Feeding Poland to the Bear

Dmitri Rogozin, the Russian envoy to NATO, speaking of a NATO defense plan for the Baltic states, recently asked, “Against who else could such a defense be intended? Against Sweden, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, against polar bears, or against the Russian bear?”[1] It was a rhetorical question with an obvious answer; for Poland, the Russian bear is a very real threat to their security. Unfortunately for them, the Obama administration is ignoring a vital rule of campers everywhere: “Don’t feed the bear!”

Obama’s decision to trade the long term security and trust of Poland for short term Russian concessions in the Middle East is damaging both to the credibility of American promises and to our own security.

The Geopolitical Context of Poland and the Russian Resurgence

The United States and Poland have important common interests, but “the Poles… are deeply concerned that Washington doesn’t understand the issues.”[2] The most critical misunderstanding is the geopolitical context of Poland and the importance and reality of the Russian resurgence to power.

Poland sits on the Northern European plain, a region with no significant natural barriers that has been the route of choice for armies invading Russia since the Napoleonic Wars.[3] Historically, Russia’s solution to this problem has been to establish buffer states on its Western frontier, and Russia has been trying to do so again in recent times. The Russians know they must act now, because their declining population means that in twenty years it will be too late for Russia to find the soldiers it needs to redraw the map of Eastern Europe.[4]

The Russian intelligence service has been working hard in the Ukraine, and has scored an important strategic victory. The recent 2010 elections there brought a president that reversed the effects of the Orange Revolution and has tied his country closer to Russia.[5] Belarus is still aligned closely with Russia, due in part to the fact that it is still a centralized, authoritarian state and much less reformed than its neighbors.[6] This ensures that Poland’s eastern border will be a significant point of conflict during the Russian resurgence:

“From the Russian point of view, the major invasion route into their country is not only wide open but also in the hands of countries with a pronounced hostility to Russia. The Baltic countries have never forgiven Russia for their occupation. The Poles are equally bitter and deeply distrustful of Russian intentions. Now that they are part of NATO, these countries form the front line... The Polish Northern Plains will be the main line of confrontation.”[7]

NATO’s Growing Irrelevance in Eastern Europe

NATO is increasingly divided on the Russian question. Western Europe, especially France and Germany, are more concerned with ensuring they can rely on their Russian sources of natural gas than they are with the security of Central and Eastern Europe.[8] The major “problem for the alliance is that there is no longer a unifying fear tying its member states together. The Central Europeans still fear Russia,” but the older members of NATO do not.[9] France is even trying to sell an advanced helicopter carrier to Russia that would directly threaten the security of their Eastern NATO “allies.”[10] These developments have forced the Poles to refocus their security plans from NATO to bilateral ties with the United States.

The US and Poland have common security interests, because “the single greatest American fear should not be China or al-Qaeda. It is the amalgamation of the European Peninsula’s technology with Russia’s natural resources. That would create a power that could challenge American primacy.”[11] This was understood by many previous presidents and underlies the purpose of America’s entry into both world wars and the Cold War,[12] but something entirely ignored by President Obama.

Pulling the Plug on European Missile Defense

In September 2009, President Obama reversed US plans to deploy a land-based missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, opting instead for a ship based system that is reputed to be more flexible and mobile that will “bring more options to world leaders.”[13] President Obama has consistently denied that the change in policy was intended to appease Russia, which has been hostile to the plan from the beginning,[14] but the reality is quite different.

In March 2009, it was revealed that President Obama had sent a secret letter to Moscow, which said that if Russia would support US action against Iran in the Middle East, the US would back away from missile defense in Europe.[15] The reversal on missile defense has been perceived by Eastern European governments as an attempt to get Russia to cooperate with American goals in the Middle East, and the Russian government itself has said that the reversal was directly linked to Russian permission for resupply routes to Afghanistan through Russia and Central Asia and that they were expecting further concessions from America.[16] Even Obama’s supporters admit that from this reversal the Russians will “take to heart the lesson that belligerence pays.”[17] Obama’s denial of any quid pro quo with Russia is simply a lie.

To demonstrate that the US still cared about Polish security, a single American Patriot missile battery was deployed to Poland. This token gesture turned out to be a joke when it was discovered that it would not have any live missiles, causing the enraged Poles to say that “they had expected an operational weapon, not ‘potted plants.’”[18]

What President Obama has done is to turn his back on one of the most loyal allies America has in the world today for short-term concessions in the Middle East. The Polish president explained that Poland has “no interests either in Iraq or Afghanistan,” and it is clear that Poland bled for America in both those wars because it expected the United States to guarantee its security.[19] Why do we maintain so many bases in Germany, a nation that has consistently opposed US policy in many areas, and are so unwilling to base troops in a nation like Poland where we are far more welcome?

Recent Russian decisions are showing their true intentions, and why we should not be feeding the bear. They have moved a large number of tactical nuclear warheads to NATO borders,[20] they continue to provide military and technical support to Iran,[21] and only two years ago invaded their neighbor Georgia, “underscoring just how credible its threats could be and striking fresh fear throughout Eastern Europe.”[22]

Obama’s reversal of American policy will have long term diplomatic consequences for America. There has to be some continuity between administrations, independent of ideology, and presidents should not casually throw away agreements made by their predecessors:

“Diplomacy by ‘reset’ damages our alliances in the long run and may do even worse to our relationships with hostile countries… The main problem in treating the world as if it began with Obama is that it doesn’t end with Obama, and our foes know it. As U.S. administrations come and go, the same strongmen, oligarchs, despots, theocrats, and absolute monarchs continue to rule most countries hostile to America. Given their long planning horizons, why should they make any irreversible concessions in return for only temporary commitments from America? If the next U.S. president might offer a better bargain, back out on a joint project, or forgive all past sins, elementary principles of game theory dictate that foreign despots stay their course. When trust—the paramount currency of diplomacy—starts to erode, only force retains full purchasing power. It is ironic that Obama… is pioneering methods of diplomacy that…will render military interventions more necessary, and more likely, by undermining their only alternative—namely, trust and long-term agreements… In justifying the abrogation of the missile-defense treaties so casually, Obama cannot but do his own legacy a disservice. No American president gets to have the last word. For the blank slate he has cleared for himself at his predecessor’s expense, Obama will pay by seeing future presidents undo his work on a whim. And as a result of his revisionist stunt, neither this country’s friends nor its enemies can know what to expect from the United States.”[23]

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[1] Strategic Forecasting, “Who Fears the Russian Bear?” Stratfor Geopolitical Diary, December 8, 2010.

[2] George Friedman, “Borderlands,” Stratfor Geopolitical Journey, November 9, 2010.

[3] George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21^st Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 103.

[4] George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21^st Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 104.

[5] George Friedman, “Moldova,” Stratfor Geopolitical Journey, November 18, 2010.

[6] George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21^st Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 113.

[7] George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21^st Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 114, 119.

[8] Strategic Forecasting, “NATO: An Inadequate Strategic Concept?” November 22, 2010.

[9] Strategic Forecasting, “Central Europe Reacts to NATO’s Strategic Concept,” Stratfor Geopolitical Diary, November 23, 2010.

[10] Strategic Forecasting, “NATO: An Inadequate Strategic Concept?” November 22, 2010.

[11] George Friedman, “Borderlands,” Stratfor Geopolitical Journey, November 9, 2010.

[12] George Friedman, “Poland,” Stratfor Geopolitical Journey, December 3, 2010.

[13] Alan B. Hicks & Scott C. Truver. 2010, "Ship-Based BMD," Military Technology 34, no. 8: 21-25.

[14] Elizabeth Zolotukhina, 2010, "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Plans, Old Challenges," Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2: 39-44.

[15] Peter Baker, “Obama Offered Deal To Russia in Secret Letter,” New York Times, March 2, 2009.

[16] Elizabeth Zolotukhina, 2010, "Ballistic Missile Defense: New Plans, Old Challenges," Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2: 39-44.

[17] Mark Fitzpatrick, 2009, "A Prudent Decision on Missile Defence." Survival (00396338) 51, no. 6: 5-12.

[18] Ian Traynor, “Wikileaks cables: Poland furious over getting ‘potted plants’, not missiles” Guardian, December 6, 2010.

[19] Strategic Forecasting, “Poland Examines its Defense Partnership Options.” December 9, 2010.

[20] Adam Entous & Jonathan Weisman, “Russian Missiles Fuel U.S. Worries,” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2010.

[21] Strategic Forecasting, “NATO: An Inadequate Strategic Concept?” November 22, 2010.

[22] Kedja Gjermani, 2009, “The Missile Defense Betrayal,” Commentary 128, no. 5: 23-27.

[23] Kedja Gjermani, 2009, “The Missile Defense Betrayal,” Commentary 128, no. 5: 23-27.

THAILAND: AN INDEPENDENT STATE?

Thailand (formerly Siam) is unique among Southeast Asian states because it was able to avoid being directly colonized by a Western power. This is a source of great national pride for the Thai people. What made Thailand better equipped to resist Western imperialist ambitions? Thailand was able to escape direct colonization because of the wise statesmanship of its kings and the regional balance of power between the French and British. However, despite avoiding direct colonization, Thailand was still affected by colonial influences and has been classified as a semi-colonial state by many scholars.

Compromises on the Road to Modernization

Prior to 1932, Siam was ruled by an absolute monarchy, and the king was able to make decisions without parliamentary interference.[1] King Mongkut recognized that he could not defeat the West militarily, so “he decided to bend before the tempest… without bluster or equivocation.”^[2] He compromised where he had to in order to ensure national survival, and took specific steps towards modernizing Siam so it could be considered civilized and maintain its independence.^[3] The royal point of view was that “Siam must be made into a modern state, but gradually and by Siamese, not forcibly by Europeans. While western ideas and methods must be taken over, the old values which lay in Siamese culture must not be destroyed. Siam must maintain its integrity as a nation and must never cease to be Siamese.”[4]

The Siamese king made compromises with the West in three critical areas: extraterritoriality agreements, unequal trade agreements, and relinquishing territory to both Britain and France. The extraterritoriality agreements meant that foreign nationals accused of crimes were not subject to Siamese law, but instead would be judged by Western embassy officials.[5] These agreements had unexpected results for Siam, because they were held to include Burmese and Vietnamese natives that were being ruled by Britain and France as well as European and American nationals and thus compromised Siamese sovereignty. After 1855, a large number of migrant workers from such countries came to Siam and enjoyed consular protection from Siamese officials. [6] In one infamous case, a Siamese policeman was ordered off a Western owned tram by its driver when he tried to arrest a Siamese woman for theft because he did not have consular approval for such an arrest on Western property. The driver, who was later charged with obstructing police in the execution of their duty, was ultimately judged by his consulate, not by the law of Siam.[7]

The king of Siam also accepted unequal trade agreements with various Western countries that implemented a three percent tariff and allowed unfettered Western access to the Siamese market.[8] This proved to be a critical decision for Siam’s survival as a nation, because the British government ultimately did not care about political control in Thailand so long as British economic interests were served.[9]

The Siamese monarch also capitulated to both the British and French in territorial matters by relinquishing territory. In 1893, during the Paknam crisis, the French were granted their demand (backed up by gunboats in range of Bangkok) of specific tributary territories to the east of Thailand then ruled by the Thai king.[10] In 1909, the British were granted control of the four Malay states in the north.[11] It is important to note, however, that both these capitulations involved territory that would best be considered Thai colonies, not parts of the Thai national homeland itself.

Having thus ensured the survival of Siam through these critical compromises with the West, the king sought to modernize the Siamese state, so that one day it could renegotiate with the West on a more equal footing. King Mongkut began the modernization process by ensuring a western education for his children, by bringing Mrs. Leonowens from Singapore to Siam as their teacher.[12] Mongkut’s son, Chulalongkorn, traveled to India to study British colonial administration there and adapt their methods to his own rule in Siam. [13]

Chulalongkorn greatly expanded the Siamese bureaucracy, in keeping with what he learned in India. He added foreign affairs, interior, justice, finance, public education, agriculture, commerce, war and marine ministries to his newly formed Cabinet Council. A truly independent judiciary (a metric used worldwide to measure governments) was established, along with modern codes of law. The king retained veto power on executions.[14] He also invested deeply in infrastructure projects, adding rail lines, irrigation systems, public education and a small air force used for civil aviation purposes.[15] At the beginning of this modernization process, Siam did not have the necessary human capital to manage these projects, so Chulalongkorn hired many foreigners as administrators to get things started.[16]

The modernization of the state changed the way the West looked at Siam. Now considered more “civilized,” Siam was able to renegotiate and abolish the unfair trade treaties and extraterritoriality agreements that had previously compromised its sovereignty and thus returned greater autonomy and control to their nation-state.[17]

Eldon James explained the effect of these modernization projects thus:

Siam had secured its recognition as a modern state. It had met the west and had not been submerged. A new state had developed in place of the medieval one of King Mongkut’s time. And yet, notwithstanding the assimilation of western progress, Siam remains Siamese. The best of her own ancient culture is intact.[18]

Thailand: A Semi-colony?

Marxist and post-Marxist scholars used the term semi-colonialism to define Siam’s relationship with the West.[19] The term was first applied to Thailand by the leader of the Thai Communist party when he wrote Thailand: A Semicolony. This work was not widely read until the period of 1973-1976, when Thailand was more open and free for a short time. Most of the semicolonial talk during this period was based on Marxist rhetoric, not true research.[20] Semicolonial scholars counter that opposition to applying the idea of semicolonialism to Thailand comes from a strong monarchy with an interest in maintaining its own view of history, and that the “myth” of Thailand’s continued independence is pushed by the Thai political elite.[21] Nevertheless, the Marxist and post-Marxist writings raise some important questions.

Hong Lysa explained that “according to the conventional Thai view, the Siamese monarchs succeeded in keeping colonialism at bay by dint of their diplomatic skills and modernizing efforts, and actually strengthened the kingdom by forging a new relationship with their subjects based on the notion of nationhood.”[22] This conventional understanding of Thai history fails to address three specific points: that the economic exploitation of Siam by the West gave them the profits of colonialism without the costs of having to impose direct political rule, that royal rule in Siam amounted to internal colonialism, and that Siam survived as an independent nation-state in part because of the regional balance of power between France and Britain.

While they do admit that Thailand was not directly and formally colonized by the Western powers, semicolonial scholars point to the extraterritoriality agreements, cession of territory, and unfair trade treaties as examples of how Siam was exploited economically and robbed of its sovereignty in a fashion similar to actual colonies.[23] Hong Lysa supports this view when she said succinctly that the Thai economy was controlled by the West.[24] One could argue that leaving Thailand politically independent was actually a better deal for the Western powers, because it enabled them to reap the rewards and profits of a colony without incurring the costs and risks of direct colonial administration; in other words, the West outsourced colonialism to the royal government of Siam.

If we examine the policies of the monarchs of Siam, we can see what might be called “internal colonialism.” Siam’s absolute monarchy, while maintaining its own political autonomy from the west, “established itself as the hegemonic power in political, economic, and ideological terms” in internal affairs.[25] Bangkok imposed its will and exploited the Northern, Northeastern, and predominantly Muslim southern regions of Thailand; “to remain free from western domination the Siamese populace was enslaved to that monarchy in new ways.”[26] Some saw “monarchs as feudal exploiters rather than national saviors,”[27] and argue that Thailand was colonized by its own king. Siam had its own territorial ambitions, and the territory it ultimately ceded to Britain and France were areas where Thailand had ruled non-Thai peoples as informal colonies. Collaboration with the West was what allowed the king of Siam to remain in power.[28]

Ultimately, the absolute monarchy was overthrown by a military coup inside Thailand. This coup occurred in 1932 in response to concerns of nepotism by the king in his appointments, excessive corruption, unemployment, and general economic hardships of the people. The coup leaders went so far as to say:

People! Let it be known that our country belongs to the people and not to the king as was deceived. Our forefathers had rescued the freedom of the country from the hands of the enemy. The royalty only took advantage and gathered millions for themselves.

From the coup, we see that despite the relative success in dealing with the foreign imperialist powers, the king could not contain the unrest among his own people. It is important to note, however, that the military leaders who led the coup continued to push the “myth” of independence for their own political purposes and did not criticize the king’s dealings with the West directly.[29] The king has continued to play an important role in politics to this day but no longer is an absolute ruler.

The regional balance of power between France and Britain also reduced the incentive for either of these powers to directly colonize Thailand. Both of these powers wanted to have a buffer zone between their colonial possessions to reduce tensions, and Siam fit the bill nicely.[30] This idea of Siam as a buffer zone was made into a formal agreement between Great Britain and France by the Franco British Declaration of 1896.[31]

Conclusion

Claims of Thai uniqueness as the only country in Southeast Asia to avoid colonization must be tempered by the realization that the wave of colonialism still affected their country in dramatic ways. Recognizing the common influences between Thailand and its colonized neighbors also helps to explain why Thailand suffers from many of the same problems, including a long tradition of military intervention in politics, interventionist policies of the International Monetary Fund, and ethnic tensions that spill over into violence.

No one can reasonably expect a third world country like Siam to have defeated the West. The fact that the Thai state survived at all as an independent entity is testament to the wise statesmanship of their kings, even if such independence was somewhat mitigated by foreign influences. Ultimately, it is only the people of Thailand themselves who can judge whether they are better off having traded direct colonialism for royal oppression within their own country.

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[1] Eldon R. James, “Siam in the Modern World,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 659.

[2] Ibid, 660.

[3] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 317 & 324.

[4] Eldon R. James, “Siam in the Modern World,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 660.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 318.

[7] Ibid.

[8]Eldon R. James, “Siam in the Modern World,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 660.

[9] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 319.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid, 322.

[12] Eldon R. James, “Siam in the Modern World,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 660.

[13] Ibid, 661.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid, 662.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid, 664.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Peter A. Jackson, “Autonomy and subordination in Thai history: the case for semicolonial analysis.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8 (2007): 329.

[20] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 316.

[21] Ibid, 319.

[22] Ibid, 315.

[23] Peter A. Jackson, “Autonomy and subordination in Thai history: the case for semicolonial analysis.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8 (2007): 335.

[24] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 316.

[25]Peter A. Jackson, “Autonomy and subordination in Thai history: the case for semicolonial analysis.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8 (2007): 341.

[26] Ibid, 342.

[27] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 316.

[28] Ibid, 321.

[29] Ibid, 322.

[30] Eldon R. James, “Siam in the Modern World,” Foreign Affairs 9 (1931): 657.

[31] Hong Lysa, “Invisible Semicolony: the Postcolonial Condition and Royal National History in Thailand,” Postcolonial Studies 11 (2008): 321.