribute nothing in taxes to dictate policy by abolishing progressive taxation and thereby ensuring that all voters understand that every new expenditure has a direct cost for them. However, the political climate in America makes such reforms impossible. Thus we see that democracy is far better suited to a socialist than a capitalist system. The danger is that the welfare state’s “steady encroachment on the private sector has been slowly but surely converting our free government and market system into a collective monster, compromising both freedom and productivity in the outcome.”14
References
1. Gabriel A. Almond, “Capitalism and Democracy,” Political Science and Politics 24 (1991): 467.
2. Ibid, 472.
3. O’Neil, p 89
4. O’Neil, p. 198
5. O’Neil, p. 65
6. Gabriel A. Almond, “Capitalism and Democracy,” Political Science and Politics 24 (1991): 468.
7. Ibid, 469.
8. Thomas Lum and Hannah Fisher, “Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010), 1, 16.
9. Gabriel A. Almond, “Capitalism and Democracy,” Political Science and Politics 24 (1991): 468.
10. Ibid, 470-471.
11. Ibid, 473.
12. Ibid, 473.
13. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy and America, translated by Henry Reeve, (Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org, originally published 1840), Chapter 13.
14. Gabriel A. Almond, “Capitalism and Democracy,” Political Science and Politics 24 (1991):, 471
Monday, October 25, 2010
Turmoil in Thailand (10/14/2010)
Thailand has had a turbulent history. The only country in Southeast Asia to avoid European colonization, Thailand has proven to be subject to many of the same problems of its less fortunate neighbors: frequent military intervention into politics, separatist insurgencies, and authoritarian rule. This paper will seek to explain some of the roots of the political instability that has plagued Thailand in recent years.
The political institutions of Thailand directly affect the stability of the country. While Thailand does have an independent judiciary (a critical element of lasting democracy), litigation can be extremely slow and extralegal means are frequently used to circumvent its decisions (Economist 2008, 7). The previously ruling party, Thai Rak Thai, was banned in May 2007 due to electoral fraud (Economist 2008, 5), and the electoral structure in place during the April 2006 election made resolution of the voting impossible. After opposition parties boycotted the election called by Prime Minister Thaksin, many voters chose to cast a “no vote” ballot. “Under Thai electoral law, candidates who faced no competition were required to win at least 20% of the vote… [the election] failed to produce a full slate of members of Parliament…[and] a constitutional crisis loomed” (Ockey 2007, 134-135).
As in many developing countries, the military in Thailand plays a strong and active political role. The long military struggle against Islamic separatist insurgents in the south has increased the military’s role in domestic politics. Croissant explained that “insurgency and counter-insurgency contribute to the erosion of liberal democracy in Thailand… [because] persistent internal conflicts make the civilians dependent on the military’s coercive power… [and] the inability of elected governments to provide for peaceful means of settling social conflicts undermined the legitimacy of the civilian actors and the democratic institutions” (Croissant 2007, 1,24).
Civilian control of the military is an essential condition for lasting democracy (Croissant and Kuehn 2009, 189). This crucial point has been problematic for Thailand throughout its history, as the Thai officer corps has a strong tradition of intervention in domestic politics (Croissant and Kuehn 2009, 209). That tradition was manifested recently by the September 2006 coup that removed Prime Minister Thaksin from power. The previously mentioned electoral crisis, widespread feeling throughout the military that the civilian government was mismanaging the war against Islamic insurgents in the south, and resentment over the politicization of military promotions were the primary motivations behind the coup (Ockey 2007, 135). Even before the coup, however, “civilians had almost no influence in defense policymaking, leaving all external defense issues to the military” (Croissant and Kuehn 2009, 198). The coup was also a reaction against Prime Minister Thaskin’s attempts to consolidate his power and destroy the military’s political influence (Croissant and Kuehn 2009, 197).
Populism arose in Thailand in January 2001, when Thaskin won a landslide victory in the general election. Thaskin’s party, the Thai Rak Thai, had a virtual majority without forming a coalition with any other party, something that had not happened in Thailand before (Choi 2005, 49-50). The previous regime had been very focused on exports and foreign investment that benefited the cities; Thaskin rose to power by reaching out to the rural agricultural interests, by offering debt relief and investment for the smaller villages (Choi 2005, 52). The rural areas of Thailand were particularly receptive to populist ideas, because the 1997 Asian economic crisis had hit them the hardest, and the poorest Thais became even poorer (Choi 2005, 55). Thaskin’s support did not extend to Bangkok. A Thai exchange student staying with my family explained that when the military deposed him in 2006, the urban middle class supported the coup as a positive move for the country, removing what they saw as a corrupt and illegitimate government (Sofun, 2010).
There are many threats to democracy in Thailand. The press in Thailand is tightly controlled by the government, and censorship is quite common (Economist 2008, 7). Without a free press, democracy cannot function in an efficient and sustainable manner because governments cannot be held as accountable. Thailand is listed by the Economist Intelligence Unit as a “flawed democracy.” Although elections are generally free from voter intimidation, vote buying is rampant, party financing transparency is an issue, and there is a general lack of confidence in political parties among the populace. Thailand also suffers from a high level of corruption among government officials (Economist 2008, 8). Until Thailand can exercise complete and total civilian control over its armed forces, military intervention will always be a threat to democracy there.
The problems in Thailand come sharpest into focus when you can see things at the level of the individual family. In my personal interview with a Thai national, she explained how these issues have directly affected her life. Although she has family in the southern regions of Thailand, she has never been able to visit them, because the violence and terrorism stemming from Islamic separatist movements there have made it such a dangerous place. She also explained that people do not feel free to express dissent, criticize the government, or even talk about politics because they fear reprisals from their government.
Thailand shows that many of the problems we see throughout the developing world cannot always be blamed on colonialism. Instability, military intervention in the political system, and separatist movements are worldwide problems that have diverse causes, and the regional tension within Thailand between the rural North, the Muslim South, and the wealthier city dwellers is not something we can write off as a European created problem.
References
Jungug, Choi. 2005. "Economic Crisis, Poverty, and the Emergence of Populism in Thailand." Journal of International & Area Studies 12, no. 1: 49-59. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed October 14, 2010).
Croissant, Aurel. 2007. "Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand." Terrorism & Political Violence 19, no. 1: 1-18. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2010).
Croissant, Aurel, and David Kuehn. "Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies." Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (May 2009): 187-217. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2010).
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2008. "Political forces and institutions." Country Profile. Thailand 5-8. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2010).
Ockey, James. 2007. "THAILAND IN 2006: Retreat to Military Rule." Asian Survey 47, no. 1: 133-140. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed October 11, 2010).
Human Rights in China (9/24/2010)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had a very painful history when it comes to human rights. The PRC has only recently accepted any responsibility to conform to international human rights norms and law. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in 1948, China was in the middle of the civil war, and it was the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek who signed it, not the PRC that would soon be established. It was not until 1997 that China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (which was ratified four years later);1 in 1998 that China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which the PRC has still not ratified). 2 These more recent steps show that the PRC has partially recognized human rights issues as a policy priority. Whether they will allow real reform or are just posturing to fit into today’s increasingly globalized world remains an open question.
The political structure of the PRC contributes to its human rights issues. The PRC seeks to control all “political content of print media, jam some foreign radio broadcasts, and censor internet sites… and email.”3 Without a press that is free to report human rights violations, there will be no end to suffering in China. For example, instead of addressing the problems of the ‘black jails’ that local officials use to imprison and intimidate those attempting to petition for grievances, China quashes the stories of abuses and uses its state-controlled media to deny that such jails even exist: "Things like this don't exist in China. China is a country with the rule of law, and everything is handled according to the law." 4 Progress made in passing human rights legislation, such as the prohibitions on torture and requiring video tape of police interrogations (which took effect in 2006) mean little if the laws and treaty commitments made by China are never actually implemented into a consistent and impartial application of the rule of law.
The PRC has emphasized economic growth over political freedom, presumably based on a belief that their control will be unchallenged if they can maintain economic development. Mahatma Gandhi said of the masses of India: “They have no political consciousness of the type our politicians desire. Their politics are confined to bread and salt.” 5 The same philosophy was boiled down to four words in American politics: “it’s the economy, stupid!” Such thinking seems to be the basis of policy in the PRC. The Congressional Research Service noted that since 2000, “political and religious persecution have increased, the leadership remains a dictatorship, and that economic development has strengthened rather than weakened the Communist government,” and specifically gave Tibet as an example of how Beijing is trying to use economic development to buy loyalty instead of focusing on political, social, and religious grievances. 6
Some change is coming in China, from the influence of both state and non-state actors. In August 2008, Zhang Chunxian, then a provincial Communist Party Secretary, said that China’s reform efforts should focus on political reform instead of economic priorities. 7 That same year, human rights activists within China signed a document called Charter 08 that called for “an end to one party authoritarian rule… an electoral democracy, under the rule of law, with equality… and protected freedoms of speech and expression.” The document has sparked a great deal of discussion inside of China, and also provoked the arrest of several of its authors. 8
Political change in China is much more likely to come as a gradual process than through a sudden revolution. The Chinese government greatly fears social unrest, and puts stability above all other priorities. In a personal interview, a Chinese exchange student stated that the Chinese in general tend to accept strict government control because they fear the chaos that could result from uncontrolled crowds in China’s vast cities. The Congressional Research Service confirmed that many social groups “value incremental over dramatic social change,” and that they fear the chaos that has plagued post-communist countries throughout the world. 9
The social structure of China contributes to its human rights problems, because it is home to many religious and ethnic minorities that the PRC fears could try to subvert state power. Amnesty International reported that Christian officials have been specifically targeted by the PRC, and gave Han Dingxiang, a Catholic bishop who died in prison after 20 years of confinement as a specific example. 10 China has no diplomatic ties with the Vatican because it refuses to allow the Vatican the authority to appoint bishops without approval from the Chinese government, and many unregistered churches have been harassed and its members imprisoned for practicing their religion. 11 Separatism in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has also been a source of conflict and oppression. Religious tensions in Tibet have been sufficient to prompt the PRC to require a permit for reincarnation of Buddhist monks to prevent the Tibetans from being able to name their own religious successors. 12
With pressure from international actors, actors within the apparatus of the State itself, and elements among the Chinese people all pushing for greater freedom in China, change will come, but it will come very slowly until the People’s Republic of China accepts the ideal given by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, that “sunlight is the best disinfectant.” Without openness, transparency, and a press that is free to criticize government policy and report human rights violations without fear of censorship, intimidation, and arrest, the injustices that come from systematic corruption of local officials will continue. The central government may pass laws to protect all the human rights of the Chinese people, but without the free flow of information, the rule of law will remain only a lofty principle, not a reality for the common citizens of the People’s Republic of China.
References
1. United Nations Treaty Collection, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en#6 (accessed September 24, 2010).
2. United Nations Treaty Collection, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed September 24, 2010).
3. Thomas Lum and Hannah Fisher, “Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010).
4. Al-Jazeera, “China’s ‘black jails’ uncovered,” http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/04/200942715494521278.html (accessed September 24, 2010).
5. Mahatma Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi: Selected political writings, ed. Dennis Dalton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 143.
6. Thomas Lum and Hannah Fisher, “Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010), 1, 16.
7. Ibid, 9.
8. Jonathan Adams, “Charter 08 worries China,” Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2009/0107/p06s01-woap.html (accessed September 24, 2010).
9. Thomas Lum and Hannah Fisher, “Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010), 23-24.
10. Amnesty International USA. “2008 Annual Report for China.” Obtained from APUS online classroom.
11. Thomas Lum and Hannah Fisher, “Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34729.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010), 14.
12.Matthew Philips, “China Regulates Buddhist Reincarnation,” Newsweek, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20227400, August 20, 2007 (accessed September 26, 2010).
Noam Chomsky distorts the truth (9/19/2010)
This was a review of a video interview given by Noam Chomsky to Democracy Now! You can see the interview for yourself at http://www.democracynow.org/2006/3/31/stream.
After listening to this interview and reading the transcript, I was able to see that neither Mr. Chomsky nor the show where he was being interviewed could be remotely considered objective. Mr. Chomsky repeated assertions that he claims as fact which are completely ridiculous, unsubstantiated, and false. The show Democracy Now! is certainly not an objective forum, either. Their choice of material for the first break is certainly indicative of their political bias, in both the song chosen and the signs depicted in the protest. One of the signs depicted says “The Bush Family: Why Birth Control is So Important,” which shows a perfect example of ignorant and hateful attacks that have no place in a meaningful or logical discussion.
Mr. Chomsky claimed that the United States harbors terrorists, and then gave Orlando Bosch and Posada Carriles as specific examples. At the time of this interview, Posada Carriles was imprisoned in an American jail in New Mexico. 1 Accusing a country of harboring a terrorist when that terrorist is currently imprisoned by said country is absolutely absurd. in In 2007, he was granted bail by an immigration judge, but that move was opposed by federal authorities, who said he was “’an admitted mastermind of terrorist plots and attacks,’ a flight risk and a danger to the community.”2 This event merely demonstrates that the United States has an independent judiciary that does not simply rubber-stamp the White House’s decisions, and shows that Mr. Posada is receiving due process of law, an important characteristic of a non-failing state. 3 Mr. Posada is currently under federal indictment and will be tried this year. 4
Mr. Chomsky claimed that there as “Virtually no support for it [the Iraq War] anywhere, except the U.S. and Britain and a couple of other places.” While it is true that many countries opposed the Iraq war, to call the forty nine different countries that supported the invasion 5 “a couple of other places” is simply dishonest. 5
Mr. Chomsky said that “the war itself was perhaps one of the greatest military catastrophes in history.” The total number of coalition deaths in Iraq now rests at 4,736, 6 which puts it at 19% of the casualties of the American revolution, 23% of the War of 1812, 35% of the Mexican-American War, 0.7% of the Civil War, 4% of World War I, 1% of World War II, 13% of the Korean War, and 8.1% of the Vietnam War. While any loss of life is tragic, to call it “one of the greatest military catastrophes in history” is misleading and absurd.
Referring to Andrew Jackson’s invasion of Florida, he claimed that it was “completely unprovoked” and that “there was no threat from England. England didn’t do a thing.” I have no doubt that the atrocities Mr. Chomsky referenced took place, but similar atrocities were also committed by the Indians; that being said, there was provocation, and England was a very real threat to America at this time. The war of 1812 ended in 1814, the memory of the Fort Mims massacre was fresh; and in 1815, the British authorities turned over a fort near the Georgia border to the former slaves that had fought for the British crown. This fort attracted other runaway slaves, and fired on and killed American sailors attempting to obtain drinking water while carrying supplies to another fort. 8 In addition, the Seminole Indians had been armed by the British forces and encouraged to attack American settlements during the War of 1812. The invasion of 1817 by General Jackson was authorized only after Seminoles slaughtered Lt. Scott, his soldiers, and the women and children that were with him. 9 Considering that the British had been in open warfare with the United States only 3 years earlier, had armed slaves and Indians, and given them a fort, it was not unreasonable for the Americans to see an “English threat.” I am sure the Americans were not guiltless; our treatment of the Indians was appalling, to be sure, but Mr. Chomsky’s characterization of these events is simply not correct.
The only point on which I could agree with Mr. Chomsky, when he explained that a truly democratic Iraq is not likely to be an ally of the United States. He said that “It would almost surely strengthen its already developed relations with Shiite Iran right next door. Any degree of Iraqi autonomy stimulates autonomy pressures across the border in Saudi Arabia, where there’s a substantial Shiite population.” I have no doubt that this is true, and I think it is very important for us to remember that just because countries become democracies does not mean that they will always be friends to America. Hamas was elected to power in Gaza in a free democratic election, after all.
References
1. Democracy Now, “Cuban Militant Posada Carriles Released from New Mexico Jail,” http://www.democracynow.org/2007/4/23/cuban_militant_posada_carriles_released_from (accessed September 16, 2010).
2. Carol J. Williams, “Cuban militant’s release draws fire,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/world/fg-posada20 (accessed September 16, 2010).
3. Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index: Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/content/fsi/fsi_9.htm (Accessed September 16, 2010).
4. Chuck Strouse, “Cuban killer Luis Posada Carriles goes on trial,” Miami New Times, February 25, 2010, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-02-25/news/cuban-killer-luis-posada-carriles-goes-on-trial/ (accessed September 16, 2010).
5. The White House, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Members,” March 27, 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html (Accessed September 16, 2010).
6. CNN, “Home and Away: Iraq and Afghanistan War Casualties,” updated September 16,2010, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.casualties/index.html (Accessed September 16, 2010).
7. Military Factory, “American War Deaths Through History,” http://www.militaryfactory.com/american_war_deaths.asp (accessed September 16, 2010).
8. University of South Florida Africana Heritage Project, “Black Seminoles, Maroons and Freedom Seekers in Florida, Part 2: The Beginning of Troubled Times,” http://www.africanaheritage.com/Angola_Sarazota_NegroFort.asp (accessed September 16, 2010).
9. Exploresouthernhistory.com, “Scott’s Massacre,” http://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/scottsmassacre1.html (accessed September 16, 2010).
After listening to this interview and reading the transcript, I was able to see that neither Mr. Chomsky nor the show where he was being interviewed could be remotely considered objective. Mr. Chomsky repeated assertions that he claims as fact which are completely ridiculous, unsubstantiated, and false. The show Democracy Now! is certainly not an objective forum, either. Their choice of material for the first break is certainly indicative of their political bias, in both the song chosen and the signs depicted in the protest. One of the signs depicted says “The Bush Family: Why Birth Control is So Important,” which shows a perfect example of ignorant and hateful attacks that have no place in a meaningful or logical discussion.
Mr. Chomsky claimed that the United States harbors terrorists, and then gave Orlando Bosch and Posada Carriles as specific examples. At the time of this interview, Posada Carriles was imprisoned in an American jail in New Mexico. 1 Accusing a country of harboring a terrorist when that terrorist is currently imprisoned by said country is absolutely absurd. in In 2007, he was granted bail by an immigration judge, but that move was opposed by federal authorities, who said he was “’an admitted mastermind of terrorist plots and attacks,’ a flight risk and a danger to the community.”2 This event merely demonstrates that the United States has an independent judiciary that does not simply rubber-stamp the White House’s decisions, and shows that Mr. Posada is receiving due process of law, an important characteristic of a non-failing state. 3 Mr. Posada is currently under federal indictment and will be tried this year. 4
Mr. Chomsky claimed that there as “Virtually no support for it [the Iraq War] anywhere, except the U.S. and Britain and a couple of other places.” While it is true that many countries opposed the Iraq war, to call the forty nine different countries that supported the invasion 5 “a couple of other places” is simply dishonest. 5
Mr. Chomsky said that “the war itself was perhaps one of the greatest military catastrophes in history.” The total number of coalition deaths in Iraq now rests at 4,736, 6 which puts it at 19% of the casualties of the American revolution, 23% of the War of 1812, 35% of the Mexican-American War, 0.7% of the Civil War, 4% of World War I, 1% of World War II, 13% of the Korean War, and 8.1% of the Vietnam War. While any loss of life is tragic, to call it “one of the greatest military catastrophes in history” is misleading and absurd.
Referring to Andrew Jackson’s invasion of Florida, he claimed that it was “completely unprovoked” and that “there was no threat from England. England didn’t do a thing.” I have no doubt that the atrocities Mr. Chomsky referenced took place, but similar atrocities were also committed by the Indians; that being said, there was provocation, and England was a very real threat to America at this time. The war of 1812 ended in 1814, the memory of the Fort Mims massacre was fresh; and in 1815, the British authorities turned over a fort near the Georgia border to the former slaves that had fought for the British crown. This fort attracted other runaway slaves, and fired on and killed American sailors attempting to obtain drinking water while carrying supplies to another fort. 8 In addition, the Seminole Indians had been armed by the British forces and encouraged to attack American settlements during the War of 1812. The invasion of 1817 by General Jackson was authorized only after Seminoles slaughtered Lt. Scott, his soldiers, and the women and children that were with him. 9 Considering that the British had been in open warfare with the United States only 3 years earlier, had armed slaves and Indians, and given them a fort, it was not unreasonable for the Americans to see an “English threat.” I am sure the Americans were not guiltless; our treatment of the Indians was appalling, to be sure, but Mr. Chomsky’s characterization of these events is simply not correct.
The only point on which I could agree with Mr. Chomsky, when he explained that a truly democratic Iraq is not likely to be an ally of the United States. He said that “It would almost surely strengthen its already developed relations with Shiite Iran right next door. Any degree of Iraqi autonomy stimulates autonomy pressures across the border in Saudi Arabia, where there’s a substantial Shiite population.” I have no doubt that this is true, and I think it is very important for us to remember that just because countries become democracies does not mean that they will always be friends to America. Hamas was elected to power in Gaza in a free democratic election, after all.
References
1. Democracy Now, “Cuban Militant Posada Carriles Released from New Mexico Jail,” http://www.democracynow.org/2007/4/23/cuban_militant_posada_carriles_released_from (accessed September 16, 2010).
2. Carol J. Williams, “Cuban militant’s release draws fire,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/world/fg-posada20 (accessed September 16, 2010).
3. Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index: Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/content/fsi/fsi_9.htm (Accessed September 16, 2010).
4. Chuck Strouse, “Cuban killer Luis Posada Carriles goes on trial,” Miami New Times, February 25, 2010, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-02-25/news/cuban-killer-luis-posada-carriles-goes-on-trial/ (accessed September 16, 2010).
5. The White House, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Coalition Members,” March 27, 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html (Accessed September 16, 2010).
6. CNN, “Home and Away: Iraq and Afghanistan War Casualties,” updated September 16,2010, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.casualties/index.html (Accessed September 16, 2010).
7. Military Factory, “American War Deaths Through History,” http://www.militaryfactory.com/american_war_deaths.asp (accessed September 16, 2010).
8. University of South Florida Africana Heritage Project, “Black Seminoles, Maroons and Freedom Seekers in Florida, Part 2: The Beginning of Troubled Times,” http://www.africanaheritage.com/Angola_Sarazota_NegroFort.asp (accessed September 16, 2010).
9. Exploresouthernhistory.com, “Scott’s Massacre,” http://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/scottsmassacre1.html (accessed September 16, 2010).
China, Railroads, and Iran (9/8/2010)
One thing I find extremely interesting is how China is trying to expand its ties to Iran. China is planning to expand its rail infrastructure to include a railway line to Iran. Aside from the economic effects of such a project connecting the Middle East with China, there are political implications as well. Nicklas Swanstrom explained that “while technically the U.S., Europe or Russia could block China's sea routes, it would also have a land route. And by tying your neighbor's infrastructure to you, it brings them closer. It decreases Russia's influence in the region, and definitely decreases the influence of the U.S. and Europe.”1 Such a land route would make enforcing sanctions on Iran impossible for the United States without Chinese approval, and puts them in an even better position than they have now to profit from circumventing the sanctions already in place. Stratfor pointed out that “every time a multinational energy company pulls out of Iran, Beijing’s state-owned players seem to take over, as happened to the Japanese firm Inpex in 2006 when it complied with a previous round of sanctions.” 2
References
1. Malcolm Moore, “China to build $2bn railway for Iran,” Telegraph.co.uk, September 7, 2010, accessed September 7,2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7985812/China-to-build-2bn-railway-for-Iran.html.
2. Strategic Forecasting, “The U.S. Push for Asian Support of Iran Sanctions,” Stratfor.com, August 5, 2010, Retrieved from email subscription.
References
1. Malcolm Moore, “China to build $2bn railway for Iran,” Telegraph.co.uk, September 7, 2010, accessed September 7,2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7985812/China-to-build-2bn-railway-for-Iran.html.
2. Strategic Forecasting, “The U.S. Push for Asian Support of Iran Sanctions,” Stratfor.com, August 5, 2010, Retrieved from email subscription.
From Chechnya to Gaza: Instability in the Caucasus and the Middle East (7/28/2010)
Both the Middle East and the Caucasus are filled with discontent, instability, and terrorism. These two regions, so different culturally and historically, have three common sources of instability and violence. First, both regions are unstable because the borders drawn by the colonial powers fuel ethnic tensions. Second, the broken promises of the West in Palestine and concerning NATO expansion have made these problems worse. Third, both regions suffer from the blight of Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. Fourth, compromise becomes very difficult because of the strategic issues due to local geography.
Colonial Borders Spark Ethnic Tension
Throughout the world, the European colonial powers drew arbitrary national borders without considering the ethnic or cultural makeup of the region in question. This practice is the source of many of today’s conflicts, which are overwhelmingly ethnic in nature. The division of ethnic groups by artificial borders has sparked armed struggles in both the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Milton-Edwards explained that “the process of modernization introduced by the colonial powers resulted in social dislocation, with traditional tribal powers undermined by a new class of urban notables… and the creation of new states such as Iraq and Jordan where boundaries took no account of pre-existing ethnic, religious, and tribal configurations… giving the entire area an artificial identity which it has spent more than a century coming to terms with…The new map that emerged resulted in the artificial creation of new states to which its citizens felt little or no sense of loyalty or identity” (2006, p. 18, 25).
The Kurds provide an excellent example of the consequences of the arbitrary decisions of the colonial powers. The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group of some twenty million people, with their own language and culture distinct from their neighbors. Yet the boundaries set by Europe divide them between Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (O’Toole, 1999). The Kurds’ agitation for independence and autonomy has overflowed into violence, and some Kurdish organizations operate as terrorist groups against targets in their respective countries. As a result, the nation-states in the region coordinate their retaliation against the Kurds, as occurred just this year, when Iran organized a crackdown on Kurdish villages, made possible by access to Turkish intelligence (Geo-Strategy Direct, 2010).
Lebanon provides another example in the Middle East, where instability has resulted from combining six different and distinct ethnic groups into one country. The Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, Armenians, and Greek Orthodox Christians were combined as the French mandate of Lebanon (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 26). With a weak state and the society divided, civil war was the inevitable result (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 223), plunging Lebanon into fifteen years of bloodshed.
Milton-Edwards explained that “Tribal sheikhs were often perceived as a significant hindrance to the difficult task of state-building in the new states of Arabia” (2006, p. 29). The same problems are seen in the Caucasus. Chechens also have a strong clan-based social structure that ties individuals to a large family and to the land itself; these relationships, combined with their ties to Islam, have prevented Chechen assimilation into Russian society (Gall & de Waal, 1998).
We also see the toll in suffering that comes from arbitrary borders in Georgia. As recently as 2008, war erupted in Georgia from a long-standing ethnic dispute between the Ossetians and the Georgians.
The Ossetians have always been an ethnic group distinct from the Georgians. The Ossetians were a Christian people whose settlement and growth southward into Georgia was encouraged and directed by the Russian empire in the 18th century so they could serve as a buffer zone to protect Russians from highlander attacks in the Caucasus (King, 2010, p. 9 and 68). Thus the Ossetians have a pattern of looking to Russia as a patron and protector for nearly three hundred years. Ossetia was given a special autonomous status within the Soviet Union, united with Georgia by treaty but became quite accustomed to managing its own affairs (King, 2010, p. 188).
The Ossetians themselves were divided by the Russian-Georgian border into North and South Ossetia; at the time this division didn’t seem that important, since they were all still part of the Soviet Union. Suddenly a border that was intended only as an administrative division became a permanent national border. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Georgia shifted to the Western sphere of influence, tensions were bound to rise with the Russian-aligned Ossetians.
Tensions in South Ossetia spilled over into violence when South Ossetia demanded greater autonomy and Georgia responded by revoking the autonomous district status South Ossetia had previously had. This conflict lasted from 1990-1992 and ended in an unresolved cease-fire with de facto, unrecognized, Russian-backed independence (King, 2010, 216-217). The conflicts of Soviet succession left Georgia without actual control of a sizeable portion of its national territory.
In 2008, Georgia moved troops to occupy South Ossetia and put an end to its de facto independence; Russia responded by driving the Georgians out of the contested area and invading Georgia itself (Friedman, 2008).
Dmitry Kadomtsev, a Russian-born American citizen was in St. Petersburg visiting his family during the 2008 war in Georgia, and his account helps to illustrate Russian public opinion. Kadomtsev explained in a personal phone interview that the Russian public strongly supported the war in Georgia because since South Ossetia had such a long history of autonomy, it had never really been considered a part of Georgia anyway. Kadomtsev’s account shows how even the Russian people considered the border dividing North and South Ossetia to be nothing but a meaningless line on a map, and that the ethnic reality does not respect political borders.
The Lies of the West
The West frequently does not keep its promises, and such promises can be the spark that ignites bloodshed. Three specific promises made and broken by the West have caused instability in both the Caucasus and the Middle East: the promise of independence to the Arab Revolt, the promise of an independent Kurdistan, and Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that “NATO will not expand one inch to the east."
Great Britain made promises to Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Arab revolt, in a series of letters known as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, promised Sharif Hussein on behalf of his country that “we confirm to you… our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants… [and that] Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif [sic] of Mecca” (McMahon, 1915). But two years before the end of the war, and while the Arabs were paying for their independence with their own blood, Great Britain and France decided to partition the Middle East between themselves instead in the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement and promised a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration (Milton-Edwards, 2006). The betrayal of the Arab revolt is at the root of the strong anti-Western sentiment felt throughout the Middle East and has fueled the conflagration of terrorism that now infests the region and has cost countless lives.
The Kurds also felt the brunt of the unfulfilled promises of the West. The Treaty of Sevres, signed by fourteen different nations (including the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, and Great Britain) made the following promises in Article 62 and 64:
A Commission sitting at Constantinople… shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas… If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey… Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.
The Treaty of Sevres was annulled and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne after Mustafa Kemal Pasha led a successful overthrow of the sultan and seized power in a nationalist government (Columbia, 2009). In the new settlement, the Kurds were abandoned to fend for themselves. Their attempts to obtain their independence have cost many lives, as they have fought in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey over a period of many years. In Iraq, they were attacked with chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein. After they were encouraged to revolt in 1991 by the West “the US administration quickly abandoned the Kurds, one White House analyst summing the situation up: ‘It probably sounds callous, but we did the best thing not to get near [the Kurdish revolt]. They’re nice people, and they’re cute, but they’re really just bandits. They spend as much time fighting each other as central authority. They’re losers’” (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 233).
The recent 2008 war in Georgia and the loss of life there was at least partially caused by another broken promise. In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Gorbachev, “if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east" (Bradley, 2009). But NATO now includes much of Eastern Europe. President Putin referenced this incident when he said “A powerful military bloc appearing near our borders will be perceived in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. Statements claiming that this process is not directed against Russia are not satisfactory to us. National security is not built on promises, especially since we have had similar promises prior to the previous waves of the bloc’s expansion” (Russia Today, 2008).
If NATO had kept its promise made to Gorbachev, Russia would not have felt such a need to intervene in South Ossetia and invade Georgia itself. The Georgia war in 2008 was about more than just ethnic tensions; it was also about showing the world that America cannot always protect its client states (Friedman, 2008). It is unlikely that Russia would have taken such strong action if NATO encirclement was not threatening its vital security interests.
Muslim Fundamentalism and Terrorism
The plague of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is a destabilizing influence throughout the world; this is particularly true in both the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Chechnya is primarily a Muslim country; Islam was strongly established in Chechnya during the eighteenth century (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 31). Religious tensions with the Russian Christians in the era of the Tsars and later the anti-religious sentiment of the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the continued violence in Chechnya. In 1919 Uzum Haji, a Chechen jihadist who led a force against the White Army, showed by his words of hatred that no lasting peace would ensue: “I weave a rope to hang engineers, students and all those who write from left to right” (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 21). That same hatred has continued to fuel the violence both in Chechnya and the rest of the Caucasus.
Russian troops fought a bloody and vicious war in Chechnya from 1994 until 1996. Despite overwhelming military superiority, Moscow lost to an underequipped and undermanned guerrilla insurgency that often used terrorism to achieve its goals. In the face of huge casualties, they withdrew, making Chechnya a de-facto independent republic for a time (Toft, 2003, p. 79). Matthew Evangelista explained the result of such a settlement thus: “The lessons learned by many Chechens- at least the ones with guns- were that Russia is vulnerable to terrorist acts, that the Russian people are easily demoralized, and that their leaders will heed their views and withdraw as the costs mount” (2003). This same idea and strategy was applied against the United States throughout the 1990s. It was not until the attacks of September 11, 2001 that American leaders finally stopped giving in to terrorists when the casualties mounted.
Hamas and Hezbollah are two other excellent examples of the destabilizing influence of terrorist organizations. Hamas has prevented a peace settlement with Israel and executes moderates as collaborators, while Hezbollah provoked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. Both groups enjoy wide popular support and show the power allegiance to non-state actors can provide.
Geographic Issues
In both the Caucasus and the Middle East, geographic issues make lasting compromises and settlements very difficult. Two specific examples include Chechnya and the Golan Heights.
Russia will never let go of Chechnya or allow Georgia to regain control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia because of one simple geopolitical reality: the Caucasus is a crucial and vital national security interest for Russia. The Caucasus Mountains provide an area that is easy for the Russians to defend from an invasion from Turkey or Iran. If Russia lost these mountains, it would be much more difficult to defend the southern border. (Friedman, 2009, p. 107). Given Russia’s history of being invaded, the Russians have reason to be concerned.
Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since 1967, when it seized the territory from Syria in the Six-Day War. The Golan Heights were used by Syria to attack Israeli targets with artillery prior to that conflict (Strategic Forecasting, 2008). Thus, the Golan Heights are an important buffer zone for Israel, and it is extremely important for Israel strategically to prevent Syrian artillery from being able to reach Israeli settlements again. The recent rocket attacks on Haifa by Hezbollah reinforce the importance of not giving up high ground that can be used to shell Israel. Therefore, the geographic issues here make a lasting peace agreement very difficult.
Conclusion
What becomes clear as we study the two regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus is that instability and violence often have the same causes throughout the world: borders that do not reflect ethnic and cultural divisions, broken promises and treaties, geographic issues and the growing power of non-state actors. The violence in the Middle East and the Caucasus are symptoms of global problems with no easy solutions.
References
Bradley, B. (2009). A diplomatic mystery. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery.
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia. (2009). Lausanne, Treaty of. Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 1. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
Evangelista, M. (2003). Chechnya’s Russia problem. Current History 102(666). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Friedman, G. (2008). The Russo-Georgian War and the balance of power. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and _ balance_power.
Friedman, G. (2009). The Next 100 Years. New York: Anchor Books.
Gall, C., & de Waal, T. (1998). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.
Geostrategy-Direct. (2010, June 16). Iran cracks down on Kurd villages with help from Turkish intelligence. Geo-Strategy Direct, p. 3. Retrieved from International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center database.
King, C. (2010). The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. New York: Oxford University Press.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
McMahon, H. & Hussein. (1915). McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Retrieved from http://www.mideastweb.org/mcmahon.htm.
O’Toole, P. (1999). A people divided by borders. BBC News World: Europe. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/218849.stm.
Russia Today. (2008). NATO expansion a ‘direct threat to Russia.’ Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT6Us.
Strategic Forecasting. (2008). Israel, Syria: swapping the Golan Heights for peace? Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from stratfor.com archives.
Toft, M. D. (2003). The geography of ethnic violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Treaty of Sevres. (1920). Retrieved from http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_ I,_Articles_1_-_260.
Colonial Borders Spark Ethnic Tension
Throughout the world, the European colonial powers drew arbitrary national borders without considering the ethnic or cultural makeup of the region in question. This practice is the source of many of today’s conflicts, which are overwhelmingly ethnic in nature. The division of ethnic groups by artificial borders has sparked armed struggles in both the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Milton-Edwards explained that “the process of modernization introduced by the colonial powers resulted in social dislocation, with traditional tribal powers undermined by a new class of urban notables… and the creation of new states such as Iraq and Jordan where boundaries took no account of pre-existing ethnic, religious, and tribal configurations… giving the entire area an artificial identity which it has spent more than a century coming to terms with…The new map that emerged resulted in the artificial creation of new states to which its citizens felt little or no sense of loyalty or identity” (2006, p. 18, 25).
The Kurds provide an excellent example of the consequences of the arbitrary decisions of the colonial powers. The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group of some twenty million people, with their own language and culture distinct from their neighbors. Yet the boundaries set by Europe divide them between Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (O’Toole, 1999). The Kurds’ agitation for independence and autonomy has overflowed into violence, and some Kurdish organizations operate as terrorist groups against targets in their respective countries. As a result, the nation-states in the region coordinate their retaliation against the Kurds, as occurred just this year, when Iran organized a crackdown on Kurdish villages, made possible by access to Turkish intelligence (Geo-Strategy Direct, 2010).
Lebanon provides another example in the Middle East, where instability has resulted from combining six different and distinct ethnic groups into one country. The Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, Armenians, and Greek Orthodox Christians were combined as the French mandate of Lebanon (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 26). With a weak state and the society divided, civil war was the inevitable result (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 223), plunging Lebanon into fifteen years of bloodshed.
Milton-Edwards explained that “Tribal sheikhs were often perceived as a significant hindrance to the difficult task of state-building in the new states of Arabia” (2006, p. 29). The same problems are seen in the Caucasus. Chechens also have a strong clan-based social structure that ties individuals to a large family and to the land itself; these relationships, combined with their ties to Islam, have prevented Chechen assimilation into Russian society (Gall & de Waal, 1998).
We also see the toll in suffering that comes from arbitrary borders in Georgia. As recently as 2008, war erupted in Georgia from a long-standing ethnic dispute between the Ossetians and the Georgians.
The Ossetians have always been an ethnic group distinct from the Georgians. The Ossetians were a Christian people whose settlement and growth southward into Georgia was encouraged and directed by the Russian empire in the 18th century so they could serve as a buffer zone to protect Russians from highlander attacks in the Caucasus (King, 2010, p. 9 and 68). Thus the Ossetians have a pattern of looking to Russia as a patron and protector for nearly three hundred years. Ossetia was given a special autonomous status within the Soviet Union, united with Georgia by treaty but became quite accustomed to managing its own affairs (King, 2010, p. 188).
The Ossetians themselves were divided by the Russian-Georgian border into North and South Ossetia; at the time this division didn’t seem that important, since they were all still part of the Soviet Union. Suddenly a border that was intended only as an administrative division became a permanent national border. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Georgia shifted to the Western sphere of influence, tensions were bound to rise with the Russian-aligned Ossetians.
Tensions in South Ossetia spilled over into violence when South Ossetia demanded greater autonomy and Georgia responded by revoking the autonomous district status South Ossetia had previously had. This conflict lasted from 1990-1992 and ended in an unresolved cease-fire with de facto, unrecognized, Russian-backed independence (King, 2010, 216-217). The conflicts of Soviet succession left Georgia without actual control of a sizeable portion of its national territory.
In 2008, Georgia moved troops to occupy South Ossetia and put an end to its de facto independence; Russia responded by driving the Georgians out of the contested area and invading Georgia itself (Friedman, 2008).
Dmitry Kadomtsev, a Russian-born American citizen was in St. Petersburg visiting his family during the 2008 war in Georgia, and his account helps to illustrate Russian public opinion. Kadomtsev explained in a personal phone interview that the Russian public strongly supported the war in Georgia because since South Ossetia had such a long history of autonomy, it had never really been considered a part of Georgia anyway. Kadomtsev’s account shows how even the Russian people considered the border dividing North and South Ossetia to be nothing but a meaningless line on a map, and that the ethnic reality does not respect political borders.
The Lies of the West
The West frequently does not keep its promises, and such promises can be the spark that ignites bloodshed. Three specific promises made and broken by the West have caused instability in both the Caucasus and the Middle East: the promise of independence to the Arab Revolt, the promise of an independent Kurdistan, and Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that “NATO will not expand one inch to the east."
Great Britain made promises to Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Arab revolt, in a series of letters known as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, promised Sharif Hussein on behalf of his country that “we confirm to you… our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants… [and that] Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif [sic] of Mecca” (McMahon, 1915). But two years before the end of the war, and while the Arabs were paying for their independence with their own blood, Great Britain and France decided to partition the Middle East between themselves instead in the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement and promised a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration (Milton-Edwards, 2006). The betrayal of the Arab revolt is at the root of the strong anti-Western sentiment felt throughout the Middle East and has fueled the conflagration of terrorism that now infests the region and has cost countless lives.
The Kurds also felt the brunt of the unfulfilled promises of the West. The Treaty of Sevres, signed by fourteen different nations (including the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, and Great Britain) made the following promises in Article 62 and 64:
A Commission sitting at Constantinople… shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas… If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey… Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.
The Treaty of Sevres was annulled and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne after Mustafa Kemal Pasha led a successful overthrow of the sultan and seized power in a nationalist government (Columbia, 2009). In the new settlement, the Kurds were abandoned to fend for themselves. Their attempts to obtain their independence have cost many lives, as they have fought in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey over a period of many years. In Iraq, they were attacked with chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein. After they were encouraged to revolt in 1991 by the West “the US administration quickly abandoned the Kurds, one White House analyst summing the situation up: ‘It probably sounds callous, but we did the best thing not to get near [the Kurdish revolt]. They’re nice people, and they’re cute, but they’re really just bandits. They spend as much time fighting each other as central authority. They’re losers’” (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 233).
The recent 2008 war in Georgia and the loss of life there was at least partially caused by another broken promise. In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Gorbachev, “if you remove your troops and allow unification of Germany in NATO, NATO will not expand one inch to the east" (Bradley, 2009). But NATO now includes much of Eastern Europe. President Putin referenced this incident when he said “A powerful military bloc appearing near our borders will be perceived in Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country. Statements claiming that this process is not directed against Russia are not satisfactory to us. National security is not built on promises, especially since we have had similar promises prior to the previous waves of the bloc’s expansion” (Russia Today, 2008).
If NATO had kept its promise made to Gorbachev, Russia would not have felt such a need to intervene in South Ossetia and invade Georgia itself. The Georgia war in 2008 was about more than just ethnic tensions; it was also about showing the world that America cannot always protect its client states (Friedman, 2008). It is unlikely that Russia would have taken such strong action if NATO encirclement was not threatening its vital security interests.
Muslim Fundamentalism and Terrorism
The plague of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is a destabilizing influence throughout the world; this is particularly true in both the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Chechnya is primarily a Muslim country; Islam was strongly established in Chechnya during the eighteenth century (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 31). Religious tensions with the Russian Christians in the era of the Tsars and later the anti-religious sentiment of the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the continued violence in Chechnya. In 1919 Uzum Haji, a Chechen jihadist who led a force against the White Army, showed by his words of hatred that no lasting peace would ensue: “I weave a rope to hang engineers, students and all those who write from left to right” (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 21). That same hatred has continued to fuel the violence both in Chechnya and the rest of the Caucasus.
Russian troops fought a bloody and vicious war in Chechnya from 1994 until 1996. Despite overwhelming military superiority, Moscow lost to an underequipped and undermanned guerrilla insurgency that often used terrorism to achieve its goals. In the face of huge casualties, they withdrew, making Chechnya a de-facto independent republic for a time (Toft, 2003, p. 79). Matthew Evangelista explained the result of such a settlement thus: “The lessons learned by many Chechens- at least the ones with guns- were that Russia is vulnerable to terrorist acts, that the Russian people are easily demoralized, and that their leaders will heed their views and withdraw as the costs mount” (2003). This same idea and strategy was applied against the United States throughout the 1990s. It was not until the attacks of September 11, 2001 that American leaders finally stopped giving in to terrorists when the casualties mounted.
Hamas and Hezbollah are two other excellent examples of the destabilizing influence of terrorist organizations. Hamas has prevented a peace settlement with Israel and executes moderates as collaborators, while Hezbollah provoked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. Both groups enjoy wide popular support and show the power allegiance to non-state actors can provide.
Geographic Issues
In both the Caucasus and the Middle East, geographic issues make lasting compromises and settlements very difficult. Two specific examples include Chechnya and the Golan Heights.
Russia will never let go of Chechnya or allow Georgia to regain control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia because of one simple geopolitical reality: the Caucasus is a crucial and vital national security interest for Russia. The Caucasus Mountains provide an area that is easy for the Russians to defend from an invasion from Turkey or Iran. If Russia lost these mountains, it would be much more difficult to defend the southern border. (Friedman, 2009, p. 107). Given Russia’s history of being invaded, the Russians have reason to be concerned.
Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since 1967, when it seized the territory from Syria in the Six-Day War. The Golan Heights were used by Syria to attack Israeli targets with artillery prior to that conflict (Strategic Forecasting, 2008). Thus, the Golan Heights are an important buffer zone for Israel, and it is extremely important for Israel strategically to prevent Syrian artillery from being able to reach Israeli settlements again. The recent rocket attacks on Haifa by Hezbollah reinforce the importance of not giving up high ground that can be used to shell Israel. Therefore, the geographic issues here make a lasting peace agreement very difficult.
Conclusion
What becomes clear as we study the two regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus is that instability and violence often have the same causes throughout the world: borders that do not reflect ethnic and cultural divisions, broken promises and treaties, geographic issues and the growing power of non-state actors. The violence in the Middle East and the Caucasus are symptoms of global problems with no easy solutions.
References
Bradley, B. (2009). A diplomatic mystery. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery.
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia. (2009). Lausanne, Treaty of. Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 1. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.
Evangelista, M. (2003). Chechnya’s Russia problem. Current History 102(666). Retrieved from the ProQuest index.
Friedman, G. (2008). The Russo-Georgian War and the balance of power. Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and _ balance_power.
Friedman, G. (2009). The Next 100 Years. New York: Anchor Books.
Gall, C., & de Waal, T. (1998). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.
Geostrategy-Direct. (2010, June 16). Iran cracks down on Kurd villages with help from Turkish intelligence. Geo-Strategy Direct, p. 3. Retrieved from International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center database.
King, C. (2010). The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. New York: Oxford University Press.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
McMahon, H. & Hussein. (1915). McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Retrieved from http://www.mideastweb.org/mcmahon.htm.
O’Toole, P. (1999). A people divided by borders. BBC News World: Europe. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/218849.stm.
Russia Today. (2008). NATO expansion a ‘direct threat to Russia.’ Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV0jbfVT6Us.
Strategic Forecasting. (2008). Israel, Syria: swapping the Golan Heights for peace? Strategic Forecasting. Retrieved from stratfor.com archives.
Toft, M. D. (2003). The geography of ethnic violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Treaty of Sevres. (1920). Retrieved from http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_ I,_Articles_1_-_260.
Water Shortages in the Middle East (7/18/2010)
The Middle East is facing water shortages throughout the region, due to rapid population growth in an area with little water to begin with. In large part this could be alleviated by importing food supplies from countries that can produce it with less irrigation than the Middle East, thereby freeing up irrigation water for other uses, but this move also increases dependence on foreign trade for even basic needs, something that does not sit well with many leaders.
Two countries in particular are facing a water crisis: Jordan and Oman. Jordan’s water situation is dire because even if all of the water previously used for irrigation during the 1990s was redirected to the cities, it would not be enough to meet projected urban demand (Beaumont, 2002, p. 331). Another issue is that Jordan has been pumping out far more ground water than can be replaced (Beaumont, 2002, p. 331). This is an unsustainable pattern that cannot continue forever. Unlike many other countries in the region, Jordan cannot resolve this problem on its own. With no coastline, desalinization is not possible for them, at least not directly. Any solution for Jordan will require a third party. Beaumont says that it is possible Lebanon might be able to help Jordan by supplying Israel with more water to Lake Kinneret, thereby allowing Jordan to take more water from the Yarmouk (2002, p. 331). It is unlikely in today’s political climate for such cooperation between a Jewish state and Lebanon to take place A more likely solution would be for Jordan to fund desalinization facilities with Israeli cooperation near Aqaba and build a pipeline to carry the water back east to Jordan (2002, p. 331).
Oman is also facing a water crisis, although their crisis is not as severe or imminent as Jordan’s. To meet its projected urban demand, Oman will have to divert 61% of irrigation water to the cities, a move that will disrupt local agriculture and is at best a short term solution. Oman, like Jordan, also has been extracting ground water at a rate far beyond sustainable levels, and when the wells begin to dry up, Oman will have only one possible solution to its water shortage: desalinization to meet its expanding urban demand for water (Beaumont, 2002, p. 332).
Reference
Beaumont, P. (2002). Water policies for the Middle East in the 21st century: The new economic realities. Water Resources Development 18(2). Accessed from APUS online classroom.
Two countries in particular are facing a water crisis: Jordan and Oman. Jordan’s water situation is dire because even if all of the water previously used for irrigation during the 1990s was redirected to the cities, it would not be enough to meet projected urban demand (Beaumont, 2002, p. 331). Another issue is that Jordan has been pumping out far more ground water than can be replaced (Beaumont, 2002, p. 331). This is an unsustainable pattern that cannot continue forever. Unlike many other countries in the region, Jordan cannot resolve this problem on its own. With no coastline, desalinization is not possible for them, at least not directly. Any solution for Jordan will require a third party. Beaumont says that it is possible Lebanon might be able to help Jordan by supplying Israel with more water to Lake Kinneret, thereby allowing Jordan to take more water from the Yarmouk (2002, p. 331). It is unlikely in today’s political climate for such cooperation between a Jewish state and Lebanon to take place A more likely solution would be for Jordan to fund desalinization facilities with Israeli cooperation near Aqaba and build a pipeline to carry the water back east to Jordan (2002, p. 331).
Oman is also facing a water crisis, although their crisis is not as severe or imminent as Jordan’s. To meet its projected urban demand, Oman will have to divert 61% of irrigation water to the cities, a move that will disrupt local agriculture and is at best a short term solution. Oman, like Jordan, also has been extracting ground water at a rate far beyond sustainable levels, and when the wells begin to dry up, Oman will have only one possible solution to its water shortage: desalinization to meet its expanding urban demand for water (Beaumont, 2002, p. 332).
Reference
Beaumont, P. (2002). Water policies for the Middle East in the 21st century: The new economic realities. Water Resources Development 18(2). Accessed from APUS online classroom.
National identity in the Middle East (Written May 16, 2010)
National identity based on a pluralist, secular state with constitutional guarantees of protection for ethnic, tribal, and sectarian minorities has the greatest potential for social coherence in the Middle East. In the film Lawrence of Arabia, Colonel Lawrence makes a bold statement:
“So long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long will they be a little people, a silly people - greedy, barbarous, and cruel, as you are.”
As the peoples in the Middle East have fought tribe against tribe, Sunni against Shiite, Arab against Jew, the toll in human suffering has been catastrophic; but politically, such internal conflict has ensured that the Middle East remain backward and unable to compete with the rest of the world economically or militarily. Our text states that “Consociationalism – power-sharing, grand coalition of government, proportional representation, community autonomy and constitutional vetoes for minorities… could offer the best chance of maintaining nation-states in the region” (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 231). The violence in Palestine is a perfect example of what happens without consociationalism; the Palestinians were denied any meaningful means of political participation or peaceful means of change and the result has been unending violence. Iraq has an opportunity to become an example for the Middle East of cooperation and peaceful coexistence for diverse ethnic groups, with a Kurdish president and a Shiite prime minister, but such an opportunity has only come as a result of Western intervention and remains dependent on American security guarantees. Secular and pluralist nation states are the best hope for stability in the Middle East.
References
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
“So long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long will they be a little people, a silly people - greedy, barbarous, and cruel, as you are.”
As the peoples in the Middle East have fought tribe against tribe, Sunni against Shiite, Arab against Jew, the toll in human suffering has been catastrophic; but politically, such internal conflict has ensured that the Middle East remain backward and unable to compete with the rest of the world economically or militarily. Our text states that “Consociationalism – power-sharing, grand coalition of government, proportional representation, community autonomy and constitutional vetoes for minorities… could offer the best chance of maintaining nation-states in the region” (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 231). The violence in Palestine is a perfect example of what happens without consociationalism; the Palestinians were denied any meaningful means of political participation or peaceful means of change and the result has been unending violence. Iraq has an opportunity to become an example for the Middle East of cooperation and peaceful coexistence for diverse ethnic groups, with a Kurdish president and a Shiite prime minister, but such an opportunity has only come as a result of Western intervention and remains dependent on American security guarantees. Secular and pluralist nation states are the best hope for stability in the Middle East.
References
Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary politics in the Middle East. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press.
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